REACTION TO THE BREAKTHROUGH OF THE GERMAN ARMY GROUP "SOUTH" COMMAND At the headquarters of the German Army Group "South" a Pfeffer-Wildenbruch radiogram, which reported on the planned breakthrough, arrived at 19.45. However, until 22.30 the message was not passed on. Commander of the 6th German Army

3rd Panzer Group. Alytus

The location of the Soviet units in the Vilnius-Kaunas direction on the morning of June 22 was typical for the border armies. Of the four rifle divisions of the 11th Army, there was one regiment each on the border, and two battalions from the composition of the fifth rifle division. This curtain was opposed by five army corps of the German 16th and 9th armies, as well as two motorized corps of the 3rd tank group. Soviet rifle regiments stationed on the border were attacked by at least two infantry divisions each. In this regard, the general “dumbness” of Soviet artillery in the zone of the 3rd Panzer Group was, perhaps, most pronounced. The report of the group on the results of the battles stated: "On all sectors of the front, the enemy offered weak resistance, nowhere were the actions of enemy artillery" .

The offensive technique of German tank groups in the first days of the war with the USSR resembled the principle of operation of a tunneling shield. When laying tunnels, the knife ring of the shield is pressed into the ground, and then the soil cylinder limited by the ring is selected. German tank groups advanced with two motorized corps on the flanks and with their own formation and an army corps in the center. Tank formations made their way into the depths of the defense, and the infantry advancing in the center crushed the enemy caught between two deep penetrations. Such a formation made it possible to rationally use the road network and increased resistance to counterattacks - the outer flanks of the motorized corps were separated by a decent distance. It was not a trivial task to cut through the "tunneling shield" with flank strikes.

In the limited space in the Baltics, the formation of a "tunneling shield" was not used, and all other tank groups (3, 2 and 1) were built in this way. The outer flanks of the 3rd Panzer Group formed the XXXIX and LVII Motorized Corps, while the center was formed by the infantry of the V Army Corps. On the northern flank, the junction with the Army Group "North" was provided by the VI Army Corps. The point of attack of the XXXIX Motorized Corps was aimed at the crossing of the Neman at Alytus, and the 12th Panzer Division of the LVII Corps was moving towards the crossing of the same river at Merkine. An important advantage of the Goth tank group was the absence of water barriers right on the border. The tank groups of Guderian and Kleist had to cross the Bug, and there was no such obstacle on the way of the 3rd TGr.

The absence of the need to force a water barrier already in the first hours of hostilities made the advance of Goth's tanks and infantry especially rapid. Border fortifications were taken on the move. It was only the air reconnaissance report about small groups of Soviet troops retreating to the Neman that caused concern.

The task of the panzer divisions becomes the fastest possible breakthrough to the river before it becomes a stable line of defense.

The first to break through to the Neman was the 7th Panzer Division of the XXXIX Corps. Around one o'clock on June 22, she enters the western part of Alytus and captures both bridges across the Neman intact. Even in the non-emotional document, the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Group, regarding the capture of bridges, it is said: "No one counted on this." Later, the Germans wrote that an order was found from a captured Soviet sapper officer ordering to blow up the bridges at 19.00 on June 22. This allowed them to start arguing that "not a single Soviet military commander made an independent decision to destroy crossings and bridges." However, let's put ourselves in the place of this officer. Molotov's speech had just sounded on the radio. The first impression is shock. Deciding to blow up a bridge quite far from the border a few hours after the start of the war was not so easy. The deep breakthroughs of the enemy still had to get used to. In addition, Soviet units retreating from the border retreated across the bridges. Blowing bridges in front of them would be a bad idea. Two hours after a successful breakthrough to Alytus, luck smiles at the neighboring LVII Corps: motorcyclists capture the crossing at Merkin. All plans for the construction of crossings to replace those blown up, carefully worked out at Goth's headquarters, are laid aside with relief. It might seem that the war with the USSR would be another blitzkrieg.

It must be said that the Soviet version of the battle near Alytus differs significantly from the picture drawn by the Germans of the rapid capture of bridges. So, according to the article of the Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor M.V. Yezhov “Tank battle of the first day of the war”, the Germans were met with fire even on the outskirts of Alytus: “... by order of the command of the 11th Army, the 5th Panzer Division advanced to the western bank of the Neman to defend bridgehead positions ...” Accordingly, the bridges, according to this version , were taken in battle, with intensive aviation support: “... on the positions occupied by Soviet tankmen on the western bank of the Neman, the enemies brought down bombing strikes, artillery fire. They suffered heavy losses. Enemy tanks managed to break through the bridge to the eastern bank of the Neman south of Alytus. But they were immediately counterattacked by units of the 5th Panzer Division, which crushed the German tanks and broke into the city. Such a scenario did not really fit in with the subsequent advance of the Germans further towards Minsk. Therefore Comrade. Yezhov was again forced to throw the long-suffering Luftwaffe into battle: “The outcome of the battle was decided by enemy aircraft, which continuously attacked our tank units. Without air cover, they suffered heavy losses and by the end of the day were forced to withdraw again to the eastern bank of the Neman. Thus, the German Air Force becomes a miracle weapon, dispersing the tank formations of the Red Army with hundreds of tanks. Refusal to recognize the obvious, the loss of the crossing under a sudden blow, gives rise to the need for additional explanations. All these explanations begin to sound especially unconvincing against the backdrop of fifty T-34 tanks that were available in the 5th Panzer Division at the beginning of the war. People are wondering: “Okay, senseless counterattacks, but then the Germans themselves are on the rampage of pearls ?! Stop and shoot them from the spot!” On the move, another explanation for the general failure appears - the lack of armor-piercing shells in the T-34. All this hastily built building is collapsing as you try to figure out how the Luftwaffe has such inhuman efficiency? Then, on such omissions and exaggerations, conspiracy theories flourish.

