2. Secondly, the German command failed to create a sufficient operational density of troops here. By the beginning of the Soviet offensive, according to the plan of Operation Kutuzov, the two German armies that occupied the Orlovsky bridgehead, the 9th and 2nd tank armies, mainly included units and formations of five army and three tank corps (28 infantry, 7 tank, 2 motorized divisions), which had the following composition and grouping.

In front of the 50th and 11th Guards Armies of the Western Front, units and formations of the 55th and 53rd Army Corps of the 2nd TA operated (from northwest to southeast - 321, 339, 110, 296, 134th infantry divisions of the 55th corps, 211th and 293rd infantry divisions of the 53rd corps).

The 25th motorized, 112th and 208th infantry divisions of the 53rd regiment (the 208th division at the turn of the Oka River) defended themselves in front of the 61st Army of the BRF.

In front of the troops of the 3rd A BrF on the Zusha River, they held the positions of the formation of the 35th ak 2nd TA (from north to south - the 34th and 56th infantry divisions). In front of the troops of the 63rd A, the 56th (part of the forces) and the 262nd infantry divisions acted, relying on the line of the Neruch River.

In front of the troops of the 48th A of the Central Fleet were formations of the 35th ak 2nd TA (299th infantry division - against the junction of the Bryansk and Central Fronts) and the 23rd ak 9th A (further to the south-west - 383rd and part of the forces of the 216th Infantry Division).

In front of the 13th Army of the Central Fleet, units and formations that were part of the German strike group 9th A on the northern face of the Kursk ledge went over to the defense: part of the forces of the 216th Infantry and 78th Assault Infantry Divisions from the 23rd Ak; 86th and 292nd infantry, 18th tank divisions from the 41st TC; 6th infantry, 2nd, 9th, 20th tank divisions from the 47th TC; 10th motorized, 4th and 12th tank divisions, part of the forces of the 36th infantry division (at the disposal of the strike force corps command).

The 31st, 7th, 258th, 102nd Infantry Divisions from the 46th Tank Corps, reinforced by the Manteuffel group (three Jaeger battalions with light artillery attached to them), defended in front of the 70th Army of the Central Front from east to west to the area of ​​​​the city of Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky.

Further, in front of the 65th and 60th armies of the Central Fleet, the defense to Sevsk was held by formations of the 20th ak 9th A (72, 45, 137, 251st infantry divisions), and to the south the 13th ak 2nd A was already located (82, 327, 340, 377th infantry divisions).

From the operational reserves of the enemy in the forests west of Zhizdra was the 5th Panzer Division, and in the rear of the 2nd TA in the area northwest of Bryansk to Rekovichi, units of the 707th security infantry division were deployed.

In addition, various auxiliary and security units and subunits were located in all large settlements, united under the control of the command of the 532nd rear area, the head of the engineering troops of the 2nd TA, the commanders of the 203rd and 221st security divisions, the 442nd division special purpose, heads of local commandant's offices.

Also, the command of the GA "Center" had the opportunity to use the armed forces of the so-called Special Lokot District - the "Kaminsky Brigade", which reached the size of a reinforced infantry division (15-20 thousand armed fighters, 36 field, 24 anti-tank and 3 anti-aircraft guns, 40 mortars, 24 armored vehicles, including 12 tanks), which was located in the area northwest of Sevsk, behind the junction of the 9th and 2nd armies.

In addition, 3 light infantry divisions (102, 105, 108th) from the 8th Hungarian Army Corps under the command of General Laszlo Dezso were deployed in the Navlya-Lokot-Seredina-Buda area, in which, according to some reports, , there were about 40 thousand soldiers and officers. However, according to the assessment of the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Hungarian Army, General Gyula Kovács, given at a meeting with the German command at the end of February 1943, the Hungarian troops withdrawn to the rear after heavy winter fighting were only capable of self-defense against partisans.

Regarding the total strength of the Oryol group, according to Russian historiography, in the units and formations of the 2nd, 9th and 2nd tank armies of the Army Group "Center" by July 12, 1943 there were about 600 thousand people, of which more than 492 thousand soldiers and combat officers, over 7 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns. At the same time, the 2nd A of the "Center" group did not take part in the hostilities in the period from July 12 to August 18, 1943, therefore, during the offensive according to the Kutuzov operation plan, only the main forces of the 2nd tank and 9 th armies. Taking into account the losses incurred during the operation "Citadel" (see in the book: "Battle of Kursk. Fracture", part 2, chapter 3), by the end of July 12, there were about 244 thousand personnel in the 9th A , 3.2 thousand guns and mortars, approximately 900 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which about 500 are combat-ready). The army's defense zone reached about 220 km. The average operational density of forces and assets in the 9th A lane was 1.1 thousand soldiers and officers, about 15 guns and mortars, 4 tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer of front.

In general (excluding units of the Kaminsky Brigade and the 8th Hungarian Army Corps, which did not participate in the battles for the Orlovsky bridgehead), there were 533 thousand military personnel, about 5 thousand guns and mortars in the 2nd tank and 9th armies , approximately 1.15 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns deployed on a front with a length of up to 460 km (according to other sources, by July 1, 1943, both armies numbered 495 thousand people, and by the beginning of the battle on the Oryol ledge - 475 thousand soldiers and officers , 825 tanks and self-propelled guns). On average, the operational density of forces and means concentrated by the German command at the Orlovsky bridgehead by July 12 was 1.16 thousand military personnel, 11 guns and mortars, 2.5 tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer of front.

Relatively air force, according to V. Gorbach's estimate, by July 12, the 1st air division of the 6th VF had 630-650 aircraft at its disposal, therefore, without its reinforcement with new units and formations, Soviet aviation in the Oryol direction could have gained an overwhelming five-fold superiority over the enemy. However, by July 12, the 6th VF was replenished with aircraft transferred from the 4th VF (from the southern front of the Kursk ledge), as well as separate units operating in the Leningrad region (two fighter squadrons), due to which the aviation group assembled on base of the 1st Air Division to support the actions of ground troops on the Orlovsky bridgehead, now consisted of 1110 aircraft, including 350 fighters, 560 bombers and dive bombers, 200 reconnaissance aircraft.

According to the German military historian C. Bekker (Cajus Bekker, participant in World War II, real name Heinrich Berendonk. - P. B.), Hitler planned to repel the offensive of the Soviet troops against the Oryol salient with the help of massive air impact on the enemy. At the same time, the chief of staff of the 6th VF, General Friedrich Kless, points out that although such a plan was considered by the Air Force General Staff, it was almost immediately rejected due to the lack of resources for building and supplying a network of airfields that could to accept a large number of additional air formations intended for operations as part of the 6th VF. On the contrary, according to General Kless, the offensive of the Soviet Air Force, which was being prepared in the summer of 1943, was to become one of the most powerful aviation operations for that time, surpassing in scope everything that had been undertaken before on Eastern Front. Moreover, this opinion was based on fairly accurate information from German intelligence - in particular, according to its information, by the beginning of July, the 15th and 16th Soviet air armies had at their disposal about 1800 combat aircraft. Indeed, by the beginning of the offensive operation "Kutuzov" (by July 10), the 15th and 16th air armies had more than 1,700 serviceable combat vehicles alone. In the direction of the main strikes, the Soviet air armies, which on average numbered about 500 aircraft, could be reinforced at the expense of the aviation corps of the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, bringing their strength to 1200 aircraft. In general, 60 percent of the forces of the entire Soviet front and front were involved in the summer offensive of 1943. long-range aviation, operating on the Eastern Front, as well as a significant part of the fighter aircraft of the air defense forces - only about 5 thousand aircraft.

August 3, 1943 began the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive(Operation "Rumyantsev"). The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, with the aim of defeating the Belgorod-Kharkov group of the German army, liberating the Kharkov industrial region, creating prerequisites for the final liberation from the invaders Left-bank Ukraine. The Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, as well as the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, took part in the operation: more than 980 thousand people, over 12 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.5 thousand. aircraft. In total, by the beginning of the offensive on August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had 50 rifle divisions, 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments.

From the side of the Wehrmacht, the 4th Panzer Army, the Kempf Army Group and the 4th Air Fleet participated in the battle: about 300 thousand people, more than 3 thousand guns and mortars, about 600 tanks and over 1 thousand aircraft (according to Soviet data); 200 thousand people and 210 tanks (according to German data). The Wehrmacht had 15 infantry divisions in this direction and 4 tank divisions in the operational reserve (6th, 7th, 11th and 19th). Already during the battle, the German command transferred from the Donbass and the Oryol direction, the SS Panzer Division "Viking" and the 17th Panzer Division, the SS Panzer Divisions " Greater Germany”, “Reich”, “Dead Head” and the 3rd Panzer Division. The Kharkov group was also reinforced with three infantry divisions.

It is officially believed that the beginning of the offensive operation of the Soviet troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. As early as July 16, the German command, fearing that the troops in the Prokhorovka area would fall victim to the flank attacks of the Red Army, ordered to begin retreating to their original positions under the cover of strong rearguards. The offensive of the Western and Bryansk fronts, which began on July 12, and on July 15 of the Central Front on the Oryol Bulge, also played its role. The troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on July 16. On July 17, units of the 5th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army were able to push the German rearguards and advance 5-6 kilometers. On July 18–19, the 6th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army joined the offensive. Tank formations advanced 2–3 km.