Chief of Staff of the 3rd Mechanized Corps P.A. Rotmistrov, to whom Yezhov refers in his article, does not build any intricate causal relationships of failure. In his memoirs there is not a word about the battles on the outskirts of Alytus, on the western bank of the Neman. In the Steel Guard, Rotmistrov writes the following: “The division commander, Colonel F.F. Fedorov managed to advance to the bridge near Alytus only the artillery of the 5th motorized rifle regiment, a separate anti-aircraft artillery division and the 2nd battalion of the 9th tank regiment. Artillerymen and tankers, having let the enemy tanks in 200-300 meters, opened fire with direct fire. In 30-40 minutes of battle, they knocked out 16 enemy vehicles and temporarily detained a tank column of the 39th motorized fascist corps. In this version, there is no longer any contradiction with the documents of the 3rd TGr. The listed units of Colonel Fedorov's division advance to the bridge after it has been captured and delay the development of the offensive from the bridgehead on the eastern bank, knocking out a number of enemy tanks. With all the claims against Rotmistrov as a memoirist as a whole, here he does not give reason to doubt his words.

If the Soviet 5th Panzer Division had managed to reach the bridges near Alytus earlier, then crossing the Neman would have become a difficult task for the forward formations of the 3rd Panzer Group. They would have to wade through a certain number of different-sized tanks, and it is unlikely that she would have won the yellow jersey of the leader. However, Soviet tanks approached the bridges already when they were occupied by the Germans. Therefore, for the Soviet troops, the battle developed according to the "attack on the bridgehead" scenario, and not "defense of the bridgehead position." In the afternoon of June 22, the tankers of the division F.F. Fedorov launched a series of attacks on enemy bridgeheads, but they were all to no avail. The attacking T-34s were, of course, much more vulnerable than those occupying static positions, that is, the answer to the question "What happened to 50 T-34s?" takes on a simpler and more obvious answer.

On the other hand, German attempts to break out of the bridgeheads were also initially unsuccessful. The installation from above was appropriate, the command of the tank group planned "on the first day to move as far east of the Neman as possible." However, Soviet tankers took advantageous positions on the reverse slopes of the heights on the outskirts of Alytus. As the tanker of the 7th Panzer Division, Horst Orlov, recalled, an attempt to move east from the southern bridgehead immediately led to the loss of six tanks. They fell victim to a Soviet tank ambush. Goth, on the other hand, continued to demand from all his corps “to move further east, without waiting for the lagging divisions. On the evening of June 22 - offensive to the last opportunity. XXXIX Corps was ordered to break through to Vilnius before the end of the day. But there was no talk of any breakthrough from the two successfully captured crossings. The situation has entered a position of stable equilibrium. The Soviet side could not liquidate the bridgeheads, the Germans could not "open" them. It was especially humiliating that the neighboring LVII motorized corps moved further east from the Neman, reaching Varena late in the evening, having completed the task of the day.

In the evening, tanks of the 20th Panzer Division approached Alytus. They were sent to the northern bridgehead. At the same time, the approaching tank units handed over part of their ammunition to the tankers of the Mainteuffel division - as a result of a difficult daytime battle, they shot most of the ammunition. The approach of reinforcements changed the balance of power. It was decided to take advantage of this, and immediately. The capture by the Germans of two bridgeheads on the Neman at once gave them a certain freedom in choosing the direction of the main attack. Around 21.00 on June 22, the northern bridgehead was "opened". The Soviet 5th Panzer Division was under threat of a blow to the flank and rear. The idea of ​​liquidating the German foothold on the Neman had to be abandoned. The battered units of Fedorov's division began to retreat from Alytus to the northeast. However, the Germans no longer have time to take advantage of the opportunities that have opened up for further advance to the east. With the onset of darkness, hostilities cease.

In the evening report of the 3rd Panzer Group, the battle near Alytus was assessed as "the largest tank battle during the period of this war" for the 7th Panzer Division. This obviously means not the war with the USSR, but the Second World War, which began on September 1, 1939. The losses of the Soviet 5th Panzer Division in the report on the battle to the headquarters of Army Group Center were estimated at 70 tanks, in the ZhBD 3- th TGr - 80 tanks. Accordingly, their own losses before the report of the 3rd TGr amounted to 11 tanks, including 4 "heavy" ones (apparently, we are talking about Pz.IV). It is not entirely clear what losses are meant. Most likely irrevocable. Accordingly, the total losses should be at least two to three times greater. According to Soviet data, out of 24 T-28 tanks that participated in the battle, 16 were lost, out of 44 T-34s - 27, out of 45 BT-7s - 30. A total of 73 vehicles, which is quite consistent with German data.

It cannot be said that Goth was completely satisfied with the results of the day. It was not even that it was not possible to immediately break through from the bridgeheads near Alytus to the east. In the combat log of the 3rd TGr, following the results of the day, the following was recorded: “One can doubt whether it was generally necessary and expedient to introduce infantry divisions into battle in view of the factual position of the enemy now revealed.” Due to some reassessment by German intelligence of the forces of the Red Army opposing the 3rd TGr, its construction as a "tunneling shield" was not optimal from the point of view of the situation.

The motorized corps of Gotha on June 22 were squeezed between the army corps and deeply echeloned in depth. The indisputable advantage of this situation was the calm behind the rear, where scattered Soviet units still remained. Otherwise, the narrowing of the hull bands contained a lot of disadvantages. It slowed down the advance of the group, and also deprived the vanguard, which met enemy resistance, of the support of artillery far behind. In addition, the rigid separation of the offensive zones excluded the legitimate targets of tanks from the conduct of motorized corps. So, the slow advance of VI AK to Prienai (it reached the river only on June 23) led to the explosion of the only bridge across the Neman there. If a tank division had advanced to Prienai, the bridge would have been captured already in the first hours of the war, when the Red Army was still in the stupor of the transition from a state of peace to a state of war. The best option for the 3rd TGr would be a breakthrough on a wide front to the Neman with motorized corps, with a quick capture of all crossings. We have to state once again that we are far from a “perfect storm”.

At that time, the Wehrmacht was preparing to form FOUR tank groups for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The German tank group had neither a standard composition nor a definite regular number of tanks.

So, the weakest, the 4th Göpner Panzer Group, consisted of three tank (1st, 6th and 8th) and three motorized divisions, a total of 602 tanks.

The largest, 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian included five tank (3rd, 4th, 10th, 17th, 18th), three motorized, one cavalry divisions and a separate motorized regiment "Grossdeutschland", armed with 994 tanks.

In total, on June 22, 1941, there were 3266 tanks in the four tank groups, i.e. an average of 817 tanks in each group.

For the sake of truth, it should be noted that, inferior to the Soviet mechanized corps in the number of tanks, the Wehrmacht tank group significantly (2-3 times) surpassed it in terms of the number of personnel. So, with full staffing, Guderian's tank group. was supposed to have more than 110 thousand personnel, while the staffing of the Red Army mechanized corps was only 36,080 people.

This apparent contradiction has a simple explanation. Preparing for war with the USSR, Hitler ordered to double the number of tank divisions, from 10 to 20. This was done by simple division, by reducing the number of tank regiments in a division from two to one. As a result, in a German tank division, there were two infantry regiments per tank regiment, and the bulk of this infantry did not move at all on armored personnel carriers (as in the old Soviet cinema), but on various trophy trucks. The chief of staff of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht, Halder, in his famous diary notes (entry dated May 22, 1941) that Guderian in the 17th TD has 240 different types motor vehicles. How to maintain such a mobile vehicle museum in the field?

There were no tanks in the motorized division of the Wehrmacht. No one. G. Goth writes that the motorized divisions of his tank group were created on the basis of ordinary infantry divisions, and the vehicles received " only in recent months before the start of the war, and the 18th division - a few days before entering the concentration area» .

In fact, the Wehrmacht tank group was a large unit of motorized infantry, reinforced by several (from 3 to 5) tank regiments. Continuing the line of "zoological" comparisons, begun at the time by V. Suvorov, we can say that the Wehrmacht tank group was a powerful and heavy buffalo, and the mechanized corps of the Red Army was a flexible and swift leopard.

In wildlife, the outcome of a fight between four buffaloes and two dozen leopards would be a foregone conclusion. The high command of the Red Army, which made the most daring plans for the Great Campaign, did not doubt the capabilities of its "leopards".

« ... Tank corps, supported by mass aviation, break into the enemy’s defensive zone, break down his anti-tank defense system, hit artillery along the way and go into the operational depth ... The use of mechanized corps concentrically will be especially effective when these mechanized corps will bring pincers together with their crushing blow for a subsequent strike against the enemy... With such actions, we believe that a pair of tank corps in the direction of the main attack will have to deliver a devastating blow within a couple of hours and cover the entire tactical depth of the order of 30-35 km. This requires massive use of tanks and aircraft; and this is possible with new types of tanks- so, with feeling legitimate pride, the head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, General of the Army Pavlov, reported at a well-known meeting of the top command staff of the Red Army in December 1940.

« ... The rate of further offensive after overcoming the tactical depth will be faster and will reach 15 km per hour ... We believe that the depth of reaching the rear of the enemy by 60 km is not the limit. It is always necessary to keep in mind, through acceleration and organization, immediately on the first day to overcome the second band of resistance and reach the entire operational depth ...»