On July 18, the Steppe Front under the command of Ivan Konev was also supposed to enter the battle, but until the end of July 19 he was engaged in a regrouping of forces. Only on July 20, the troops of the Steppe Front managed to advance 5–7 km. On July 22, units of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched a general offensive and by the end of the next day, having knocked down German barriers, they generally reached the positions occupied by Soviet troops before the start of Operation Citadel on July 5. However, the further advance of the Soviet troops was stopped by the German forces, which relied on the former defensive lines and received reinforcements. The headquarters offered to immediately continue the offensive, but for its success it was necessary to regroup the forces and replenish the units with personnel and equipment. Having listened to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command postponed the further offensive until early August.

Artillerymen of a fighter brigade (combined arms type) are pursuing a retreating enemy (Photo by RGAKFD).

Plans of the Soviet command, preparation of the operation

The plan of the offensive operation was prepared by the headquarters of the Voronezh Front on the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The operation was named "Commander Rumyantsev", in honor of the great Russian commander of the 18th century, the winner of the Prussian troops Frederick the Great and the Turkish troops at Larga, Cahul. The first version of the operation provided for the encirclement of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping. The commander of the Voronezh Front, Nikolai Vatutin, wanted to conduct a classic version of the encirclement and destruction of enemy troops with converging strikes (“cannes”). They planned to inflict one strike in the Krasnopolye area, the other in the Chuguev area. One strike force was supposed to bypass Kharkov from the south, advancing to the west. The second grouping was to advance from north to south, bypassing Kharkov from the west. If the operation had been successful, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group, that is, almost the entire Belgorod-Kharkov group of the Wehrmacht, would fall into the "boiler". The second scenario was less ambitious and ambitious. It was proposed to deliver the main strikes from the Proletarsky - Krasnaya Yaruga and Chuguev area. If the operation was successful, the entire Kempf group and most of the 4th Panzer Army were to be surrounded.

However, in order to implement both variants of the offensive operation, it was necessary to concentrate large strike groups on the flanks, which would break the enemy’s defensive formations and break through to a depth of 250 km. To create them, it was necessary to carry out a series of regroupings of forces, which took a lot of time. In addition, the possibility of detecting these regroupings by German intelligence increased. Such a development of events did not suit the bet. Stalin gave about 8 days for the replenishment of units, the supply of ammunition and rest. The current situation required a strike as soon as possible. Soviet intelligence reported to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the Belgorod-Kharkov group at that time was seriously weakened. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was transferred to the Donbass, and the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland" - to the Oryol direction. This was caused by the offensive of the Southern and South-Western Fronts in the Donbass and the Western and Bryansk Fronts in the Oryol Bulge. However, both offensives of the Soviet troops were already running out of steam, and it was necessary to hurry, while the German selected divisions were tied up in battles in the Donbass and in the Orel region. In addition, after Operation Citadel, a significant number German tanks and assault guns were under repair. There was a replenishment of equipment of armored units. So in the Army Group South on July 31, 1942, there were 625 combat-ready tanks, 633 were under repair, 190 were on the way, 251 combat-ready assault guns, 84 were under repair, 11 were on the road. Most of the equipment needed short-term repairs lasting 6 to 21 days. If the preparation of Operation Rumyantsev had dragged on for a longer period, the Army Group South would have seriously strengthened its anti-tank potential.

The blow had to be delivered as quickly as possible, until the German troops recovered from Operation Citadel. Based on the instructions of the Headquarters, an offensive plan was developed. The main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, bypassing Kharkov from the west. This plan gave a significant gain in time, since it was not necessary to regroup forces. On the left flank of the Voronezh Front and the right flank of the Steppe Fronts, during the previous battles, there were already established strike groups. In addition, they planned to attack along the rivers, which weakened their defensive potential. After the shock groups of the two fronts entered the area west of Kharkov, the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was supposed to launch an offensive towards them. As a result, the idea of ​​encircling German troops was retained. But the encircled territory was smaller, and the strike force of the Voronezh Front was stronger than that of the Steppe Front. The offensive plan included very high rates of movement of strike groups. In 3-4 days they had to advance 100-120 km. Such a swift throw was supposed to lead to the defeat of the Belgorod-Kharkov group before the arrival of German reserves. From the air, the Voronezh Front was supported by the 2nd Air Army (753 aircraft), the Steppe Front - by the 5th Air Army (769 aircraft).

For such an offensive, fresh forces were needed. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts withstood the German offensive, but suffered serious losses. However, the Headquarters had reserves. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command is still in preparation defensive operation on the Kursk ledge formed very powerful reserves in case of a negative development of the situation. Even if the German armies had been able to cut off the Kursk salient, surrounding the significant forces of the Voronezh and Central fronts, the disaster would not have happened. The Soviet command had a whole new front that could close the gap. Partial reserve armies had to be used during the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk, the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle.

But most of the reserves were kept. They were used during Operation Rumyantsev. The steppe front was reinforced by the 53rd army under the command of Ivan Managarov. The Voronezh Front received the 27th Army under the command of Sergei Trofimenko and the 47th Army of Pyotr Kozlov (from August 3, the army was headed by Pavel Korzun). The 4th Guards Army of Grigory Kulik remained in reserve, they planned to use it to develop success or parry enemy attacks. In addition, the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army, which suffered significant losses in defensive battles, received reinforcements.

Konev put Managarov's 53rd army at the forefront of the front, it was supposed to deliver the main blow. Vatutin did not transfer fresh armies to the strike force, there were already serious forces there - the 5th and 6th guards armies, the 1st tank army and the 5th guards tank army. Therefore, the 27th Army was to advance together with the 40th Army, to the west of the main grouping of the Voronezh Front. Their strike was aimed at the southeast, in the Grayvorona region. The 47th reinforced the 38th Army on the western flank of the front.

In addition, the auxiliary strike force from the 40th and 27th armies solved the problem of possible German counterattacks against the main grouping of the Voronezh Front. If German troops tried to strike at the base of the Soviet strike force, then the 40th and 27th armies would have to take the hit. If the German reserves attacked the Soviet tank armies advancing in the vicinity of Kharkov, they would, in turn, be under attack by the 40th and 27th armies leading the offensive. To parry possible German attacks, these two armies received three tank corps (more than 400 tanks). Thus, the armored potential of the 40th and 27th armies was comparable to an entire tank army (the 1st tank army had 450 tanks). In addition, the 4th Guards Army was located in their rear.

Before the offensive, the Voronezh Front carried out an operation to mislead the enemy in relation to the area where the Soviet troops would strike the main blow. To the west of the assembled strike force, in the area of ​​Sudzha, they simulated the concentration of large armored and rifle formations. For camouflage, 8 radio stations, 450 tank models and 500 gun models were used. Radio stations imitated the work of radio tank formations. The infantry moved towards the front. These activities have been successful. The German command concentrated the 7th Panzer Division to protect this direction. The activity of German aviation in the Sudzha region also intensified, which began to bombard the "clusters" of Soviet troops.

German defense

The Belgorod-Kharkov group consisted of 15 infantry and 4 tank divisions. The German infantry divisions suffered serious losses in Operation Citadel and had not yet had time to fully restore their combat potential. The German panzer divisions received reinforcements and, having repaired the damaged tanks, were in good condition.

After the withdrawal of troops to their original positions, the Germans went on the defensive in well-fortified positions. The main line of defense was 6-8 km wide and consisted of two positions, which had strong points connected by trenches and communications. The second defensive line was located 2-3 km from the front line, having various engineering, defensive structures and long-term firing points. The total tactical defense zone of the German troops was 15-18 km. All settlements in the defensive zone were prepared for all-round defense. especially great importance had powerful strongholds - Tomarovka and Borisovka. Belgorod was a powerful center of defense. At 50-60 km from the front line of defense, through Bogodukhov, Zlochev, Kazachya Lopan, Zhuravlevka and Vesyoloye, an operational rear defensive line passed. Near Kharkov, the Wehrmacht created two ring defensive lines.

Belgorod was turned into a powerful defense center. Many strongholds were built on its territory. Around the city, defending the near approaches to it, an external defensive bypass was created. On the outskirts of the city, a significant number of long-term firing points were built, stone buildings were turned into strongholds. The city was prepared for street fighting. Crossroads were blocked by barricades, they were shot through by machine guns. Many buildings and streets were mined. The northern and eastern parts of the city were covered with strong minefields.

Operation start. Liberation of Belgorod

On August 2, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts took up their starting positions for the offensive. For the headquarters of Army Group "South" Soviet offensive on this sector of the Eastern Front came as a surprise. The German command believed that the strike capabilities of the Soviet troops in this direction were depleted by Operation Citadel. The Germans did not expect the Soviet troops to go on the offensive so soon.

On August 3, from 05:00 to 05:05, a short artillery raid of all fire weapons of the fronts continued along the front line of the German defense. A pause was taken until 5.35, and then a full-fledged artillery preparation began, which lasted three hours. From 0755 to 0815 all barrels again fired powerfully at the German front line, at the same time the Soviet infantry, behind the fire shaft, began advancing to the first German trench. By 8.15 the fire began to move deep into the German positions. Simultaneously with the artillery preparation, Soviet aviation in groups of 20-30 aircraft bombed and fired at German positions with machine guns and cannons. Aviation also ironed the locations of German artillery and reserve forces.

At 0815, the Soviet infantry, supported by tanks, broke into the enemy's advanced trenches. At 13.00, when the rifle units of the 5th Guards Army wedged into the main enemy defensive zone for about 2 km, the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle. Tank formations were supposed to complete the breakthrough of the German defense and enter the operational space. Tanks were introduced into the gap in a narrow 5-kilometer section, it was a grandiose accumulation of armored vehicles.

The troops of the Voronezh Front on the very first day broke through the German defenses to the entire tactical depth. The arrows of the 5th and 6th Guards armies advanced 8-12 km. The 1st Panzer Army, which was forced to participate in the breakthrough of the second line of defense of the Wehrmacht, advanced 12 km and reached Tomarovka. The tankers of the 5th Guards Tank Army achieved the greatest success, advancing to a depth of 20-25 km. The operation went well, but not as planned. Tankers advanced 20 km, and not 40 km as originally planned.

The offensive of the troops of the Steppe Front also developed quite successfully. The artillery of the front dealt a powerful blow to the German defensive positions. Initially, however, the German troops withstood the blow. Then significant masses of aviation were thrown into battle. Stormtroopers and bombers dealt heavy blows to the German centers of resistance. For the final breakthrough of the German positions at 15.00, the 1st mechanized corps was brought into battle. During the first day of fighting, units of the 53rd Army and the right flank of the 69th Army advanced 7-8 km.

Forcing the Seversky Donets by soldiers of the 7th Guards Army. Belgorod. July 1943

On the second day of the operation, the first hitches began. The commander of the 6th Panzer Corps, Hetman, did not comply with Katukov's order - not getting involved in the battle for the well-fortified Tomarovka, bypass it and move on, inserting a barrier. In the morning, the hetman began the battle for the German stronghold, the corps lost 21 vehicles. Only the personal intervention of Katukov forced Hetman to continue the offensive in the afternoon, bypassing Tomarovka from the east. A motorized rifle brigade was left as a barrier. The 5th Guards Tank Corps, which was operationally subordinate to Katukov, also took part in the frontal attacks on Tomarovka. The corps lost 23 vehicles without success. As a result, two tank corps lost time, only Krivoshein's 3rd mechanized corps developed the offensive. The 31st Panzer Corps was in reserve.

On the same day, the situation in the air changed. Luftwaffe activity in the Belgorod region increased dramatically. German attack and bomber aircraft began to inflict heavy blows on Soviet mechanized columns. Mobile formations began to suffer heavy losses in people and equipment from the effects of enemy aircraft.

However, despite these interferences, Katukov's 1st Panzer Army was able to pass about 20 km that day. German reserves did not get in the way of Katukov's army. The 19th Panzer Division was transferred to Tomarovka, and the 6th Panzer Division to the Belgorod area. The 3rd mechanized corps was able to wedge between two German mobile formations without getting involved in battle with them. Soviet tanks continued to move south and southwest.

Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army was less fortunate on the second day of fighting. The guards entered the battle with the 6th Panzer Division of the enemy, which took up defensive positions prepared in advance in the area of ​​​​Orlovka and Bessonovka. The terrain was difficult to reach for tanks, with large quantity ravines, beams, rivers. German troops occupied the heights, preparing positions for tanks and anti-tank artillery. The approaches to them were mined. The German defense was also strengthened by the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks (6 "Tigers"). Egorov's 18th Panzer Corps ran into the German defenses and, having no opportunities for flank maneuver, stopped.

The 18th and 29th tank corps of Rotmistrov's army, after a tense first day of the offensive, had limited supplies of fuel and ammunition. We decided to bring into battle, which was in the second echelon, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps. However, an order was received from Vatutin to send part of the army's forces to storm Belgorod, to help the troops of the Steppe Front. The mechanized corps had to be sent to the east. As a result, on August 4, Rotmistrov's army passed 10 km. Komfronta was angry. Vatutin threatened Rotmistrov with a lawsuit for exposing the flank of Katukov's army.

On August 5, the battles for Belgorod began. Konev sent the strong 53rd Army around the city from the west, while the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Parts of the 7th Guards Army crossed the Seversky Donets and reached the eastern outskirts. From the west, the offensive was supported by units of the 1st Mechanized Corps (as part of the 53rd Army). The city was in a semi-encirclement and was attacked from three directions. The Wehrmacht offered stubborn resistance, clinging to every block and stronghold. The German command wanted to keep this powerful knot of resistance in their hands. However, the German troops could not withstand such a massive blow. As a result, by 18 o'clock Belgorod was completely cleared of the Germans. The Steppe Front solved the problem of liberating Belgorod. The turn of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps from Rotmistrov's army did not have a decisive impact on the collapse of the defense of the Belgorod resistance center. The steppe front coped quite well on its own.

On August 5, the offensive of the 27th and 40th armies began. As early as August 4, their forward formations conducted reconnaissance in force, probing the enemy's defenses. On the morning of August 5, a powerful artillery strike was inflicted on enemy positions, after which the armies went on the offensive. The defense of the 11th Panzer Division of the enemy was broken through on a 26-kilometer section. Soviet troops advanced 8-20 km in a day. From the complete collapse of the German defensive orders in this direction saved the entry into the battle of the 7th Panzer Division.

After the introduction of the 27th and 40th armies into battle, the Tomarov grouping of the enemy was under the threat of complete encirclement. In Tomarovka, the formations of the 255th, 332nd infantry and 19th tank divisions held the defense. The German troops held back the onslaught of the 6th Guards Army and the 6th Tank Corps, but now they were surrounded on both flanks. There was only one way to retreat - to Borisovka. On the night of August 6, the Wehrmacht left the fortified point. By the morning of August 6, Tomarovka was liberated from the enemy.

The 1st Tank Army of Katukov, due to the delay of the 5th Guards Tank Army, was forced to leave two brigades of the 3rd Mechanized Corps to cover its left flank. Which reduced the strike capabilities of the tip of the advancing forces. On this day, the tank army experienced the greatest resistance from the German aviation, and not from the enemy ground forces. In general, Katukov's army showed that day good results and traveled about 30 km.

Belgorod-Kharkov operation ( « Commander Rumyantsev» ) August 3-23, 1943 became the final stage of the Battle of Kursk - a defensive and offensive operation Soviet army in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. During these battles, a major offensive of the German army was thwarted and a powerful enemy grouping was defeated. By the end of July The Red Army succeeded stop the advance of the fascist troops on Kursk Bulge and debunk the German myth that in summer conditions the Red Army always retreats, and the victory goes to the troops of the Wehrmacht. The powerful offensive of our troops in the Orel-Kursk direction, launched on July 13, 1943, forced the German command to withdraw the troops of Army Group South in the direction of Kharkov. The forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts organized the pursuit of the 4th tank army. By July 23 German forces retreated to the lines occupied by them before the start of Operation Citadel.

The offensive was aimed at defeating the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping and liberating the Left-Bank Ukraine.

A rapid breakthrough of the German defense line prepared in advance seemed impracticable, but it was impossible to delay the development of the offensive: a long period of preparation for the offensive made it possible for the Germans to regroup their forces for defense. According to intelligence data, about 500 tanks and self-propelled guns of the Germans needed short-term repairs (2-3 weeks) and putting them into operation before the start of the offensive would significantly strengthen German group. Thus, the command of the Red Army had to make a difficult choice between an earlier start of the offensive and its power.

According to the plan of the command, it was supposed to strike with the flanks of the Voronezh (commander - General of the Army N.F. Vatutin) and Stepnoy (commander - Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts from the area northwest of Belgorod and split the enemy grouping into pieces. Towards our two fronts from the south, the forces of the Southwestern Front were supposed to strike and prevent the enemy from retreating from Kharkov to the west and southwest. With a simultaneous attack on Akhtyrka, it was planned to isolate the Kharkov area, preventing the enemy from bringing up reserves.

The operation was planned in two stages: defeat the enemy forces around Kharkov and liberate the city.

A distinctive feature of the future operation was that the strikes were directed along the rivers. Getting rid of the need to force water barriers was to allow the troops to maintain a high speed of advance. Another advantage of this direction was the protection of advancing units from flank attacks by riverbeds.

The large-scale event to mask the direction of the main attack deserves special attention. In the area of ​​the small river Sudzha, far to the west of the shock group prepared for the offensive, the concentration of a large number of combined arms and tank formations was skillfully imitated. Over 500 models of tanks and guns have created a whole fake army, preparing for the offensive. The radio stations imitated the operation of the radio networks of tank formations. The infantry simulated a massive transfer of forces to the front line.

Current page: 24 (total book has 44 pages) [accessible reading excerpt: 29 pages]

1.2. The concept of the operation "Commander Rumyantsev"

On the other hand, the top military-political leadership of the USSR in the summer of 1943 still sought to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy precisely on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, not allowing him to put in order the troops, weakened by losses after the offensive according to the Citadel plan. According to Manstein's subsequent assessment of events 603
Manstein E. Decree. op. S. 544.

In the second half of 1943, the Soviet command set itself the goal of achieving what it failed to accomplish in the winter of 1942/43 - the destruction of the Yug GA and at the same time the GA A on the shores of the Azov and Black Seas, since this success could have a decisive impact on the situation on the entire Eastern Front and open the way for the Red Army to the Balkans. Accordingly, to prevent this was the goal of the hostilities conducted by the GA "South" from the moment the operation "Citadel" was terminated until the onset of the thaw period in the spring of 1944.

First of all, the Soviet Supreme High Command set itself the task of organizing the destruction of a large grouping of German troops in the Belgorod and Kharkov region as soon as possible. However, the operation to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping of the Germans was conceived and planned in a completely different environment than the offensive against the Orlovsky bridgehead of the German troops - in conditions of extremely limited time at the final stage of the defensive battle on the southern face of the Kursk salient. In the 20th of July, after returning to the defensive at the starting lines, the German command began to transfer tank and motorized formations from its southern strike force to the Donbass and Orel regions in order to repel the Red Army offensive that had begun there. At the same time, those German troops that had retreated to their former defensive positions immediately began to reinforce them with engineers, prepare new intermediate lines in depth and allocate tactical and operational reserves.