It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines ... Unfortunately, even Hitler, although he was considered a "possessed corporal", was smart enough not to wait, but to attack himself. Attack before Stalin completes all his twenty-nine mechanized corps to the last nut. As a result, it was by no means the same mechanized corps that had to be fought as described above.

It was not possible to fully equip all 29 mechanized corps to full strength by June 1941. This - as the clearest and most convincing proof of our "unpreparedness for war" - was always talked about by historians from the special propaganda department, forgetting to explain to readers what kind of war the "invariably peace-loving" Stalinist empire, which created an armored horde, was preparing for (but just did not have time to prepare) , the number of guns in which was supposed to exceed the number of sabers in the army of Batu Khan.

« We did not calculate the objective capabilities of our tank industry,- the Grand Marshal of Victory bitterly complains in his memoirs, - to fully equip the mechanized corps, 16,600 tanks of only new types were required ... there was nowhere to get such a number of tanks for one year in almost any conditions» .

Well, how could the former chief of the General Staff forget the program for the deployment of mechanized corps, approved by him on February 22, 1941?

All mechanized corps were divided into 19 "combat", 7 "reduced" and 4 "reduced second stage". In total, by the end of 1941, it was planned to have 18,804 tanks in the mechanized corps and two separate tank divisions, including 16,655 tanks in the "combat" mechanized corps.

In other words, the average number of tanks (877) in 19 "combat" mechanized corps should have been equal to the average number of tanks in each of the 4 Wehrmacht tank groups.

From point of view quantitative indicators this program was successful. By February 22, 1941, the mechanized corps included 14,684 tanks. The increase in numbers by 4,120 units planned by the end of the year was significantly less than the actual production, which amounted to 6,590 tanks in 1941 (including 1,358 KB and 3,014 T-34s).

For comparison, we note that the Germans (who allegedly "worked all of Europe") in 1941 produced only 3094 tanks of all types, including 678 light Czech PZ 38 (t).

In the next year, 1942, the tank industry of the USSR already produced 24,718 tanks, including 2,553 heavy KB and 12,527 medium T-34s. Total: 3911 KB and 15,541 T-34s in two years.

Moreover, this volume of production was provided in such conditions that in February 1941 Zhukov and Stalin could only see in a nightmare: two of the most important enterprises (the world's largest tank factory No. 183 and the country's only manufacturer of tank diesel engines, plant No. bombs to transport from Kharkov to the Urals, and two huge Leningrad plants (No. 185 named after Kirov and No. 174 named after Voroshilov) were in the blockade ring. There are no reasonable grounds to doubt that, under normal conditions, Soviet industry, all the more, would be able to ensure by the end of 1942 (as planned) the full complement and re-equipment of all 29 mechanized corps with new tanks, which required “only” 3654 KB tanks to equip and 12,180 T-3 tanks.

Having finished with disputes and forecasts, let's move on to assessing what was in kind. By the start of hostilities, there were 11,029 tanks in the 20 mechanized corps deployed in five western border districts. More than two thousand tanks were part of three mechanized corps (5th, 7th, 21st) and a separate 57th TD, which in the first two weeks of the war were brought into battle near Shepetovka, Lepel and Daugavpils. Thus, Zhukov and others like him had to start a war, content with only a FOUR-TIME numerical superiority in tanks. This is if you consider it super modest, i.e. not taking into account the tanks that were in service cavalry divisions and troops of internal districts. In total, as of June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 19,540 tanks (again, not counting the light amphibious T-37, T-38, T-40 and T-27 tankettes), not counting 3258 cannon armored vehicles.

The available tanks were distributed among the mechanized corps extremely unevenly. There were corps (1st, 5th, 6th), almost completely equipped, there were corps (17th and 20th), which did not even have hundreds of tanks. The composition of the tank fleet was just as heterogeneous. In most of the mechanized corps there were no new tanks (T-34, KB) at all, some (10, 19, 18th) were armed with extremely worn out BT-2 and BT-5, produced in 1932-1934, or even light tankettes T-37 and T-38. And at the same time there were mechanized corps equipped with hundreds of the latest tanks.

At first glance, it is difficult to understand the internal logic of such a formation. At least, no connection between the serial number and the degree of staffing is found. So, the 9th mechanized corps of Rokossovsky, the formation of which began back in 1940, was armed with only 316 (according to other sources - 285) tanks, and the 22nd mechanized corps, deployed in the spring of 1941, already had 712 tanks by the beginning of the war.

But one has only to put on the map of the border regions of the USSR the places of deployment of mechanized corps, as the plan of the upcoming "Thunderstorm" will be revealed to us in all its splendor.

The seven most powerful mechanized corps of the Red Army, superior in number and (or) quality of tanks to any tank group of the Wehrmacht, were located on the eve of the war in the following very logical way.

The main blow was to be delivered by the troops of the Southwestern Front to Krakow - Katowice. That is why three mechanized corps (4, 8, 15th), numbering 2627 tanks, including 721 KB and T-3, deployed at the very top of the "Lviv ledge". In total, there were eight (!!!) mechanized corps in the composition of the troops of the South-Western Front.