In this regard, the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff urgently worked out operational decisions regarding the immediate transition to the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. When developing possible solutions, it should be taken into account that the configuration of the front line in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction was a wide arc that covered the entire location of the 4th TA and the Kempf task force of the enemy, the bulk of whose forces and assets were concentrated in the Tomarovka - Golovchino - Belgorod area . This dictated the decision to cover the entire Belgorod-Kharkov grouping of Germans through concentric strikes from the Miropolye-Ugroedy region to Valki and from the Martovaya-Pechenegy region to Merefa. At the same time, the organization of such an operation required the creation of strong groupings on the outer approaching flanks of both fronts, capable of completing operations up to 250 km deep without slowing down. This could be achieved only as a result of a complex transfer of troops to the right flank of the Voronezh and the left flank of the Steppe fronts, which required a lot of time and did not correspond to the prevailing situation. Firstly, by the time the Kursk defensive operation was completed, the main grouping of troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts had formed in the Oboyan-Cherkasskoye-Gostishchevo area, where two tank armies (1st and 5th Guards), three combined arms armies (53rd, 6th and 5th Guards), as well as most of the forces of the 69th Army. Secondly, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command believed that the operational situation required the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts to go on the offensive as soon as possible, until the Germans had time to organize defenses, replenish their units after an unsuccessful offensive and create reserves by transferring troops from the depths or from other front sections.

In addition, the area of ​​offensive operations of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was a terrain crossed by a significant number of tactical watersheds - rivers and streams with ravines and gullies. This area made it difficult offensive action Soviet troops and made it easier for the enemy to organize defense: most of them more or less major rivers, such as Vorsklitsa, Vorskla, Merla, Udy, Lopan, flows mainly in a southwestern direction, which created natural obstacles to an offensive in a southerly direction; when advancing in a southwestern direction, these rivers limited maneuver towards the flanks and created advantageous cut-off positions for enemy reserves; at the same time, the Seversky Donets River formed a natural defensive line of the Germans, covering their entire Belgorod-Kharkov grouping from the east. Therefore, the most advantageous direction for the use of tank and mechanized formations was the area between the rivers Vorskla and Lopan, while the nature of the terrain in front of the right flank of the VorF made it difficult for large masses of armored vehicles to operate here.

General Sergei Shtemenko notes 604
Shtemenko S. M. General Staff during the War: From Stalingrad to Berlin. pp. 228–230.

That the question of the need to defeat the enemy in a counteroffensive has already been considered in the most general form, since only the results of the defensive battle near Kursk could give full basis to develop the final plan of offensive operations of the fronts. In April-May 1943, the Headquarters and the General Staff were critical of proposals for possible ways the defeat of large enemy groupings, especially in cases where this was planned to be carried out by encirclement. Experience showed that in terms of timing, the complexity of the maneuver, the balance of forces and other conditions of a specific situation, not every enemy grouping was profitable to encircle. In particular, this directly applied to the forces of the German troops defending in the area of ​​Belgorod and Kharkov. In favor of the encirclement of the Belgorod-Kharkov group, the commander of the VorF, General Nikolai Vatutin, was the first to speak out, but the General Staff had a different opinion, guided by the following arguments. First of all, the enemy forces here were very large: the German 4th Panzer Army and the so-called Task Force Kempf, numbering a total of eighteen divisions, including four tank divisions. It was also necessary to take into account the powerful two-lane defensive system of the German troops, the creation of which began in March. Breaking through the defense of the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping, its encirclement and subsequent liquidation was a difficult task, the solution of which would have chained a large number of Soviet troops to itself for a long time, diverting them from the offensive on the Dnieper, which would allow the enemy to create a new strong defense on the right bank of the Dnieper.

In this regard, in General Staff a plan was worked out to encircle and destroy the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping in parts, starting with its main forces north of Kharkov, by delivering converging strikes from the Sumy region to the southeast and from the Volchansk region to the west. However, to carry out such strikes, large regroupings of troops and a long time were required, which provided the enemy with the opportunity to reorganize and replenish the units and formations of the Yug GA, weakened after Operation Citadel. Consequently, this option was also declared unacceptable. As a result, the General Staff came to the final conclusion: the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping of German troops should be isolated from the influx of reserves from the west, for which it is necessary to use the two tank armies available north of Belgorod, with their help, break open and disorganize the entire enemy defense, dismember her deep blows and only after that destroy the enemy in parts.

Commander of the 40th VorF Army, General Kirill Moskalenko (Marshal Soviet Union since 1955) recalls 605
Moskalenko K. S. Decree. op. pp. 79–80.

That at a meeting on the forthcoming offensive, he expressed considerations on the plan of the operation, which consisted in the fact that the main forces of the VorF would strike from the Krasnopolye-Soldatskoye line in the general direction of Akhtyrka, Poltava. This would make it possible to cover the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping from the west and, in cooperation with the troops of the Steppe and Southwestern Fronts, encircle and destroy it, repeating Stalingrad on an even larger scale. In addition, such an idea opened up the prospect of delivering the main blow in the 40th A zone, which would have to act not on the auxiliary, as planned, but on the main direction. However, the proposal to shift the direction of the main attack somewhat to the west was not accepted. Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov replied to Moskalenko that now the VorF did not have enough strength for the proposed deep coverage and encirclement of the enemy, so the Supreme Commander ordered to hit the enemy on the head - on his main forces, which are concentrated near Belgorod. However, Zhukov agreed with the proposal to the extent that it was necessary to intensify the strike on the enemy in the 40th A band and, for this purpose, to bring into battle a fresh 27th A not in the 6th Guards band. A, as outlined earlier, but on the left flank of the 40th A. Thus, it became clear that the Headquarters proceeded from the desire not to give the enemy time to further strengthen the defense, which could be achieved only if the planned strike was delivered as faster.

As a result, the task of destroying the Belgorod-Kharkov group of Germans was to be solved by dividing it into two parts as a result of a powerful strike by a group of Soviet troops concentrated in the Oboyan - Cherkasskoye - Gostishchevo area (53rd and 69th, 5th and 6th guards combined arms armies, 1st and 5th guards tank armies). The general direction of this attack was determined on Bogodukhov - Valki, due to which coverage was achieved from the west of the Kharkov grouping of the enemy. At the same time, for the first time during the war, it was supposed to use two tank armies as a mobile front group to develop success in one direction. 606
Cm.: Decree. op. S. 280.

It was also planned to deliver an auxiliary strike by part of the forces from the Stary Saltov - Martovaya area to the Basis. Western part the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping was supposed to defeat with a deep blow part of the VorF forces from the Krasnaya Yaruga - Kresanov - Soldatskoye area to Akhtyrka, with the aim of encircling the Tomarovsko-Borisov group of Germans by the forces of the 27th and 6th guards armies, as well as destroying enemy forces defending in the area Big Bobrik - Krasnopolye, by a flank attack of the 40th A from the Kresanov area to Boromlya. At the same time, the Psel River, flowing in the western part of the area of ​​the forthcoming hostilities, although it was an obstacle to the offensive from the Miropolye-Krasnopolye region to the west, at the same time served as a cover for the right flank of the troops advancing southward on Bogodukhov.

The new operation conceived in this way received the code name "Commander Rumyantsev". The plan of action arose towards the end of the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk, the plan for the offensive operation in its final form was developed on the basis of instructions from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, given on July 22, 1943, and after July 23, direct work began on the plan - including on the ground 607
Cm.: Battle Near Kursk: From Defense to Offensive. S. 455.

The fighting did not actually stop, the Headquarters did not provide a long operational pause for the transition from defense to offensive, so the development of the operation plan was peculiar - it was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters and the Military Councils of the fronts and proceeded mainly in the troops. So, on July 22, the representative of the Stavka, Marshal Zhukov, held a meeting at the headquarters of the VorF on the preparation for the upcoming offensive; On July 27, he met with the commander of the 53rd Army, StepF, and on the same day reported that he had worked out a decision on the offensive operation with him; On July 31, he heard the decisions of the army and corps command for an operation at the headquarters of the 5th Guards. TA. In addition to representatives of the Headquarters, the Military Councils of the Voronezh, Steppe and South-Western fronts actively participated in the development of the plan for the operation "Commander Rumyantsev". On August 1, Marshal Zhukov arrived in Moscow, agreed with Stalin on the main provisions of the plan, after which the fronts immediately set tasks for the armies, and the operation began.

Written or graphic document with general plan operation "Commander Rumyantsev" did not exist - the Headquarters and the General Staff meant by this code name not a specific document, but coordinated action plans for the Voronezh, Steppe and part of the forces of the Southwestern Fronts in August 1943, united by a common goal and a single leadership 608
Cm.: Shtemenko S. M.

In a documented form, the plan of the operation appeared after it had begun, when the operational side of the offensive was outlined in the reports of the Military Councils of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts dated August 5 and 6, 1943, respectively, and then refined in accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters. In the future, the plans for the operation were adjusted by the command of the fronts and the Headquarters, taking into account the development of the operational situation.

At the end of July 1943, the operation was supposed to involve the forces of three fronts - Voronezh, Steppe and South-Western, the purpose of which was to defeat the enemy in the Belgorod and Kharkov region, which opened the way for the Soviet troops to the Dnieper, made it possible to seize crossings on this river and cut off the enemy's withdrawal route from the Donbass to the west. Taken together, all this promised great operational benefits. It was planned to fulfill the plan in two stages: at the first stage, defeat the German troops to the north, east and immediately south of Kharkov, and then, at the second stage, liberate the city of Kharkov. Thus, the main goals of the operation "Commander Rumyantsev" were the defeat of the grouping of German troops in the Belgorod and Kharkov region, the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper, the capture of crossings and blocking the enemy's retreat from the Donbass to the west, which created the conditions for the complete liberation of Left-Bank Ukraine 609
Cm.: Great Shtemenko S. M. General Staff during the War: From Stalingrad to Berlin. S. 231.

Since the operation "Commander Rumyantsev" was the main one on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the actions of the Soviet troops in other directions (in particular, in the Donbass) were planned taking into account its interests. This was controlled by Marshal Vasilevsky, who at that time was as a representative of the Stavka on the Southwestern and Southern fronts, together with their command, developing plans to defeat the enemy in the Donbass.

1.3. Forces and means concentrated by the Soviet side for the operation "Commander Rumyantsev"

In the course of preparation, the composition of the forces involved in the operation was finally formed. As a result of the regroupings carried out, the VorF included the 38th A, 40th A (the army was given the 2nd TC), 27th A (the army was given the 10th and 4th Guards Tank Corps), 6th Guards. A (the army was attached to the 5th Guards Corps), 5th Guards. A, 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies, 2nd VA. By the end of July 23, VorF troops occupied the line Snagost - Uspenskoye, Glushinsky:

- 38th A on the section Snagost - Alekseevka - Uspenskoye (exclusively);

- 40th A on the section Uspenskoye - Bubny;

- 6th Guards. And on the site Gertsovka - Trirechnoe;

- The 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies in the Trirechnoye sector (exclusively) - Glushinsky (the tank army was preparing to enter the front reserve).

The VorF reserve consisted of the 27th and 1st tank armies, concentrated in the area of ​​Beloe - Bobrava - Pena (27th A) and in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bIvnya - Melovoye (17 km southwest of Ivny) - Vladimirovka (1st TA).

The 69th A, 7th Guards were included in the StepF. A, 53rd A with 1st micron, 5th VA 610
Cm.: Konev I. S. Decree. op. S. 21.

By the end of July 23, the StepF troops reached the line Glushinsky (exclusively) - Melehovo - Myasoedovo - Razumnoye and further along the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets River to Volchansk:

- 53rd A on the section Glushinsky (exclusively) - Kiselevo (9 km southeast of the Vistula) (exclusively);

- 69th A on the section Kiselevo - Myasoedovo (exclusively);

- 7th Guards. And on the section Myasoedovo - Reasonable - Volchansk.

South of StepF (south of Volchansk), along the line of the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets River, troops of the SWF were deployed, including the right-flank 57th A, which was planned to be used in the operation "Commander Rumyantsev" as part of StepF, which occupied the Volchansk (exclusively) - Malinovka section .

Nominally StepF were also subordinated to the 47th A with the 3rd Guards. MK and 4th Guards. And with the 3rd Guards. shopping malls, concentrated in the areas of Korocha - Novaya Sloboda - Alekseevka (47th A) and Chernyanka - Orlik - Loznoye (4th Guards A). However, in fact, their operational use was not allowed without agreement with the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, where it was planned to bring these armies into battle to develop an offensive in the VorF zone, so that before the start of the operation, they were both withdrawn to the Headquarters reserve 611
Cm.: Koltunov G. A., Solovyov B. G. Decree. op. S. 279.

Therefore, on July 30, 1943, General Ivan Konev reported to the Stavka representative, Marshal Zhukov, that the Steppe Front had been assigned active tasks, but the four best armies of the front (5th and 5th Tank Guards Armies, 27th A with 4th Guards TK, 4th Guards A with 3rd Guards shopping mall - P. B.) transferred to the Voronezh Front; included in the Steppe Front, the 69th and 7th Guards Armies of the Voronezh Front, as a result of the July battles, have a small number of divisions and heavy losses in the materiel of artillery and weapons; there are few tanks in the front - in the 53rd A there are only 60 tanks, in the 69th A - 88 tanks, in the 7th Guards. A - 50 tanks, in the 1st mechanized corps - 200 tanks 612
Cm.: Konev I. S. Decree. op. S. 22.

In this regard, Konev asked to strengthen the front with one tank corps, which he considered possible to take from VorF (4th or 3rd Guards Tank Corps), and also to transfer StepF to the 4th Guards. A or 52nd A.

In addition, the 5th assault (until July 21, 1943 - the 8th mixed air corps) and the 10th fighter air corps of the 5th VA StepF (army commander General Sergei Goryunov, chief of staff General Nikolai Seleznev) in mid-July were not yet ready to conduct combat work - they were understaffed with poorly trained and unexperienced flight personnel, and a significant part of the equipment was worn out and needed repair 613
Cm.: Gorbach V. Decree. op. pp. 334–335.

At the same time, in order to optimally organize the redeployment of the 2nd and 5th air armies, the command of the air forces of the Red Army made a change in their combat strength. On July 18–19, the two corps mentioned above were transferred to the 2nd VA VorF, from where the 4th fighter, 1st assault and 1st bomber air corps came under the control of the 5th VA. As a result, insufficiently trained and technically ready aviation units were under the command of General Krasovsky, and General Goryunov had to solve the problem of replenishing the combat losses suffered by the formations of the 2nd VA during the Kursk defensive operation - 170 new aircraft were required to equip the arriving corps 614
Cm.: Gorbach V. Decree. op. pp. 336–337.

The position of the 5th VA was further complicated by the fact that its formations were relocated to airfields previously occupied by the 2nd VA, from where the outgoing units of the technical and logistics services of this army, contrary to the instructions of the Air Force command, removed all inventory, all stocks, supplies and materials, up to to kitchen boilers. On the other hand, the 2nd VA had a shortage of vehicles - up to 55 percent of the prescribed amount, which caused delays in the delivery of ammunition and fuel and lubricants (the stock of fuel and lubricants was about 60 percent of the norm, the stock of bombs and shells - 55 - 65 percent) 615
Cm.: Gorbach V. Decree. op. pp. 339–340.

Regarding fuel reserves, the total reserves of motor gasoline available at VorF and especially at StepF did not ensure an uninterrupted supply of troops even by the time the offensive operation began. 616
Cm.: Koltunov G. A., Solovyov B. G. Decree. op. pp. 283–284.

Moreover, like the 2nd VA, a number of operational formations of both fronts were understaffed with vehicles. Thus, the staffing of the 1st TA for vehicles was about 55 percent - more than 3 thousand vehicles were missing 617
Cm.: The hatches were opened in Berlin. Battle path of the 1st Guards Tank Army. M.: Military Publishing House, 1973. S. 71.

The lack of fuel and transport reduced the maneuverability and mobility of units and formations, especially artillery.

As you can see, before the start of the planned operation, the Soviet troops needed time to prepare and increase their combat capability. Marshal Zhukov notes 618
Zhukov G.K. Decree. op. pp. 467–468.

That the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, having reached the front line of the German defense on July 23, could not immediately go on the counteroffensive, although this was demanded by the Supreme Commander. It was necessary to replenish fuel, ammunition and other types of logistics, organize the interaction of all types of troops, thorough reconnaissance, and make some regrouping of troops, especially artillery and tanks. In addition, all commanders and staffs, especially the leadership of the StepF, needed to get acquainted with the situation, and the troops needed to go to their assigned lanes and set up rear work in a new way. According to the most stringent estimates, all this took at least eight days, but Stalin hurried with the start of the battle. Only with great difficulty, after repeated negotiations, Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky managed to convince him not to rush into action and start the operation when it was fully prepared and financially secured. In connection with the position of Stalin, the opinion of A. Tomzov is interesting 619
Cm.: Tomzov A. Losses of armored vehicles of Army Group "South" in the Battle of Kursk. German armored vehicles on the Kursk Bulge. Appendix III // Battle Near Kursk: From Defense to Offensive. S. 823.

What if the Soviet offensive had been postponed and started not on August 3, but later, then the Germans managed to restore much more armored vehicles damaged during Operation Citadel, and then the course of hostilities could have developed somewhat differently, in any case, the Red Army met would have a much stronger resistance. On the other hand, the difference in the timing of the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operations allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to transfer the 16th and 17th breakthrough artillery divisions, 3rd Guards. Mindivizion and command of the 7th AKP RGK from the Western and Bryansk fronts after they completed the tasks of ensuring a breakthrough in the enemy's defenses.

On August 1, 1943, the combat strength of eight combined arms (27, 38, 40, 53, 69, 5, 6, 7th guards) and two tank (1st and 5th guards) armies of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts with attached forces and means of reinforcement included: 15 rifle corps 620
The directorates of the four corps are at the disposal of the command of the fronts. ( Note. ed.)

(50 rifle divisions); 8 tank and 3 mechanized corps; artillery corps (2 artillery and 1 guards mortar divisions); corpus area air defense(5 anti-aircraft artillery divisions); 3 separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions; 3 fighter brigades; 7 separate tank brigades; 4 separate artillery brigades and 5 separate anti-tank artillery brigades; 16 separate tank and 10 separate self-propelled artillery regiments; 41 separate artillery, guards mortar, anti-tank, anti-aircraft regiment; 1 separate artillery battalion and 2 armored train battalions 621
Cm.: fiery arc ... S. 590-591.

In the units and formations of the two fronts, there were about 1144 thousand people (of which 656 thousand combat personnel), 14 376 guns and mortars (including rocket launchers, but excluding 50-mm mortars), 2439 tanks and self-propelled guns deployed on the front with a length of 244 km (in the strip occupied by one Worf until July 18) 622
Cm.: Goncharov V. Battle Near Kursk: From Defense to Offensive. pp. 764–765; Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. S. 81; fiery arc. pp. 598–599; Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century. S. 287.