An auxiliary strike on Lublin and Warsaw was to be delivered by the troops of the left wing of the Western Front - and in the forests near Bialystok, next to the tape of the Warsaw highway, we find the 6th mechanized corps (1131 tanks, including 452 new KB and T-34). And three other mechanized corps hid in the wilderness of the cramped “Bialystok ledge”.

In the second echelon of the Southwestern and Western fronts, in the area of ​​​​Shepetovka and Orsha, two other "heroes" were advanced - the 5th MK (1070 tanks) and the 7th MK (959 tanks).

The troops of the Southern (Odessa district) and Northwestern (Baltic district) fronts were given much more modest tasks: to firmly cover the flanks of the shock groups and prevent the enemy from invading the territory of the districts. That is why in their composition we find only two corps, staffed by half of the state, and with old tanks.

Everything is simple, clear and completely logical. Only the location of that particular mechanized corps looks like a mystery, with the story about which we began this part of the book.

“And he went, swept up by the team ...”

The first in number, "age" and staffing of the mechanized corps before the war was part of the Northern Front (Leningrad District). Why and why? Although the Leningrad District is traditionally included in the list of "western border districts of the USSR" - what kind of "western border" is this? From the west, the district bordered on the Soviet Baltic states, and to the borders East Prussia from Leningrad as much as 720 km. The Leningrad Okrug was borderline only in relation to the four millionth Finland.

The Leningrad Military District was turning into a front with the name "Northern". At first glance, this is rather strange - it would be more logical to call it "Leningrad", "Baltic", at worst - "Karelian". But in Stalin's empire, accidents were extremely rare.

« In mid-June 1941, a group of senior officials of the district, headed by the commander of the district, Lieutenant General M.M. Popov, went on a field trip near Murmansk and Kandalaksha”, - recalls one of the participants in this trip, Air Chief Marshal (in those days - the commander of the district air force) A.A. Novikov. Murmansk is not just the north, it is already the polar north. Further, Comrade Marshal, with a feeling of deep indignation, describes how Popov and other Soviet generals are watching the columns of dust that the Finnish troops advancing towards the border raised over the forest roads. In other words, the “field trip” of the command of the district (front) took place in the immediate vicinity of the Finnish border. Looking at the "forest roads" in the adjacent territory (in the military language this is called "reconnaissance") so captivated the commander that Lieutenant General Popov returned to Leningrad only on June 23, and the entire first day of the Soviet-German war, the front (district) was commanded by an arrival from Moscow as a representative of the Stavka K.A. Meretskov.

Of course, it can be assumed that General Popov's trip to Murmansk was connected with the preparation of the district troops to repel the future Nazi invasion. Alas, it is not. No one expected the German offensive in the Arctic. What is very eloquently evidenced by the memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel X. Reisen, commander of the II / KG30 bomber group, about the first raid on Murmansk on June 22, 1941:

« ... we met neither fighter nor anti-aircraft opposition. Even the planes that carried out the attack at low altitude were not fired on ... enemy aircraft literally did not exist, German vehicles operated on Soviet territory completely uninterrupted...»

Yes, and some kind of strange chronology of events turns out: General Popov leaves for Murmansk before the start of hostilities to prepare the city for "defense against the Germans", but immediately leaves it as soon as the German attack becomes a fait accompli ...

It is possible to write about the transfer of the 1st Panzer Division that its goal was to "strengthen the defense of Murmansk." Can. Paper will endure everything. But why take the Soviet generals for complete fools? If they wanted to transport a tank division to Murmansk, they would have transported it, Kirovskaya Railway just to Murmansk and brought. What was the need to turn left 260 km to the destination and unload the division in a deserted and roadless forest-tundra?

And how could a division equipped with BT light tanks strengthen the defense Soviet Arctic? Let us turn once again to the memoirs of the commander of the 1st TD, General V.I. Baranova:

« ... the actions of the tankers were complicated by the rugged terrain. Off-road, rocks and steep hills covered with forests, hollows and clearings overgrown with bushes and dotted with boulders, lakes, mountain rivers, marshy swamps... The use of tanks even as part of a battalion was out of the question. The battles were fought in small groups, platoons and even ambushes...»

On such an "anti-tank terrain", a high-speed BT inevitably lost its main quality - mobility. And there were never any other special advantages for this combat vehicle with bulletproof armor and a light 45-mm cannon. So, was it really possible for a tank division to be taken to distant lands only to tear it apart into small groups and "act as separate vehicles from ambushes"? To “strengthen the defense”, it would be much easier and more effective to transfer a dozen heavy artillery regiments of the RGK to the Arctic in the same echelons, and to ambush not light tanks armed with a “forty-five” (a fragmentation projectile of which weighed 1.4 kg), but heavy howitzers of caliber 152 or, even better, 203 mm. So they would have met the enemy with shells weighing 43-100 kg, from which you can’t hide even among granite boulders.

Nevertheless, the 1st Panzer arrived precisely in Alakurtti (and precisely in those days when Soviet generals looked at Finnish forest roads through binoculars) not by chance, and not at all out of stupidity, but in accordance with an amazingly beautiful Plan. We will come to the discussion of this plan a little later, but now we will turn again to the events of June 17, 1941.

It was on this day, when the 1st TD began loading into echelons leaving for the Arctic, that the command staff of the 10th MK departed for staff exercises. The leadership of the district decided to conduct these exercises in the north of the Karelian Isthmus, in the Vyborg region, near the Finnish border. At 9 am on June 21, something changed, the exercises were suddenly interrupted, and all commanders were ordered to immediately return to their units.

At two in the morning on June 22, 1941 (at the very time when the echelons with the 1st Panzer Division were approaching the unloading station), the general himself arrived at the command post of the 21st TD of the 10th mechanized corps, in the village of Chernaya Rechka near Leningrad. - Lieutenant P.S. Pshennikov is the commander of the 23rd, the largest of the three armies of the Northern Front. The lieutenant general personally assigned the commander of the 21st TD, Colonel Bunin, the task of preparing the division for action.

At 12.00 on June 22, a combat alert was announced in the division, with units leaving for their assembly areas on alert. The next day, at 6 a.m. on June 23, the 21st Panzer Division received a combat order from the headquarters of the 10th MK about speaking to the Ilya-Noskua area (now the city of Svetogorsk, Leningrad Region), a few kilometers from the Finnish border.

The author did not have at his disposal the text of the "Journal of Combat Operations" of other divisions of the 10th MK (24th tank and 198th motorized), but, judging by the fact that they left the area of ​​permanent deployment in Pushkin and Oranienbaum in the same time, as the 21st TD, and moved in the same direction, it can be assumed that on June 22, 41, they received similar orders from the command of the corps and the 23rd Army.

It's time to get to know this mechanized corps better now.

The 10th mechanized corps (commander - Major General I.G. Lazarev) was equipped and prepared for combat operations much worse than the 1st MK. Different sources give different figures for the number of tanks in the 10th MK: from 469 to 818 units. Such confusion in the numbers, in all likelihood, is due to the fact that many T-26 and BT tanks of early releases were adopted by the corps, which were rapidly decommissioned before the start of the war in anticipation of the arrival of new equipment.

To a greater extent, this remark applied to the 24th Panzer Division of the 10th Mechanized Corps, formed on the basis of the 11th Reserve Tank Regiment and receiving heavily worn training materiel from it: 139 BT-2 and 142 BT-5 (a total of 281 production tanks 1932-1934). When the 24th TD began to advance to the initial area for the offensive, out of the 281 available tanks, 49 were left at the place of permanent deployment as out of order. After that, out of 232 tanks that went on a campaign, only 177 tanks reached the forest area in the Svetogorsk region.

In all respects, things were better in another tank division of the 10th MK. The 21st Panzer Division was formed on the basis of the 40th Red Banner Tank Brigade, which earned its order for courage and skill shown in battles on the Karelian Isthmus. By the beginning of the war, the 21st TD had 217 T-26 light tanks on the list. And this division performed the march much more organized. In the combat log of the 21st tank we read: “ ... on the march there were lags of individual tanks and vehicles, which were quickly restored by the division's closing service and sent along the route» .

As for the third division of the 10th MK - the 198th motorized - it had only a few dozen serviceable tanks, and in fact it was an ordinary rifle division with unusual large quantity vehicles.

Everything is relative. We will refer to this golden rule, so diligently forgotten by the communist "historians", more than once. Of course, in comparison with the 1st MK (1039 tanks and 4730 vehicles for various purposes, from gas tanks to refrigerators and showers, the latest tracked tractors and the latest howitzers in artillery regiments), the 10th MK looks simply unarmed. But they were going to fight not with their neighbor in the district, but with some other enemy ...

On the same day and hour, when huge rumbling and fairly smoking columns of tanks, armored cars, caterpillar tractors of the 10th mechanized corps moved through Leningrad to Vyborg, on the morning of June 23, 1941, along the Leningrad highway from Pskov to Gatchina (Krasnogvardeysk) moved and the main strike force of the Northern Front: two divisions (3rd tank and 163rd motorized) from the 1st MK.

« Tanks raced, raising the wind, formidable armor advanced ...»

Only in some strange direction raced. Not to the war - but from the war. Or is it still for a war, but for a different one?

And at that time, on the most distant (still - distant) western approaches to Leningrad, a big trouble was brewing.

From the very first hours of the war in the Baltics, in the defense zone of the Northwestern Front, the course of hostilities clearly took on the character of an unprecedented rout.

This is how Soviet military historians describe the events of those days in the monograph “1941 - Lessons and Conclusions”: “ ... the consequences of the first enemy strikes turned out to be catastrophic for the troops of the North-Western Front. The troops of the covering armies began a disorderly retreat... Having lost control, the front command was unable to take decisive measures to restore the situation and prevent the retreat of the 8th and 11th armies...»

It is worth noting that the "disorderly withdrawal" of the troops of the North-Western Front gave the enemy the impression of a pre-planned retreat! The Chief of Staff of the German Ground Forces F. Halder writes on June 23, 1941 in his famous "War Diary":

« ... it seems that there is still no need to talk about organized withdrawal. The exception is, perhaps, the area in front of the front of Army Group North, where, apparently, a withdrawal beyond the Western Dvina River was indeed planned and prepared in advance. The reasons for this preparation cannot yet be established ...» Yes, there was not enough German generals fantasies to imagine our realities...

Let us return, however, to the description of these events given by Russian historians:

« ... On June 26, the position of the retreating troops deteriorated sharply. The 11th Army lost up to 75% of its equipment and up to 60% of its personnel. Its commander, Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov, reproached the front commander, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov in inaction ... the Military Council of the Front considered that he could not report in such a rude form, while F.I. Kuznetsov made the erroneous conclusion that the army headquarters, together with V.I. Morozov was captured and works under the dictation of the enemy... Discord arose among the command. Member of the Military Council Corps Commissar P.A. Dibrov, for example, reported that the chief of staff, Lieutenant General P. S. Klenov, was always ill, the work of the headquarters was not organized, and the front commander was nervous ...»

While they were looking for an “extreme” at the headquarters of the North-Western Front, on June 26, 1941, in the Daugavpils region, the head of the Operational Directorate of the headquarters of the North-Western Front, Major General Trukhin, surrendered (later Trukhin actively collaborated with the Germans, headed the headquarters of the Vlasov “army” and ended his life on the gallows on August 1, 1946).

For a correct understanding of further events, it is very important to note that the High Command in Moscow soberly assessed the situation and had no illusions that the scattered remnants of the uncontrollable North-Western Front would be able to contain the advance of the German troops.

Already on June 24 (that is, on the third day of the war!) It was decided to create a defensive zone at the turn of the Luga River - 550 km west of the border, 90 km to the streets of Leningrad. At the same time, on June 25, the Headquarters decided to conduct a counterattack against the 56th Wehrmacht tank corps, which had broken through to Daugavpils. In an effort to somehow delay the German offensive on the natural defensive line of the Western Dvina River, the command of the Red Army involved in this counterattack the completely understaffed 21st mechanized corps (the planned completion date for the formation of this corps was set for 1942) and even the 5th air - landing (!) Corps, which had neither the appropriate weapons nor proper training to fight tanks. In other words, they tried to plug the gap in the crumbling defense front with everything that was at hand.

And in this situation, the 1st mechanized corps, the most powerful in the northwestern theater of operations (which even after sending the 1st TD to Lapland, still had six times more tanks than Lelyushenko's 21st mechanized corps!), Breaking the roads with tracks of hundreds tanks, went north, to Gatchina, i.e. in the exact opposite direction from the front line!

By the way, the Germans themselves were very discouraged by the disappearance of the “Pskov tank group”, inexplicable for them. At first it seemed to them that the 1st MK left Pskov to the south. Halder on June 22, 1941 notes in his diary:

« ... the Russian motorized Pskov group ... was discovered 300 km south of the previously assumed area of ​​\u200b\u200bits concentration. ..»

« ... of all the operational reserves of the enemy known to us, it is currently unclear only the location of the Pskov tank group. Perhaps she was transferred to the area between Siauliai and the Western Dvina ...»

The next day, June 25, Halder was informed that " The 7th tank corps of the enemy was transferred from the Pskov area through the Western Dvina to the area south of Riga» .

Let's not be too strict in evaluating the work of the German military intelligence. It simply could not occur to them where they actually needed to look for the 1st mechanized corps. And they did not have reconnaissance aircraft with such a range that would allow them to record the movements of the tank units of the Northern Front. Now, if they had a reconnaissance satellite, then a truly fantastic sight would open from its "board".

From the border of East Prussia to the Western Dvina, two long columns in a northeast direction moved two German tank corps from the 4th Panzer Group: the 41st under the command of Reinhardt and the 56th under the command of Manstein. Further, on a huge three-hundred-kilometer space, ordinary peaceful (if you look at it from space) life went on. And further east, in the same northwest direction, in the same clouds of dust and smoke, two Soviet mechanized corps moved: the 1st MK - from Pskov to Leningrad, the 10th MK - from Leningrad to Vyborg.

And what is quite surprising - the marching Soviet and warring German divisions moved almost at the same speed!

Corps Manstein passed 255 km from the border to Daugavpils (Dvinsk) in four days. The average rate of progress is 64 km per day.

The Reinhardt corps passed from the border to the town of Krustpils on the Western Dvina in five days. The average rate of progress is 53 km per day.

And the tank divisions of the 10th mechanized corps reached the concentration area indicated by him northeast of Vyborg, 150 km from Leningrad, only by the end of the day on June 24th. The divisions of the elite 1st mechanized corps also needed two days to march from Pskov to Gatchina (200 km in a straight line).

Strictly speaking, the pace of progress Soviet tanks th divisions was still one and a half times higher.

But the Germans did not just march, but (as is commonly believed) they also "overcame the fierce resistance of the Red Army."

The inability of the mechanized units to organize a forced march was the first unpleasant surprise that the command of the Northern Front encountered. The low rates were by no means associated with the special low-speedness of Soviet tanks (the BT can still be considered the fastest tank in history), but with the ugly organization of the traffic control service and the evacuation of faulty vehicles. In the order of the commander of the 1st mechanized corps, dated June 25, 1941, specially devoted to this issue, it was noted that the cars followed in columns spontaneously, overtaking each other, stopping at the request of the drivers in unplanned parking lots, creating traffic jams. There was no collection of stragglers and repair of faulty machines.

Things were not much better in the 10th mechanized corps. The length of the advance route of the 24th Panzer Division was 160 kilometers, which it covered in 49 hours! The average march speed is 3.5 km / h (if you remember, D. Pavlov assumed that the mechanized corps would not just march, but advance at a pace of 15 km / h!). In the 21st Panzer Division, tanks spent 14-15 engine hours during a two-day march, which clearly indicates that even in this most trained and best-equipped division, half of the "march" consisted of standing in traffic jams and traffic jams.

Be that as it may, by June 25-26, all units and formations of the 1st and 10th mechanized corps deployed in the areas indicated by them over a vast area from Gatchina to the Arctic, put people and equipment in order after a multi-day march, and sent to the Finnish border , and as it has now become known from the memoirs of living participants in the event, and FOR the Finnish border, reconnaissance groups and ...

And nothing happened. The ground (let's emphasize this word with a thick line) forces of the Northern Front (14th, 7th, 23rd armies consisting of fifteen rifle, two motorized, four tank divisions and a separate rifle brigade) froze in agonizing and inexplicable inactivity.

At dawn on June 25, 1941...

While the troops of the Northern Front (Leningrad Military District) made these mysterious regroupings, the fighting in the Baltic continued to develop in the same, i.e. catastrophic direction. Only in the area of ​​Daugavpils, a desperately bold attack by the tankmen of the 21st mechanized corps of Lelyushenko slowed down the advance of the enemy for a couple of days. In all other sections, the Germans crossed the Western Dvina almost unhindered, reaching the "finish line" Rezhitsa - Pskov - Leningrad.

The only reserve that the Soviet command could immediately use was the very powerful aviation forces of the Leningrad District. Bridges and crossings across the Western Dvina were within reach of the 2nd, 44th, 58th (Staraya Russa region), 201st, 202nd, 205th (Gatchina region) bomber aviation regiments. Did the Soviet military command understand the huge role that aviation could play in holding the strategically important water line? How else to understand! A few days later, when in Belarus, in the strip of the defeated Western Front, the Germans began to cross the Berezina, Timoshenko himself, People's Commissar for Defense, gave an order according to which literally everything that could fly was involved in the destruction of the crossings across the Berezina. From light bombers Su-2 to heavy and clumsy, like a river barge, TB-3.

Tymoshenko's order required bombing continuously, from low altitudes. German historians called those days "air Verdun". Our aircraft suffered terrible losses. Regiments of long-range DB-3 bombers, in no way suitable for low-altitude operations, were melting like a candle in the wind. Pilots and navigators died long-range aviation- professionals with a unique level of training for the Red Army Air Force. The Headquarters paid this price for the opportunity to win a few days to transfer reserves to Belarus from the internal districts. And, we note, none of the later historians and military experts has ever criticized this cruel, but justified by the situation, decision of the people's commissar ...

Let's return, however, to the Baltics. Could the Air Force of the Northern Front deliver a tangible blow to the crossings on the Western Dvina (Daugava)? On the eve of the war, the six above-mentioned bomber aviation regiments had 201 SBs in good condition. In addition, three bomber air regiments (35th, 50th, 53rd) from the 4th air division (the region of Tartu in Estonia), which was operationally subordinate to the Northern Front from the start of hostilities, could also be involved in a massive airstrike. This is another 119 serviceable bombers.

The distance of 400-450 km from the airfields on which these units were based to the Western Dvina made it possible to use "obsolete" SB bombers with a maximum bomb load. Moreover, unlike the tragic situation that developed in the sky over the Berezina, the bombers could be covered along the entire route to the target and back by the latest MiG-3 fighters from the 7th, 159th and 153rd Fighter Regiments. These newest were - according to Soviet historians- very few: only 162 MiGs in good condition. This is really less than we would like - but one and a half times more than the number of the only Luftwaffe fighter squadron JG 54 in the entire northwestern theater of operations (98 serviceable Messerschmitts Bf-109 F as of June 24, 1941).

If this was not enough, then the Northern Front included the 10th, 137th and 72nd bomber regiments in the area of ​​Murmansk and Petrozavodsk, which could be quickly relocated south to Leningrad.

Maybe this is not as much as you want, but the 1st Luftwaffe Air Fleet, which was paving the way for the German divisions of Army Group North, had only 210 serviceable bombers (as of the morning of June 24, 1941). It is noteworthy that in the summary of the headquarters of the North-Western Front No. 3, compiled at 12 noon on June 22, it was said that " the enemy has not yet brought into action significant air force forces, limiting himself to the action of individual groups and single aircraft» . The assessment is quite understandable, if we take into account that the real number of serviceable combat aircraft of all types (330 units) in the 1st Luftwaffe Air Fleet turned out to be exactly ten times less than what the top leadership of the Red Army expected to see in this direction. At least, this is the conclusion that can be drawn from the materials of the famous operational-strategic "game" declassified only in 1993, conducted by the General Staff in January 1941.

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