It should be noted here that a comparison of data on the combat composition and strength of the forces and means of the two indicated fronts suggests an underestimation of the total number of their armored vehicles. By the beginning of the operation, 4 tank and 2 mechanized corps, 1 separate tank and 6 self-propelled artillery regiments as part of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies, according to some reports 623
Cm.: Babajanyan A. Kh., Popel N. K., Shalin M. A., Kravchenko I. M. Decree. op. S. 67; Katukov M. E. Decree. op. S. 573; Ratio Kursk battle. The decisive turning point of World War II. pp. 361, 364; Rotmistrov P. A. Steel Guard. M.: Military Publishing House, 1984. S. 206.

There were up to 1105 tanks and self-propelled guns (1st TA - 562 tanks and self-propelled guns, of which 542 combat-ready; 5th Guards TA - 543 tanks and self-propelled guns, of which 503 combat-ready). As part of 7 separate tank brigades (53 tanks each), 15 separate tank and 4 separate self-propelled artillery regiments (39 tanks each and from 12 to 21 self-propelled guns per regiment), attached to the combined arms armies of two fronts, the state should have had at least 1 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and the 1st mechanized and 4th guards. the tank corps consisted of 204 and 189 tanks and self-propelled guns, respectively - a total of 393 combat vehicles 624
Cm.: Ratio forces and losses in the Battle of Kursk. Annex 3 // Kursk

In total, approximately 2.4-2.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns are obtained, however, three more operational-tactical tank formations remain unaccounted for - the 2nd, 10th and 5th Guards Tank Corps, which were involved in the operation "Commander Rumyantsev" from the very beginning of its implementation. In each of these corps, by the beginning of August, there were 100-150 tanks and self-propelled guns, in particular, when the 10th TC was withdrawn on July 16 for resupply, its units had 110 combat-ready tanks 625
Cm.: Zamulin V.N. Prokhorovka - unknown battle great war. M.: AST; Transitbook, 2005, pp. 503–504.

The 5th Guards and 2nd Tank Corps received armored vehicles from the VorF reserve for resupply, in addition to the fact that both corps had a repair fund for combat vehicles 626
Ivanovsky E.F. The tankers started the attack. M.: Military Publishing House, 1984. S. 135.

Consequently, the total number of armored vehicles, which both fronts had, should have been about 2.7-2.9 thousand combat vehicles, and not 2439 tanks and self-propelled guns (1972 tanks and self-propelled guns on VorF, 467 on Stepnoy 627
Cm.: Goncharov V. Statistics and comments. Appendix II // Battle fiery arc. pp. 764–765.

). In fact, according to some reports, VorF troops had 199 more armored vehicles - 2171 tanks and self-propelled guns 628
Cm.: Katukov M. E. Decree. op. S. 573; The ratio of forces and losses in the Battle of Kursk. Annex 3 // Kursk battle. The decisive turning point of World War II. S. 364.

Then the total number of armored vehicles on both fronts reaches 2638 tanks and self-propelled guns, which seems more reliable, given the likely shortage in individual armored units and formations that participated in defensive battles on the southern face of the Kursk ledge (for example, in tank brigades of the 6th TC 1- th TA by the beginning of the operation there were 40–45 tanks each 629
Cm.: Getman A. L. Tanks go to Berlin. M .: Military Publishing House, 1982. S. 103.

). A similar size of the armored fleet of the two fronts - over 2.6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns - is also given in separate Soviet military-historical works, although two tank brigades of the 57th A South-Western Front (109 combat vehicles) are also taken into account. 630
Cm.: Soviet tank troops 1941–1945. M.: Military Publishing House, 1973. S. 138.

The formations of the 2nd and 5th air armies of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (22 air divisions) on August 1, 1943 consisted of 1311 combat aircraft - 748 and 563 vehicles, respectively (including 555 fighters, 435 attack aircraft, 285 bombers, 36 reconnaissance aircraft ), to support which 200 long-range aviation aircraft were additionally involved - more than 1.5 thousand aircraft in total (according to other sources, there were 753 aircraft in the 2nd VA before the offensive began, and in the 5th A - 769, in total over 1500 combat vehicles of front-line aviation, and a large number of new and repaired military equipment came from factories and from army workshops immediately before the start of the offensive, from July 31 to August 2) 631
Cm.: Goncharov V. Statistics and comments. Appendix II // Battle Near Kursk: From Defense to Offensive. S. 766; Gorbach V. Decree. op. S. 338; fiery arc. pp. 594–595.

In addition, in order to prevent the enemy from maneuvering with forces and means, during the period from August 4 to 15, formations of the 17th VA of the South-Western Front (a separate bomber air division and two mixed air corps - at least 300-400 aircraft) were also involved in the battle) 632
Cm.: Gorbach V. Decree. op. pp. 369–375; fiery arc. S. 482.

So the actual number of aircraft used in the operation was much more than 1,500 aircraft - apparently, about 2,000 aircraft in total.

Thus, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of 3.8:1 in terms of personnel (in terms of combat strength 3.3:1), 4.8:1 in artillery, 6.6:1 in tanks and self-propelled guns, at least 1.5:1 - for aircraft (most likely 2:1, and at the beginning of the operation at least 3.4:1). The average operational density of forces and means concentrated on the Voronezh and Steppe fronts reached 4.7 thousand soldiers and officers, 59 guns and mortars, 11 tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer of front, which was 4.7 times higher than that of the enemy, in personnel, 5.9 times in artillery, 5.5 times in armored vehicles. Consequently, the command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts theoretically had the opportunity to evenly distribute troops throughout the occupied zone and simultaneously go on a general offensive - the achieved numerical and material superiority mainly ensured a fourfold superiority, which was considered by experience to be quite sufficient to achieve success in an offensive against a pre-prepared defense .

These data fully confirm the opinion of Field Marshal Manstein 633
Manstein E. Decree. op. S. 545.

That in the area of ​​​​operations of the GA "South" the decisive condition for the course of the campaign was the superiority of forces on the Soviet side in the number and number of formations, as well as to an ever-increasing degree in their armament, which was already colossal by the end of Operation Citadel. So, according to German data, on July 17, 1943, 29 infantry and 13 tank and motorized divisions of the army group were to defend against 109 Soviet rifle divisions, 9 rifle brigades, 10 tank corps, 20 separate tank brigades, 16 tank regiments, 8 anti-tank fighter brigades; until September 7, another 55 rifle divisions, 2 tank and mechanized corps, 8 tank brigades and 12 tank regiments were recorded in front of the front of the army group (at the same time, the strike force of the Soviet rifle division, in comparison with the German infantry, was increased by attached separate tank brigades or regiments; the striking strength of one Soviet tank corps corresponded approximately to the strength of a German tank division; a Soviet mechanized corps outnumbered a German motorized division). Manstein estimates the overall balance of forces on the front of the GA "South" at a ratio of approximately 7: 1 in favor of the Soviet side (on average, the overall balance of forces, excluding aviation, was 5: 1 in favor of the Soviet side. - P. B.). Accordingly, the field marshal notes that such a numerical superiority made it possible for the Russians to attack not only in one, but often in many areas at the same time, having an overwhelming superiority in forces. In addition, it allowed the enemy to replenish their losses surprisingly quickly. So, in front of the front of Army Group South, the enemy was only able to withdraw from the front for rest once, and sometimes even twice, 48 rifle divisions, 17 tank and mechanized corps, and, in addition, monthly give all divisions 10 percent refill. (Indeed, the 1st TA VorF, which suffered heavy losses during the Kursk defensive operation, received more than 200 new tanks and by the beginning of August 1943 was completed by 82 percent in terms of personnel, 81 percent in tanks, 67 percent in self-propelled artillery installations, by 85 percent in terms of guns and mortars, although General Nikolai Popel claims that they did not allocate new replenishment to the VorF troops, therefore they conducted offensive operations with the forces and means that remained after the end of the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk 634
Cm.: Babajanyan A. Kh., Popel N. K., Shalin M. A., Kravchenko I. M. Decree. op. S. 63; Popel N.K. Decree. op. S. 181.

Soviet tank armies in battle Daines Vladimir Ottovich

Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation

The Belgorod-Kharkov operation was the final operation of the Battle of Kursk. Its plan was to break through the enemy defenses on a 22-kilometer section northwest of Belgorod with a powerful frontal attack by the adjacent wings of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, then cut the enemy grouping with subsequent envelopment and defeat in the Kharkov region. At the same time, it was planned to deliver an auxiliary strike from the Gotni area to Akhtyrka in order to ensure the actions of the main forces of the Voronezh Front from the west, and by advancing the right wing (57th Army) of the Southwestern Front from the Martovaya area to Merefa to assist the Steppe Front in liberating Kharkov.

By the beginning of the operation, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts numbered 980.5 thousand people, more than 12 thousand guns and mortars, 2400 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1300 combat aircraft. In addition, 200 long-range aviation aircraft, part of the forces of the 17th Air Army of the Southwestern Front and aviation of the country's Air Defense Forces, were allocated to support the troops of the fronts.

The Soviet troops were opposed by the 4th Panzer Army, the Kempf task force (since August 16 - the 8th Army) of the South Army Group (commander - Field Marshal E. von Manstein) and aviation of the 4th Air Fleet. In total, the enemy numbered about 300 thousand people, up to 600 tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1 thousand combat aircraft. He was inferior to the Soviet troops 3.2 times in manpower, 4 times in guns, mortars, tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.5 times in aviation.

The enemy firmly fortified the area of ​​Belgorod and Kharkov. The tactical defense zone consisted of the main and auxiliary zones with a total depth of up to 18 km. The main strip (6-8 km) included two positions, strong points and nodes of resistance were interconnected by full-profile communication passages. The second strip extended for 2–3 km. Between the first and second was an intermediate position. Settlements were turned into powerful fortresses, and all stone buildings were prepared for all-round defense.

It was planned to use the tank armies of the Voronezh Front in the main direction as an echelon for the development of success in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. The 1st Panzer Army received the task of building on the success of the right flank of this army in the direction of Tomarovka, Bogodukhov, Valka, by the end of the fourth day of the operation, to capture the Bogodukhov, Valki, Novaya Vodolaga area and cut off the escape routes of the Kharkov grouping to the southwest. The depth of the task is up to 120 km. The 5th Guards Tank Army was to build on success in the general direction of Zolochev, Olshany, by the end of the third day of the operation, capture the Olshany, Lyubotin area and cut off the Kharkov grouping's retreat to the west. The depth of the task is about 100 km. The introduction of both tank armies was planned to be carried out in narrow lanes: the 1st Tank Army in a strip 4-6 km wide, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - about 5 km.

By the beginning of the operation, there were minor changes in the combat strength of the 1st Tank Army (see Table No. 16). In the 3rd mechanized corps, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment was added and a motorcycle battalion was removed, the 6th tank corps received a motorcycle battalion and a self-propelled artillery regiment, and the 31st tank corps received an anti-tank artillery regiment and a separate anti-tank artillery battalion.

Table No. 16

10 days were allotted for preparation for the offensive. During this time, the tankers studied the terrain in the zone of upcoming actions, the nature of the enemy's defense, organized interaction, prepared the materiel and replenished stocks of materiel. Telephone and radio communications, as well as communications using mobile means, were organized with all interacting parts and connections. Operational groups were created in the army and corps, which were supposed to move behind the first echelon of the advancing troops. Staff officers were trained and trained on sandboxes to practice command and control. Much attention was paid to carrying out measures to disinform the enemy, which made it possible to draw his attention to the Sumy direction and ensure the surprise of strikes in the Belgorod region.

On August 3, after a powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the shock groups of the Soviet fronts went on the offensive. At the same time, the partisans began to carry out Operation Rail War behind enemy lines. On the Voronezh Front, the 5th and 6th Guards Armies advanced only 4-5 km by the middle of the day. Therefore, formations of the first echelon of tank armies and the 5th Guards Tank Corps were introduced into the battle to build up the strike. Building on the success of the rifle divisions, they completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, advanced forward units to the line of Tomarovka, Orlovka, advancing 12–26 km. As a result, Tomarovsky and Belgorod centers of resistance of the enemy were divided.

In the offensive zone of the 53rd and 69th armies of the Steppe Front, the situation was not so favorable. The enemy offered stubborn resistance. Therefore, in order to accelerate the breakthrough of the defense, the 1st mechanized corps was introduced into the battle. He completed the breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense and entered the area north of Rakov.

On the morning of August 4, the troops of the strike force of the Voronezh Front proceeded to pursue the enemy. The 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army was withdrawn from the battles for Tomarovka and sent behind the 3rd Mechanized Corps, which had broken through the enemy's second line of defense. Formations of the 69th and 7th Guards Armies of the Steppe Front on August 5 stormed Belgorod and immediately rushed to Kharkov. As a result, the front of the enemy defense breakthrough reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced up to 100 km, and combined arms armies advanced 60–65 km. This forced the enemy to begin advancing to the Belgorod-Kharkov direction of the divisions "Reich", "Dead Head", "Viking", the 3rd Panzer Division from the Donbass and the motorized division "Grossdeutschland" from the Orel region.

In turn, the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev was sent on August 6 to I.V. Stalin proposals for the further development of the operation "Commander Rumyantsev". It was planned to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army from the Voronezh Front to the Steppe Front, which was supposed to go to the Olshany, Stary Merchik, Ogultsy area. The 1st Panzer Army was planned to be concentrated in the area of ​​​​Kovyagi, Alekseevka, Merefa. On August 6, the commander of the Voronezh Front and the 1st Tank Army was sent directive No. 13449 of the General Staff on the use of the army's strike force in a compact manner, without dispersing its efforts in several directions.

The troops of the 1st Panzer Army, developing the offensive in a southwestern direction, liberated Bogodukhov with the forces of the 6th Panzer Corps on August 7 with a sudden blow. The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing the enemy's resistance centers in the Orlovka area, broke into Zolochev. The troops of the 6th Guards Army captured a strong defense center - Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed the Borisov enemy grouping.

By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Panzer Army reached the river. Merchik. The 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front. Troops of the 6th Guards Army reached the Krasnokutsk region, and formations of the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The steppe front approached the outer defensive contour of Kharkov and hung over it from the north. Formations of the 57th Army, transferred on August 8 to the Steppe Front, approached Kharkov from the southeast.

On August 10, Stalin instructed Marshal Zhukov to use tank armies to isolate the Kharkov group of the enemy "by intercepting the main railway and highway communications in the directions to Poltava, Krasnograd, Lozovaya as soon as possible and thereby speed up the liberation of Kharkov." For this purpose, the 1st Tank Army (260 tanks) was supposed to cut the main routes in the area of ​​​​Kovyagi, Valka, and the 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing Kharkov from the southwest, was to cut the tracks in the Merefa area.

Field Marshal E. von Manstein, in an effort to eliminate the breakthrough of the Soviet troops, pulled up the 3rd tank corps (about 360 tanks) to Kharkov, which he intended to use together with the Kempf task force to strike at the eastern flank of the wedged Soviet troops. “At the same time,” writes Manstein, “the 4th Panzer Army was to strike at the western flank with the forces of two tank divisions returned by the Center group and one motorized division. But it was clear that these forces and the forces of the group in general could no longer hold the front line.

The advanced tank brigades (49th, 112th and 1st Guards) of the 1st Tank Army on August 11 reached railway Kharkov - Poltava, breaking away from the main forces of the corps to a distance of about 20 km. In the area south of Bogodukhov, they met with the advanced units of the 3rd tank corps of the enemy, which was advancing to the line of deployment to launch a counterattack. As a result, a counter battle ensued, which lasted all day. “The pressure of the enemy grew with every hour,” recalled M.E. Katukov. “Now our army was defending in a one-echelon formation. All three corps deployed at the forefront and, having organized mobile ambushes on the heights, the edges of groves, the outskirts settlements fought heavy and grueling battles. Fascist attacks did not stop. The Nazis conducted continuous artillery and mortar fire, bombed our battle formations, which were not so dense by this time. So, for example, five tank brigades defending at the turn of Aleksandrovka - Sukhina - Krysino had only 40 tanks, and half of them were light.

The enemy managed to surround the forward detachments of the 1st Panzer Army in the area of ​​​​Kovyagi with superior forces, which on the night of August 12 were forced to break through to connect with the main forces of the corps. In this difficult situation, the commander of the Voronezh Front ordered the 1st Tank Army and one rifle corps of the 6th Guards Army to strike at the enemy troops that had broken through to Merchik and firmly secure the right flank of the front's main strike force.

On the morning of August 12, the 1st Panzer Army resumed its offensive. At the same time, the enemy brought the main forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps into the battle near Bogodukhov in order to defeat the troops of the Voronezh Front, which had entered the Bogodukhov area, and free the Kharkov-Poltava road. As a result, an oncoming tank battle unfolded, in which 134 tanks participated from the side of the 1st Panzer Army, and about 400 tanks from the enemy side. The enemy managed to push the formations of the 1st Panzer Army by 3–4 km. In the middle of the day on August 12, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps came to their aid. Together they stopped the enemy. The next day, formations of the 6th and 5th Guards armies entered the battle. With the support of front-line aviation, ground forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and then threw him back to his original position. The 1st Panzer Army, although it stopped the enemy, could not defeat it, and on the night of August 14 went over to the defensive.

The transition to the defensive was carried out in those battle formations in which formations of the 1st Panzer Army carried out offensive operations, trying to concentrate their main efforts on securing the occupied line. Therefore, the second echelons and reserves of the corps were located at a distance of 2-3 km from the forward edge, and then the depth of defense gradually increased. The defense was of a focal nature with the creation of a system of tank ambushes, anti-tank areas and minefields. Ambushes were located in a checkerboard pattern to a depth of 2–3 km, together with submachine gunners and anti-tank artillery units. Anti-tank areas were created in the corps and army units on a special basis. important directions each as part of an anti-tank artillery battalion or regiment. The army had a one-echelon formation and low densities of forces and assets. She conducted defensive actions together with the 23rd Guards rifle corps 6th Guards Army. The success of the defense organization was facilitated by reliable management and well-organized interaction at all levels. The formation commanders made decisions on the map, refined it on the ground, and then quickly brought the tasks to the attention of the troops, widely practicing personal communication with subordinates.

While the troops were engaged in the organization of defense, on August 12, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to develop the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. In directive No. 10165, the Voronezh Front was ordered to strike the 1st Panzer Army in the general direction of Valka, Novaya Vodolaga, together with the 5th Guards Tank Army, to cut off the escape routes of the Kharkov grouping to the south and southwest. After the defeat of this grouping and the capture of the city of Kharkov, it was ordered to continue the offensive in the general direction of Poltava, Kremenchug, and by August 23-24, the main forces would reach the line of the Yareski station, Poltava, (claim) Karlovka. In the future, it was necessary to advance to the river. Dnieper and go to it at the Kremenchug, Orlik section, providing for the capture of crossings across the river by moving parts. To ensure the offensive of the strike force, it was necessary for the right wing of the front to reach the river by August 23–24. Psel, where to firmly gain a foothold.

After capturing Kharkov, the Steppe Front was to continue the offensive in the general direction of Krasnograd, Verkhnedneprovsk, and by August 24-25, the main forces would reach the line of Karlovka, Krasnograd, Kegichevka station. In the future, develop an offensive to the river. Dnieper, providing for the capture of crossings across the river by moving parts.

According to the headquarters of the 1st Panzer Army, at the turn of Trefilovka, Fastov, Butovo, Trirechnoye, high. 233.2 in the first line, three infantry divisions (255, 332, 167th) and two tank divisions (3rd and presumably 6th) of the enemy were defending, which were equipped on average by 40–50% with personnel, 35–40% tanks and up to 70% artillery. At the Trefilovka, (claim.) Novaya Goryanka, Yamnoye, Pushkarnoye, Zagotskot sections, a defensive strip up to 7 km deep was created in advance with a highly developed system of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, along the entire front edge there are wire barriers of 2–3 stakes and trenches of a full profile . Bunkers and fortified observation posts were built on the front line and in the depths, and shelters on the reverse slopes. On average, there was one bunker, 3-4 shelters, up to 0.8 manpower battalion per 1 km of the front. In the same sector, the enemy had 25-30 regimental artillery guns, up to 12 105-mm batteries. Tank dangerous directions were blocked by minefields. The reconnaissance of the 1st Panzer Army failed to establish the outline of the true front line of the enemy's defense. On the second defensive line of Borisovka, Bessonovka, the SS Panzer Corps and the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland" were supposedly located. On the main and second lines, it was supposed to have, in addition to regular artillery, three infantry divisions and three tank divisions, four artillery regiments of the RGK (40, 54, 70 and 52 regiments of six-barreled mortars).

Meanwhile, the enemy did not abandon his plan to break through the defenses of the troops of the Voronezh Front. For two days, on August 15 and 16, he tried to do this on the left flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, but was unsuccessful. Then a strike was made on the morning of August 18 from the Akhtyrka area by the forces of two tank and two motorized divisions and a separate tank battalion equipped with Tiger and Panther tanks. They managed to break through the defenses of the 27th Army. At the same time, from the area south of Krasnokutsk, the "Dead Head" tank division attacked Kaplunovka. The commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army with the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 3rd Mechanized and 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps to meet the enemy's counterattack grouping. With blows to the enemy's flank, they stopped his advance towards Bogodukhov. Having reliably covered the Akhtyrka direction, General Vatutin decided to strike at the rear of the Akhtyrskaya enemy grouping with the forces of the 40th and 47th armies, the 2nd and 10th tank and 3rd guards mechanized corps.

2nd Tank Corps of General A.F. Popov, developing a strike to the south, on August 19, together with the 52nd rifle corps of the 40th army, captured Lebedin. After that, the main forces of the 2nd Tank Corps went to Tarasovka, and the 4th Guards Tank Corps of General P.P. Poluboyarova - to Akhtyrka. 10th Tank Corps of General V.M. Alekseev together with the 100th rifle division The 40th Army of the Voronezh Front liberated Trostyanets, cut the Sumy-Bogodukhov railway, disrupting the planned transfer of the Great Germany motorized division from the Oryol bridgehead to the Akhtyrka area. Using the success of tank formations, the troops of the 40th and 27th armies reached the Boromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka, Kotelva line.

However, the enemy managed to stop the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and even to push them back in some places. The formations of the 1st Panzer Army suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment. This forced the army commander to withdraw six tank brigades to the rear by August 22.

On August 23, the troops of the Steppe Front liberated Kharkov. This ended the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation, and with it the entire Battle of Kursk. Prerequisites were created for a general offensive, the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine and access to the Dnieper. Colonel-General G. Guderian stated: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat ... The initiative completely passed to the enemy.”

During the operation, the losses of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts amounted to: irretrievable - 71,611, sanitary - 183,955 people, 1,864 tanks and self-propelled guns, 423 guns and mortars, 153 combat aircraft. The enemy lost more than 500 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft.

After the completion of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, the 1st Tank Army (6th, 31st Tank Corps, 1547th Self-Propelled Artillery, 79th Guards Mortar Regiment, 385th Separate Communications Aviation Regiment) in accordance with Directive No. 40717 of the General Staff of 8 September 1943 was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the area of ​​​​the city of Sumy. For two night marches, the army concentrated in the indicated area. Here the troops were put in order, received replenishment, engaged in combat training. In October, the 6th Tank Corps was reorganized into the 11th Guards Tank Corps for its heroism, courage, steadfastness, courage, organization and skillful performance of combat missions. For the excellent conduct of the operation in the Belgorod direction, all units that were part of the 3rd mechanized corps were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the corps was given the name 8th Guards Mechanized Corps.

On November 26, 1943, the army headquarters received a new directive of the General Staff No. 42690 on its transfer from the morning of November 29 by rail to the Brovary region, Darnitsa. The army administration, the 8th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 11th Guards Tank Corps, army reinforcement and support units, and logistic institutions were subject to the transfer. The 31st tank corps was withdrawn from the army and transferred to the direct subordination of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

A day later, on November 28, a new directive of the General Staff follows, which noted that, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the 18th and 1st Tank Armies arriving in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from 24.00 on November 29 were included in the troops of the 1st Ukrainian front. Formations of the 1st Panzer Army were to concentrate on the right bank of the river. Dnieper in the area of ​​Svyatoshino, Tarasovka, Zhulyany. The army needed to be understaffed at the expense of replenishments arriving for this purpose, tanks, weapons, vehicles and other types of property. Tanks, materiel and heavy cargo were ordered to be unloaded in the area of ​​Svyatoshino, Boyarka, and the rest of the echelons - in the areas of Darnitsa, Brovary and Darnitsa, Boryspil with further concentration in marching order. On December 9, by directive No. 30263 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the army concentration area was changed to the Kolonshchina, Bashev, Shnitki area.

By December 10, the combat units of the 1st Tank Army were transferred by rail from the Sumy region to the right bank of the Dnieper and concentrated in the Svyatoshino region. The rear arrived here by 20 December. On the night of December 11, the advance of the corps, and then the army units, to the Myshev area began. The army troops were to take part in the Berdichev offensive operation. By this time, it included one mechanized and one tank corps, a separate tank brigade, self-propelled artillery and guards mortar regiments, two engineer battalions (see table No. 17). The army numbered more than 42 thousand people, 546 serviceable tanks and self-propelled guns, 585 guns and mortars, 31 rocket launchers and 3432 vehicles.

Table No. 17

From the book Kursk Bulge. July 5 - August 23, 1943 author Kolomiets Maxim Viktorovich

From the book Soviet tank armies in battle author Daines Vladimir Ottovich

Kharkov offensive operation (February 2-March 3, 1943) After the completion of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation, the troops of the Voronezh Front began preparations for the Kharkov offensive operation. Its goal is to complete the defeat of the main forces of Army Group B (up to

From the book Kharkov - the cursed place of the Red Army author Abaturov Valery Viktorovich

Stalingrad strategic offensive operation (November 19, 1942 - February 12, 1943) During the defensive battles in the Stalingrad direction, a lot of work was done on planning and preparation

From the book Battle of Kursk. Offensive. Operation Kutuzov. Operation "Commander Rumyantsev". July-August 1943 author Bukeikhanov Petr Evgenievich

Berlin strategic offensive operation (April 16 - May 8, 1945) As already noted, the plan of the Berlin strategic offensive operation was to break through the enemy

From the author's book

Kyiv strategic offensive operation (November 3-13, 1943) At the end of October 1943, the center of events on the Dnieper moved to the Kyiv region, which was the most important strategic node of the enemy's defense. With its loss, the entire southern grouping of enemy troops could

From the author's book

Berlin strategic offensive operation (April 16 - May 8, 1945) The chapter on the 1st Guards Tank Army details all issues related to the preparation and planning of the Berlin strategic offensive operation. So

From the author's book

Prague Strategic Offensive Operation (May 6-11, 1945) By the beginning of May 1945, Army Group Center (4th Panzer, 17th, 1st Panzer Armies; Field Marshal F. Scherner) operated on the territory of Czechoslovakia ) and part of the forces (8th, 6th tank armies) of the Austrian Army Group

From the author's book

Orel strategic offensive operation (July 12 - August 18, 1943) As already mentioned in the chapter on the 2nd Guards Tank Army, on July 12, 1943, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front, the Bryansk and Central Fronts launched

From the author's book

Berlin strategic offensive operation (April 16 - May 8, 1945) Considering that the chapter "First Guards Tank Army" covers all issues related to the preparation and planning of the Berlin strategic offensive operation, we will limit ourselves to the fact that

From the author's book

Prague strategic offensive operation (May 6-11, 1945) We are familiar with the situation that had developed by the beginning of the Prague operation, the forces of the parties, the concept of the operation and the tasks of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the chapter “The Third Guards Tank Army”. Directive

From the author's book

Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation "Commander Rumyantsev" (August 3 - 23, 1943)

From the author's book

Budapest strategic offensive operation (October 29, 1944 - February 13, 1945) After the completion of the Debrecen operation, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, together with part of the forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the Danube military flotilla, began

From the author's book

Vienna strategic offensive operation (March 16 - April 15, 1945) The Vienna strategic offensive operation was carried out by the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in order to complete the defeat of the enemy in the western part

From the author's book

Prague Strategic Offensive Operation (May 6-11, 1945) As noted in the chapter on the 3rd Guards Tank Army, the plan of the Prague Operation was to encircle, dismember and

From the author's book

Chapter 9 Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation "Kharkov epic" of the Great Patriotic War ended in August 1943, after the Soviet troops, having repelled enemy attacks on the Kursk Bulge, launched a counteroffensive and liberated, now

From the author's book

Part two. Operation "Commander Rumyantsev" (Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive