330 Infantry Regiment. How to take part in the project

HEROES OF THE 330TH REGIMENT OF THE 86TH RIFLE DIVISION

January 18, 1943 The blockade of Leningrad was broken and the ancient city-key was liberated. The first to break into Shlisselburg were units of the 86th rifle division Hero Soviet Union Colonel V.A. Trubachev and armored vehicles from the armored battalion of the 61st tank brigade of Colonel V.V. Khrustitsky. 34th Ski Brigade Lieutenant Colonel Ya.F. Potekhin, bypassing the city from south to northeast, cut off the retreat of the Nazis trying to get out of it. From the north, along the ice of Ladoga, east of Shlisselburg, the sailors of the 55th Infantry Brigade of Colonel F.A. tried to cut off the Nazis' retreat from the city. Burmistrov.

Trubachev V.A.

Hero of the Soviet Union Trubachev V.A., commander of the 86th Infantry Division

During Operation Iskra, which began on January 12, 1943. The troops of the 67th Army were to break through the enemy defenses in the Moscow Dubrovka - Southern outskirts of Shlisselburg section, 13 kilometers long. 86th division of the Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel V.A. Trubacheva advanced on the left flank of the breakthrough, in the area of ​​​​the northern outskirts of Maryino - the southern outskirts of Shlisselburg, including Mount Preobrazhenskaya. The task of the division was to break through the enemy defenses in its sector (south of Shlisselburg) and with the right neighbor of the 136th division, destroying the enemy, break through towards the units of the Volkhov Front. The assault on Shlisselburg was ruled out to avoid heavy losses. When forcing the Neva, the offensive of the division's subunits bogged down under heavy enemy fire. Nevertheless, by the evening of January 13, all three regiments (169th, 284th, 330th) were transferred to the left bank. On January 13, Divisional Commander Trubachev received an additional order - to liberate the city of Shlisselburg (previously, the division's task was only to block the city). This combat mission was assigned to the 330th regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Serov, the rest of the regiments of the division, advancing east of Shlisselburg with battles, went towards the Volkhovites ... During the seven-day battles in the offensive zone of the 86th division, the enemy lost 650 people killed and more than 900 wounded.

"For the exemplary performance of combat missions on the front of the fight against German occupiers, for exceptional services to the Motherland and the working people of Leningrad during the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad 86th Art. The division was awarded the high government award of the Order of Lenin. Division commander Hero of the Soviet Union V.A. Trubachev was awarded military rank general - major. He was awarded the order Kutuzov 2nd degree.

SEREDIN G.I.

Retired colonel, the first honorary resident of the city of Petrokrepost Seredin G.I.

On January 14, the commander of the 330th regiment, Serov, reported that Mount Preobrazhenskaya had been taken. It wasn't true. For an untrue report, Lieutenant Colonel Serov was removed from command of the regiment. The newly appointed commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Grigory Ivanovich Seredin, managed to achieve a decisive turning point in just one night from January 14 to 15. fifteen January, important strategic points were captured - the Shoe Grove and Mount Preobrazhenskaya. Preparations began to storm the city. Shlisselburg was a powerful node of resistance and was ready for all-round defense. All stone buildings - schools, clubs, houses, factories, churches - were turned by the Nazis into impregnable fortresses. Street intersections were strengthened, many bunkers, trenches and communication passages were built. Our fighters had no experience in street fighting. The command of the regiment decided to create assault groups of 20-25 people in each company. All groups knew who and which quarter to take by storm. To communicate with the headquarters and artillery, it was decided to give prearranged signals with rockets. Starting the battles for Shlisselburg on January 16, Seredin, with the support of armored vehicles from the 61st tank brigade, liberated the city by 2 pm on January 18 with relatively small forces (only two battalions) . For the liberation of Shlisselburg, the commander of the 330th regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Grigory Ivanovich Seredin, was awarded a high government award - the Order of Suvorov, 3rd degree. In 1975 G.I. Seredin became the first "Honorary resident of the city of Petrokrepost (Shlisselburg)".

Nezhenets I.N.

At 4 am on January 13, 1943. Assistant Chief of Staff of the 330th Regiment Senior Lieutenant I.N. Nezhenets with a group of machine gunners of 36 people imperceptibly crossed to the left bank of the Neva north of the "Vegetable" state farm. Breaking into the enemy trenches, they launched an offensive from south to north, destroying the garrisons of seven bunkers and several groups of machine gunners. At dawn, our fighters reached the southwestern slopes of Mount Preobrazhenskaya, where they were stopped by enemy fire. January 15, Art. Lieutenant Nezhenets with his fighters supported the offensive of the 3rd battalion of Captain Zavodsky, who by storm captured Mount Preobrazhenskaya.

PROTSENKO G.E.

During the crossing of the Neva in the 86th division, the 330th regiment suffered the greatest losses, since it moved on the left flank of the division and was closest to Mount Preobrazhenskaya, from where the enemy opened heavy machine-gun and mortar fire on our infantry. Suffering heavy losses, having reached the middle of the Neva, the battalions of the regiment lay down. Only dozens of fighters who were destroyed by the Nazis could reach the left bank.

After the unsuccessful crossing of the Neva, where the units of the 330th regiment suffered huge losses, the 1st combined battalion was formed from the 1st battalion of senior lieutenant Protsenko and the 2nd battalion of captain Bezzubik under the command of senior lieutenant G.E. Protsenko. At 6 a.m. on January 13, Protsenko’s battalion crossed the Neva in the area of ​​the Vegetable state farm (just below the Coal pier) and reached the southern edge of the Bashmak grove, which is east of Mount Preobrazhenskaya. On January 15, at 09.05, after a short shelling, the 1st combined battalion stormed the Bashmak grove. Protsenko's battalion crossed the railway embankment, and broke into the southeastern outskirts of Shlisselburg, occupied Pesochnaya Street, capturing several dugouts and bunkers there. During the battle for the grove "Shoe" was taken prisoner German officer, captain Steyrer, commander of the 1st battalion of the 401st regiment of the 170th infantry division. On January 16, the assault on Shlisselburg began. By evening, the 1st consolidated battalion took possession of a 3-storey stone house (engineering technical worker) on Oktyabrskaya street. An observation post was set up here. On January 17, the commander of the 1st consolidated battalion, Art. Lieutenant G.E. Protsenko was wounded, he was replaced by Captain N.D. Toothless. By the evening of that day, 17 blocks in the central and southeastern parts of the city had been liberated.

FACTORY V.

Captain Vladimir Zavodsky commanded the 3rd battalion of the 330th regiment. After an unsuccessful assault on January 12, his battalion crossed the Neva on the evening of January 13 in the area of ​​the "Vegetable" state farm. Advancing from south to north, Zavodsky's battalion was stopped by dagger machine-gun fire from the southern slopes of Mount Preobrazhenskaya, which was a strong enemy stronghold on the southwestern outskirts of the city. On January 15, according to the successfully developed plan of the new regiment commander G.I. The middle, Zavodskoy's battalion captured the height in 50 minutes. After a short artillery preparation, bypassing the height from the rear, with the forces of two companies and a detachment of submachine gunners, our soldiers took possession of the dominant height. During the assault, our infantrymen showed military ingenuity. They mounted heavy machine guns on three caterpillar tractors and moved up the hill from the side of the road. In the smoke and dust, the Nazis mistook them for tanks, which started a panic that our fighters took advantage of, having immediately mastered Mount Preobrazhenskaya. At this height, in numerous embrasures of bunkers, there were not only machine guns, but also guns. Most of the embrasures were turned towards the Neva. All the Nazis on Mount Preobrazhenskaya were destroyed, not counting a few prisoners. More than a hundred Nazis who were behind the embankment narrow gauge railway fled to Shlisselburg. By order of Captain Zavodsky, our artillery and mortars opened fire on them. During the assault on Shlisselburg, the fighters and commanders of the 3rd battalion knocked out German submachine gunners from factory shops, churches and many other buildings. It is officially believed that it was the fighter of the 3rd battalion of the 330th that so far raised the red flag over Shlisselburg at 14:00 on January 18th.

SENIOR LIEUTENANT OZERNIKOV

On January 12, when crossing the Neva, four rifle battalions of the 330th and 169th regiments, having reached the middle of the river, stumbled upon enemy machine-gun and mortar fire, and were forced to lie down on the ice. It turned out that many Nazi bunkers were not destroyed by our artillery. In this battle, an outstanding feat was accomplished by the deputy commander of the rifle company for the political part of the 330th regiment, Senior Lieutenant Azernikov, who replaced the departed company commander. When all units lay down on the ice under heavy fire, he raised the fighters to attack. Suffering heavy losses, the company reached the left bank. There, our fighters broke into the German trench, entering into an unequal, mortal battle with the enemy. In that battle, which lasted several hours, the entire company, along with Lieutenant Azernikov, died. A day later, when a unit of the 330th regiment, advancing from the south, occupied this place, our riflemen saw a trench where the heroes of Azernikov fought on both sides full of the corpses of German soldiers.

BREYMAN M.O.

During the assault on the Bashmak grove, Mikhail Osipovich Breiman, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, distinguished himself. At the head of a group of fighters, he captured one gun and destroyed two machine guns in enemy bunkers. In this fight, M.O. Breiman was seriously wounded.

GARKUN A.M.

During the assault on the Preobrazhenskaya mountain, the commander of the 7th company of the 3rd battalion of Art. Lieutenant A.M. Harkun. The company of Garkun, having bypassed the height from the east (to the right of the road), cut off its northern slope from the city and went to the Neva, after a short artillery shelling went on the assault. From the south, a company of senior lieutenant V. Semenikhin and a group of submachine gunners of Art. Lieutenant Nezhenets. After a short battle, the height was in our hands, and Garkun's company rushed to Shlisselburg and captured three blocks on the outskirts of the city. However, by order of the battalion commander Zavodskoy, the company returned back and entrenched along the narrow gauge railway north of Mount Preobrazhenskaya. During the liberation of Shlisselburg on the night of January 18, Garkun's company stormed the shops of the cotton factory from Preobrazhenskaya Mountain. Having broken through the barricades of trolleys and barrels at the tip of the island, Garkun surrounded the factory with his company and, with the support of the fire of our armored cars, destroyed all German machine gunners there.

Arginov K.

The Red Army soldier Kotrazbay Arginov acted heroically during the assault on the Preobrazhenskaya Mountain, who destroyed a machine-gun crew in an enemy bunker with three grenades. During the battle at the cotton factory, the brave fighter stabbed a German machine gunner with a bayonet and shot two, then destroyed two machine-gun crews in bunkers with grenades. For these actions, the Red Army soldier K. Arginov was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

MIKHAILOV V.M.

The commander of the assault group, Lieutenant Vasily Mikhailovich Mikhailov. During the liberation of Shlisselburg, his group destroyed 6 enemy bunkers. Mikhailov himself destroyed 5 fascists in only one battle. His heroic group as part of the 7th company of art. Lieutenant Garkun, breaking into the factory building with automatic fire and grenades, destroyed German soldiers.

Nosov P.M.

The Red Army soldier Pavel Mikhailovich Nosov acted heroically in the street battles of Shlisselburg. He destroyed an enemy bunker with a grenade, then one attacked five Nazis and destroyed them. Two fascists attacked the wounded soldier. Fritz Nosov killed one, while the other managed to shoot at our fighter, but our fighter, having gathered his last strength, grabbed his teeth into the throat of the enemy.

Most of the fighters of the division were Tula. In September-November 1941, the division was subordinate to the commander of the Moscow Military District.

In the period from October 13 to October 19, 1941, the division was based in the western part of the city of Serpukhov. During this period, individual parts of the division were involved in the combat missions of the 49th Army, Lieutenant General I.G. Zakharkin, to hold the enemy in the Serpukhov direction. Here the division took its baptism of fire. On October 14-15, 1941, the 1st rifle battalion of the 1109th rifle regiment of the division took part in the battles on the outskirts of the city of Aleksin in the Tula region and was completely destroyed by units of the 260th infantry division of the Wehrmacht. The 1st and 2nd Rifle Regiments of the 330th Rifle Division provided cover in the Tarusa direction, but did not engage in battle. On October 20-22, 1941, the 3rd rifle battalion of the 1113th regiment took part in the battles for the Vysokinichi district center of the Moscow region on the Protva River against the troops of the 17th Wehrmacht infantry division, as a result of the fighting, the 3rd battalion was almost completely destroyed. On October 19-22, 1941, all the surviving units of the division were withdrawn to Zagorsk (Journal of combat operations of the 330th rifle division. TsAMO RF. F. 1644, Op. 1, D. 9. L. 2).

On December 2, 1941, the division became part of the newly formed 10th Army (Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov).

In reality, the first to break into Mikhailov were units of the 328th Infantry Division (Colonel P. A. Eremin), which also included soldiers of the 330th Division. It so happened that the mounted signalman Kogtin, sent to the headquarters of the division, with a report on the capture of the city, did not find the headquarters of the division, and the report returned. At this time, the 330th division on the radio reported to the army headquarters about the capture of the city, allegedly only by its units. This further affected the accuracy of coverage of events outside the city of Mikhailov

At dawn on December 11, the 1109th Rifle Regiment (Major E.V. Dmitriev) of the 330th Rifle Division of the 10th Army advanced north of the village of Bobrik-Gora, and having crossed the Don on ice, managed to drive the enemy out of the fortifications by the morning of December 12, avoiding frontal attack. The German units left Bobrik-Gora and retreated to Sotsgorod. On the afternoon of December 12, the 108th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, having liberated the Maklets station, cut the Stalinogorsk-Uzlovaya highway. The German units retreating from Ivan Ozero turned to Bobrik Gora, but near Zelenstroy, in the Don dell, they were surrounded and destroyed.

On December 12, 1941, the forces of the 330th Infantry Division of the 10th Army liberated Stalinogorsk 1st (Sotsgorod), and the troops of the group of Lieutenant General P. A. Belov at the same time, coming close from the north to the 10th Army, occupied Stalinogorsk 2nd (Industrial district). On December 14, 1941, part of the forces of the division, together with part of the forces of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division, was released

330th Rifle Division (notes from combat characteristics) The 330th Rifle Division was formed in the city of Tula from August 28 to October 1, 1941 on the basis of the human resources of the city and districts of the Tula region. The term of readiness of the division was determined by the Headquarters - 11/15/1941. The combat path of the formation begins from the moment the order of the Military Council of the newly formed 10th Army of the Western Front No. 001 of December 04, 1941 on the inclusion of the formation in the Active Red Army is issued. On the night of 6.12. In 1941, units of the 330th Infantry Division, during the offensive that had begun, knocked out the German military outposts of up to 2 companies from Poyarkovo, capturing 3 prisoners, 17 motorcycles, a tank and other German military property. On the same night, the division captured the city of Mikhailov Ryazan region . The enemy fled and abandoned over 500 vehicles, armored vehicles, 18 guns, 20 motorcycles, 10 cars, 2 anti-tank rifles, 4 light machine guns and many other military equipment. (From the combat characteristics of the division, signed by the head of the Operations Department of the headquarters of the 10th Army, Colonel Sosedov, the military commissar, battalion commissar Gorin, on 10.4.42, TsAMO F.208 op. 2511 d.1047). This was the first battle for Major Andrey Petrovich Voevodin **, a native Muscovite and commander of the 1113th Infantry Regiment of the 330th SD and his subordinates. The regiment commander was closely connected with the Red Army masses, for which he enjoyed exceptional prestige and the love of his subordinates. The 1113th Rifle Regiment concentrated on the outskirts of the village of Poyarkova, which is 12 km from the town of Mikhailov by 2 p.m. on December 6. The combat guards of the Germans met with mortar and machine-gun fire, but were shot down by the offensive pressure of the forward battalions. The regiment received a further combat mission - to make the transition along the Poyarkovo-Havortov route and concentrate on the southeastern approaches to the city of Mikhailov. The enemy seriously fortified the cities, creating a powerful defensive knot here. For defense, the Nazis even adapted the city church and monastery, located in the northeastern ocarina of the city. Seven roads converged to the city, which was of great operational and tactical importance in building the German defense in this direction. The march of the battalions of the regiment took place from 2 p.m. on December 6, 1941, in the conditions of a snowstorm and severe frost. Because of this, the marching columns were hidden from enemy ground and air reconnaissance. By 20-21 o'clock. units of the division occupied the indicated areas, but units of the 328th rifle division, which also had the combat mission of capturing the city of Mikhailov, got stuck in the snow on the march and contact with them was lost. There was also no communication with the headquarters of the 10th Army. After a 2-hour wait for units of the 328th SD, the commander of the 330th SD, Colonel Sokolov *, realizing that keeping the personnel of the regiments in an open field in extreme cold did not bode well, at his own risk, in violation of the order of the commander, decided to start preparing to attack the city, sent reconnaissance and sappers to clear the approaches to the city (by the way, with which more than 300 mines were removed). Exactly at midnight, without artillery preparation, the 1111th and 1113th rifle regiments of the 330th SD with attached reinforcement units went on the offensive. When the battle began on the outskirts of the city, artillery began to fire at the enemy in various areas in the depths of the city in the mode of one high-explosive fragmentation grenade and 5 shrapnel shells with a fuse at 25 meters. Panic broke out in the enemy camp and he fled. The ability of the 41st and 63rd motorized infantry and 422nd artillery regiments of the enemy to defend was broken. By 8:00 on December 7, 1941, the city was captured and practically cleared of the Germans. Captured: 135 trucks and 20 cars, 100 motorcycles, 25 armored vehicles, 5 tractors, 30 guns of various calibers, 23 machine guns, 4 radio stations, 3 wagons with ammunition and an echelon with aerial bombs. The loss of enemy units in the city of Mikhailov amounted to only more than 500 soldiers and officers killed. The losses of the division in this battle amounted to: killed - 72 people. and wounded 134 fighters and commanders. When, on the open field in front of the city of Mikhailov, the advancing battalions of the 1113th regiment came under heavy enemy fire and the attack could be choked, the regiment commander personally led the Red Army men to attack. In the forefront of the attackers stood the commander and military commissar of the regiment - Major Voevodin A.P. and Senior Political Officer Mikhailov VV*** Encouraged by the personal example of their commanders, the fighters did not stop in their offensive impulse and stormed the city. Major Andrey Petrovich Voevodin was seriously wounded in the head and soon died (author's note - his wife Elena Alekseevna participated in this battle together with the regiment commander, in which capacity information has not yet been found). Military commissar Mikhailov V.V. was seriously wounded, the commander of the 2nd battalion, Senior Lieutenant B.A. Kuklin, was killed by the death of the brave. and other fighters and the commander of the regiment. The chief of staff captain Lisitsyn Vladimir Petrovich **** took command of the regiment. The place of the retired military commissar of the regiment was taken by the senior political instructor Krivalov. ***** Major Kupyrev was appointed the new commander of the regiment, who was later replaced by Captain Lisitsyn V.P. This battle was highly appreciated by the Military Council of the 10th Army, personal units received gratitude. This was one of the major defeats in the beginning of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow. Note: * Colonel Sokolov Gavriil Dmitrievich commander of the 330th Infantry Division (author's note - the second time Major General Sokolov G.D. took command of the unit from 11/02/1942 and was until 08/04/1943), 1900 the year of birth, Russian, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1929, in the Red Army since 1919, participant civil war in 1919-1921, Patriotic War from 6.-9.1941 and from 1.11.1941. During the war years, he also commanded the 154th Rifle Division of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of the 1st Baltic Front .... Awards: two Orders of the Red Banner (21.7.42 and 5.11.42), the Order of Alexander Nevsky (13.02.44 ). Data as of 2.1944. **Major Voevodin Andrei Petrovich commander of the 1113th Infantry Regiment of the 330th Infantry Division, born in 1900, Russian, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in the Red Army since 1919. Member of the Civil and Patriotic War. He died a heroic death in the battle for the town of Mikhailov, Ryazan Region, on December 7, 1941. Awards: Order of the Red Banner (posthumously) and the Medal of the 20th Years of the Red Army. Buried in Mikhailov. Wife Elena Alekseevna lived in Moscow, Mytnaya st. 23, apt. 485. *** Senior political instructor Mikhailov Vladimir Vladimirovich, military commissar of the 1113th rifle regiment of the 330th rifle division, born in 1910, Russian, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in the Red Army since 1931. Member of the Patriotic War since 1941. In the battle for the city of Mikhailov, Ryazan region, on December 7, 1941, he was seriously wounded and was evacuated to the hospital. Awarded with a medal"For courage." After recovering and studying at the Academy of the Red Army. M.V. Frunze Lieutenant Colonel Mikhailov V.V. in 1943 he was appointed commander of the 95th Guards. Infantry Regiment of the 31st Guards. rifle division, and from March 1944 on the Leningrad front, and from April 1945 guards. lieutenant colonel Mikhailov V.V. commander of the 684th Infantry Regiment of the 189th Kingisepp Red Banner Rifle Division, distinguished himself in the Courland operation. Updated data - Guards Lieutenant Colonel Mikhailov Vladimir Vladimirovich, born in 1910, Russian, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1938 (according to other sources since 1942), in the Red Army since 1932 he was called up by the Zamoskvoretsky RVC of Moscow. Member of the Finnish company 1939-1940. (Karelian Isthmus). Member of the Patriotic War since August 1941 on the Western Front and since March 1944 on the Leningrad Front. Slightly wounded in August 1941, seriously wounded on December 7, 1941 near Mikhailov. Awards: Order of the Red Banner Order dated 19.2.43, Order of the Patriotic War 2nd class Order dated 3.3.43 and Order of Alexander Nevsky Order 67 A dated 31.5.45 No. 1062/N, medals "For Courage" Order ZF No. 0128 dated February 7, 1942, "For military merit" on November 3, 1943, for long service, "For the Defense of Moscow" on May 1, 1944 **** Captain Lisitsyn Vladimir Petrovich Chief of Staff, commander of 1113 from December 7, 1941 th Rifle Regiment of the 330th Tula Rifle Division, born in 1893, Russian, non-partisan, in the Red Army from 1918 to 1923. called up by the Ukhtomsky RVC of the Moscow Region and since 1941, called up by the OK MVO. Member of the Civil War, fought against the Ural and Don Cossacks in 1918, 1919 and 1919 as part of the 4th and 9th armies of the Red Army. Member of the Patriotic War from 24.8.1941 - 6-7.12.1941 near the town of Mikhailov, 9.12.1941 near the village of Mizhanovo, Malye Belyn, Zhilevo, 10.12.1941 Bolshaya Kolodeznaya, 10.12.1941 near the village of Ivanovo-Ozero, Prudki, 12/12/1941 Malaya Kolodeznaya, 12/13/1941 Urvanka, 12/27/1941 Beregovaya, Besedino and 12/31/41 Belev. Has injury and frostbite. Captain Lisitsyn Vladimir Petrovich, commander of the 1113th Infantry Regiment, on February 14, 1942, died a heroic death in the battle for the village of Pogost Kirovsky district Smolensk region. Wife: Evgenia Georgievna lived at st. Malakhov Leninskaya railway, Kraskovskoe sh., 912. (Moscow region). ***** Senior political officer Krivalov Vladimir Ivanovich, military commissar of the 1113th Infantry Regiment of the 330th Infantry Division, born in 1911, Russian, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in the Red Army since 1931. Member of the Patriotic War since 1941 - Belev, December 29-31, 1941; the village of Malye Savki, February 17, 1942; Zhilino 20.2.1942; Lower Pesochnaya, February 5-9, 1942; on the passage of General Belov's troops on June 19-28, 1942. Senior battalion commissar Krivalov was seriously wounded in December 1942. After recovering, Major Krivalov served as deputy commander of the 203rd Army Reserve Rifle Regiment of the 5th Army, and in August 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Krivalov, in the same position as part of the 5th Army of the 1st Far Eastern Front, participated in the war with Japan. Awarded: two Orders of the Red Banner (1942 and 1945), two Orders of the Patriotic War, 2nd class (1944 and 1945), medal "For the Defense of Moscow". Information on the commander of the 1113th Infantry Regiment, Major Kupyrev, has not yet been found. Researched by Alexander Slobodyanyuk on March 17, 2012.

In April, only the 330th regiment of the 86th rifle division was left on the Nevsky Piglet.

Back in the autumn of 1941, tall beautiful pine trees grew here, along the coast stood the houses of the village of Moscow Dubrovka, but after several months of cruel, bloody battles, the picturesque corner was turned into a lunar landscape. There were no houses, no trees, even the fertile layer of the earth was destroyed by shells and bombs, there were half-filled trenches everywhere. About five hundred soldiers of the 330th regiment, who remained in the ranks, under the leadership of the regiment commander Blokhin, successfully repulsed the German attacks. But on April 27, the ice began to drift, and the defenders of the bridgehead were cut off from their rear. German soldiers, taking advantage of this, attacked our positions. Soon the Germans broke through to the Neva in many places, and the bridgehead was cut by the enemy into separate pockets of resistance.

The last line of defense was the command post of the 330th Infantry Regiment, the famous "Schurovsky" dugout: the last defenders of the bridgehead gathered here. They were led by the head of the regiment of the 86th rifle division, battalion commissar A.V. Shchurov. Communication with the "Nevsky Piglet" was interrupted, and in order to inform the right bank about the plight of the bridgehead, he ordered the wounded Major Sokolov to cross to the other side with a report and documents. At night, Sokolov, being under enemy machine-gun fire in icy water, was able to swim to the other side of the Neva, making his way between the ice floes floating along the river.

But the position of the surviving defenders of the bridgehead had already become hopeless. Not far from the dugout, our soldiers put on steep bank pieces of white cloth so that they could be seen from the opposite bank, and wrote in red, possibly in blood, "HELP!". In my painting, I depicted this tragic moment.

April 29 German soldiers they threw grenades at the last center of defense - the Shchurovsky dugout. "Nevsky Piglet" was completely captured by the enemy.

In September 1942, our troops crossed the Neva, knocked out the Germans from the "patch" and heavy fighting broke out here again.

No one will ever say for sure how many of our soldiers died on the Nevsky Piglet. According to various estimates, from 200 to 280 thousand soldiers. The foothold on the banks of the Neva is one of the bloodiest battlefields in the history of wars. But to our shame, many of the dead heroes, who at the cost of their lives tried to save Leningrad, remained unburied. I had to communicate with a resident of the village of Nevskaya Dubrovka, who talked about the piles of bones that he saw on the "Nevsky Piglet" immediately after the war. The representative of the search association "Return" Georgy Vladimirovich Stelets kept an old photograph taken by his father Vladimir Grigorievich in the late 60s on the Nevsky Piglet. Georgy, then still a teenager, stands at a rusty mortar, and the bones of our soldiers are visible in the grass. According to his recollections, the remains of our soldiers lay on the surface of the earth until they completely decayed in the mid-70s. The search teams that have been working on the Nevsky Piglet since 1990 find mainly those soldiers who were buried in trenches, craters and dugouts, that is, those who were hidden by the earth during the fighting.

In 1990, the search association "Return" under the leadership of Georgy Vladimirovich made a unique discovery. After a long search, a dugout was found, in which the command post of the 330th regiment was located, the legendary Shchurovsky dugout. During its excavations, Sokolov was also present, who helped the search engines in many ways. The remains of the last defenders of the "Nevsky Piglet" were discovered: the battalion commissar Shchurov, the major of the medical service Agrachev and other soldiers. The personal belongings of the dead were also found.

I wholeheartedly welcome you! Igor Vasilyevich, good afternoon. Good afternoon. Let's continue. Yes. Today we will continue the topic of barrage detachments, which, according to the beliefs of our accusers, always stood behind the backs of the Red Army and, accordingly, drove them into battle, because otherwise our people for some reason did not go into battle for Stalin. Or they shot in advance, like Mikhalkov's. We didn't get there yet, we were already shot. Yes. These are the beliefs we now have. And, unfortunately, it must be said that such ideas are very common. But, as we already found out last time, reality, as always, is very different from what the whistleblowers are telling us. That is, in reality, we really did have barrage detachments, and there were several types of them, which were created at different times and had different subordination. As we remember, there were also barrage detachments at the 3rd departments, which later became Special Departments (that is, the NKVDs), there were barrage battalions and divisions created in September 1941, but which, oddly enough for our alternative gifted audience, instead of shooting their fighters in the back, they, together with these fighters, took part in battles, including here near Leningrad. And finally, there were also barrage detachments created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD. Now we, in fact, are approaching that very famous order No. 227, which was issued in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Caucasus and Stalingrad. In principle, we have such a widespread idea that the barrage detachments appeared just then. But in fact, as I said, it is not. There it was created another type of barrage detachments, that is, army. Actually, I will quote here this order, No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin, which was given on July 28, 1942. Just with regards to the barrier detachments: “The military councils of the armies and, above all, the commanders of the armies: b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrier detachments (200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters of the divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland. "Alarmists and cowards". Yes, we always have people who, let’s say, have problems understanding Russian speech, they conclude from this that ... It’s easy to blame everyone, yes. Yes. But in reality, there was precisely the idea of ​​​​stopping the fleeing units, and shooting those who sow panic. Including in front of the formation, but not so that from a machine gun and everyone, but selectively. Accordingly, on July 28, this order is issued. In pursuance of this order, on August 1, the commander of the troops of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov gives his order No. 00162 / op, in which, again, regarding the barrier detachments, the following is said: “The commanders of the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies form five barrier detachments within two days, and the commanders of 1 th and 4th tank armies - three barrage detachments of 200 people each. 5. Obstructing detachments to subordinate to the Military Councils of the armies through their special departments. Put the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments. The barrage detachments are to be equipped with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions. Provide roadblocks with vehicles. 6. Within two days, restore the barrage battalions in each rifle division, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919. Defensive battalions of divisions to be equipped with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report on execution by August 4, 1942. As we can see, these new army detachments are being formed here, in accordance with Order 227, and the detachment battalions that have existed in all divisions since September 1941 are also being restored. But since, again, this kind of measures are, by and large, they are needed during a retreat or in defense. Since our army, on the contrary, tried to counter-attack in the winter of 1942 (and in a number of places successfully), there, accordingly, the need for such measures temporarily disappeared, but now these barrage battalions are again being ordered to be restored. Well, there were also barrage detachments at the Special Departments, which showed themselves in the same Battle of Stalingrad. And here I will immediately quote the message of the Special Department of the NKVD Stalingrad Front dated August 14, 1942 “On the implementation of order No. 227 ...”: “In total, 24 people were shot during the indicated period of time. So, for example, the commanders of the squads of the 414th rifle regiment, the 18th rifle division, Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, got cold feet, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by the detachment and, by order of the Special Division, they were shot in front of the ranks. I dare say, the squads remained in place, it was the commanders who abandoned their subordinates and ran to the rear. It happens, yes. Further: “A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-wounded his left hand, was convicted of a crime, for which he was put on trial by a military tribunal. On the basis of order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 people. These detachments are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns. Yes, by the way, I’ll clarify here: this is a report about the 4th Panzer Army, which was part of the Stalingrad Front, that is, three of these detachments were formed in it. “Operational workers of special departments were appointed as heads of detachments. As of August 7, 1942, the indicated detachments and detachments of detachments and battalions detained 363 people in units and formations in the army, of which: 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds. That is a suspicion of self-shooting. As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 to the staffing department, 73 to the special camps of the NKVD, 27 to penal companies, 2 to the medical commission, 6 people were arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people. shot in front of the line." What needs to be clarified here: it turns out that almost more than half of them were returned to their units without any repressions, 43 - not to their own department, but to the staffing department, 73 - were sent to the special camps of the NKVD, which were engaged in filtering prisoners of war, about which I already told you during one of the shows. For checking. And again, for the vast majority of them, this test will end successfully. Well, there, respectively, 27 people were sent to penal companies, 6 were arrested, 2 with suspicious wounds, they will apparently be checked to see how it was received, and 24 were shot. That is, again, instead of a brutal machine-gun execution, people were actually dealt with here and indeed some were subjected to, as they say now, repressions, but to say that these were innocent people and suffered indiscriminately, this is somehow in general ... Well, the key is - they were caught not by machine-gun fire in the back in combat positions during the battle, but detained in the rear behind the front line. In general, according to this order No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, that is, in about two months, 193 army detachments were formed, including 16 of them on the Stalingrad front and 25 on the Don (that is, this actually in the area of ​​the Battle of Stalingrad). At the same time, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, detachments along the entire Soviet-German front detained 140,755 servicemen who had fled from the front line (remember this figure - 140,000-odd thousand). Of the detainees, 3,980 people were arrested (that is, about 4,000), 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points. That is, again, it turns out that the number of people who have been subjected to any, let's say, repression, is less than 10%. The overwhelming number of detainees, moreover, those who fled from the battlefield, they were simply returned to their units so that they continued to fulfill their military duty. Again, let's go back, that is, through simple surveys, they find out who ran, who ran first, who yelled at the same time, "Let's run." Well, with the identified citizens, with the organizers - with alarmists and deserters - it is natural to have a special conversation. Well, what they shot - yes, but what you wanted, here, war time. Now they will break through and then ten times more will die, so you must be eliminated like mad dogs. Practically it is. Because, indeed, even starting from the time ancient world and the wars of that time, the army suffers the main losses during the flight, and not during the defense. Accordingly, since the Battle of Stalingrad was taking place just at that time, we are interested in what happened on the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front during this period (from August 1 to October 15, 1942) 36,109 people were detained (that is, approximately 36 thousand), but of them: 736 people were arrested, 433 were shot, 1056 people were sent to penal companies, to penal battalions - 33 people and returned to their units and to transit points 32,933 people. That is, the proportion is about the same, even in fact there is more more quantity those people for whom everything went well. Well, in general, it’s quite clear that the battles there are really very fierce, so it really happens that the nerves can’t stand it and begin to recede, but they were simply brought to their senses and returned back. In general, to put it mildly, it is strange: to destroy your own personnel against the backdrop of battles and the advancing enemy. And on the Stalingrad Front, 15,649 people were detained, respectively, of which: 244 were arrested, 278 were shot, 218 were sent to penal companies, 42 were sent to penal battalions, and 14,833 people were returned to their units and transit points. That is, there is generally a percentage of repressions, somewhere around 5%. Again, here I’ll just give a few examples of how detachments acted on the Stalingrad front during this battle. For example: “On August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control, retreated to the rear in a panic. The detachment under the command of lieutenant of state security Filatov, having taken drastic measures, stopped the soldiers retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines. In another section of this division, the enemy tried to break through deep into the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy. On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in a panic. The head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense. That is, right here, it would seem, this brutal scene - that machine-gun fire was opened, but over the heads of the retreating and as a result, respectively, the soldiers of these two regiments were not shot from machine guns by their own, but were brought to their senses and returned back to their former lines of defense and the enemy was stopped. “On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The consolidated brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized withdrawal. The actions of the detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces brought order to the brigade. The brigade occupied the former lines and, on the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya. That is, here we are, by the way, not the first time we are witnessing a scene when a barrage detachment not only stops the fleeing or delays the retreating fighters and brings them to their senses, but then, together with them, enters into battle with the Germans and, accordingly, also often suffers losses . Actually, this was the case in 1941, say, near Leningrad (I quoted the documents), this was also the case near Stalingrad. Again, here, for example: “On September 13, 1942, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. The detachment of the 62nd Army, led by the head of the detachment, lieutenant of state security Khlystov, took up defenses on the outskirts of an important height. For four days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the approach of military units. Again, after two days, i.e. September 15-16: “The detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought for two days against superior enemy forces in the area of ​​​​the Stalingrad railway station ...” At the same time, although this formation itself, it is small, as we remember, consisting of two hundred people However, they were able not only to repel the attacks of the Germans, but also to counterattack and inflict significant losses on the enemy in manpower, and held out until the arrival of ordinary army units. At the same time, moreover, as noted in the documents, there was such an extreme that the detachments were used as ordinary linear units. Here, on this occasion, it is said as follows: “A number of facts have been noted when barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of formations. A significant number of detachments were sent into battle on a par with line units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were assigned for reorganization and the barrier service was not carried out. Well, further on are a few specific examples, when in this way the barrage detachments were used as ordinary units. At the same time, approximately 65-70% of the personnel suffered losses. And of course, this was not always justified. In general, in order to roughly assess the situation in which these people acted in the same Stalingrad, you can look at a number of award lists that are now posted on the Internet, since we have been running the “Feat of the People” project for several years now. And there you can see how ours, as we say "bloody gebnya", looked from this point of view. For example, senior lieutenant Vasily Filippovich Finogenov, who served as adjutant of the senior battalion, this was the name of the battalion's chief of staff at that time (this is such an army term). Here he is a senior adjutant of the 1st army detachment, born in 1918, Russian, non-partisan: “Working as a senior adjutant in 1 A. Z.O. 62 armies for the defense of the city of Stalingrad, following the order of NPO No. 227, detained about 6,000 soldiers and commanders who were sent to their units for the defense of the city of Stalingrad ... return them to their units. Further in this award we read the following: “It was ordered by the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 62nd army to close the gap with a detachment, to prevent the enemy from reaching the Volga in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bplant 221. On October 16, 1942, the detachment fought, he personally, on the orders of the head of the detachment, led the battle of the 2nd company and with light machine gun fire destroyed 27 fascists. The mortar crew of the 201st mortar battalion was out of order, he organized mortar firing and did not allow the enemy to accumulate for an attack. There was a case, when bypassing the defense area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe detachment, the Germans attacked him, here he destroyed 6 Nazis with automatic fire. The man was serious. Yes. But, unfortunately, it was. Because for these exploits he was awarded the medal "For Courage", and a few months later he was wounded and died in the hospital. By the way, here again in this barrage detachment there were a number of such people who distinguished themselves at that time. Here, for example, Ivan Ilyich Andreev, a Red Army soldier, fighter of the 1st AZO of the 62nd Army, born in 1925, Russian, non-partisan. As we can see, this is 1942, respectively, he is a maximum of 17 years old, and most likely even 16: “... While serving in a barrage detachment when closing a gap in the area of ​​​​the Barrikady plant, he organized mortar firing of the 201st mortar battalion, calculation which was destroyed and thus did not allow the enemy to accumulate for an attack. Apparently, the two of them acted here just with Senior Lieutenant Finogenov. The following example, again from the same barrage detachment, Stepan Stepanovich Limarenko, political officer of the 1st AZO (army detachment), 62nd Army, born 1916, Russian, member of the CPSU (b): “In the fight against German fascism for the defense of the city of Stalingrad, political officer comrade Limarenko Stepan Stepanovich, performing his duties as a fighter of a detachment, under enemy fire, he detained 78 unstable Red Army soldiers who left their defensive positions and tried to retreat. Comrade Limarenko detained them and forced them to take their former lines. Just the functions of the bloody gebni are to stop the Red Army soldiers and bring them back. We read further: ... On October 16, 1942, Comrade Limarenko, together with the Red Army soldier Chernodymov V. P. detained two anti-tank rifles with crews, who, seeing the German tanks, left their positions and retreated to the rear of their defense. Comrade Limarenko set up an anti-tank rifle, from which he destroyed three enemy tanks on Sculptural Street. Than the most German tanks failed to get to the Volga. Military Limarenko spoke seriously. And here is an award sheet for the Red Army soldier Chernodymov, who was with Limarenko. Born in 1921, Russian, member of the Komsomol: “Participating in the fight against German fascism to defend the city of Stalingrad, the Red Army soldier Comrade V.P. At the same time, on October 16, 1942, Comrade Chernodymov, together with political officer Comrade Limarenko, detained the calculation of two PTR rifles with rifles that German tanks saw, trying to go to the rear along Sculpture Street to our units, this calculation left their positions and went to the rear. Comrade Chernodymov personally destroyed two enemy tanks with an anti-tank rifle, the rest returned back. Here is the only thing that is not clear. What do they get there? A total of five German tanks were hit, or did they still count each one. But even if, say, three for two, it's still ... A lot. Yes. Because they used anti-tank rifles, that is, in general, this is really a feat. These are the situations. Moreover, there are many such cases described here. For example, two fighters of the 4th detachment of the 62nd Army (that was the 1st detachment, and this is the 4th), they just the next day, that is, on October 17, 1942, saved the ammunition depot, which was located on the shore The Volga, respectively, the Germans bombed it, a fire broke out there, and two fighters, instead of scrabbling, as many would have done in such a situation, they tried to save this warehouse. I will even read the award lists: “Kurbanov Tadzhedin Agalievich. Red Army soldier, fighter of the 4th detachment of the OO NKVD of the 62nd Army. Born in 1919, Lezgin, candidate of the CPSU (b). Being at the post near crossing No. 62 on October 17, 1942, the crossing was heavily bombed by enemy aircraft, as a result, shells and mines were set on fire in the ammunition depot near the crossing. Comrade Kurbanov, despite the bombing and the fact that the ammunition is burning - bursting, rushed to save them. Thanks to his courage and courage, the ammunition was saved." Accordingly, together with him he also took part in extinguishing this fire: “Obozny Nikolai Ivanovich. Red Army soldier, deputy political officer, fighter of the 4th detachment of the OO NKVD of the 62nd Army. Born in 1915, Russian, member of the CPSU(b). Being on October 17 of this year at a post near crossing 62, the crossing and the post where he stood were heavily bombed by enemy aircraft, as a result of which a warehouse with Katyusha ammunition and other shells and mines was set on fire. Comrade Obozny, despite the fact that the shells were bursting, rushed to pull them apart. Thanks to his courage and courage, the fire was extinguished, the ammunition was saved. Comrade Obozny is worthy of the medal "For Military Merit." Stunned. That is, again, as you know, our creators, who make our current Russian films about the war, are very fond of portraying our special officers or NKVD fighters as well-fed cowardly creatures who can only hide behind other people's backs. As we can see, in reality, the vast majority of them acted in a completely different way. And indeed, in general, they were not only engaged in the performance of their function of restoring order, but also actually behaved, as befits real fighters. As I have already said, in fact, during the Battle of Stalingrad, we observed three types of barrage detachments in action at once: detachments under the Special Departments, small, newly created army detachments and division detachments. At the same time, army detachments and division detachments, they acted closer to the front, i.e. they often went into battle and stopped mass panic on the front line, while detachments under special departments, they were already serving further in the rear, on communications, in order to again filter the contingent that was coming, well, to detain people who deserted or let's say inappropriately there are in the rear zone. Since during the Battle of Stalingrad the concepts of front and rear were already quite arbitrary, because there the Germans pressed us practically to the Volga, such a division of labor was also often not respected. For example: “On October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of ​​the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate infantry brigades. At the same time, among the leading command staff, repeated attempts were observed to abandon their units and cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. Under these conditions, to fight cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd Army created an operational group under the leadership of senior security lieutenant Ignatenko. Combining the remnants of platoons of special departments with the personnel of the 3rd army detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of restoring order, detaining deserters, cowards and alarmists who tried, under various pretexts, to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the operational group detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 privates and officers, and 15 servicemen, by order of special agencies, were shot in front of the ranks. We see the ratio, that is, 800 people were detained, 15 of them were shot before the line, but the rest were simply returned to the line and again continued to fight. Accordingly, if this bloody gebni did not exist, then what would happen - at first the commanders, and then the correspondingly unstable fighters, would try to cross to the other side of the Volga, leaving their positions, as a result could end ... From the point of view of today's civilian people, it seems it would be clear - nobody wants to die, and therefore, we will retreat, there we will be alive and will be able to benefit the Motherland more. But the whole trouble is that it was necessary to bring benefit to the Motherland at the moment, standing tightly right here, and not running anywhere. Once you receive an order, you must follow it. Sometimes at the cost of your own life. In general, yes, absolutely. Because, indeed, from the point of view of common sense, you want to be away from the front line, but from the point of view of military duty, you need to follow the order that you have been given. I will give a few more examples from the Don Front. This is a memorandum dated February 17, 1943 “On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943”: “October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, separate units 138 rifle divisions, met by powerful enemy artillery and mortar fire, faltered and fled back in panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion of the 706th rifle regiment, 204th rifle division, which were in the second echelon. By the measures taken by the command and detachment battalion of the division, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the ranks, and the rest were returned to the front line. On October 16, 1942, during an enemy counterattack, a group of Red Army soldiers of the 781st and 124th rifle divisions, in the amount of 30 people, showed cowardice and began to flee in panic from battlefields, dragging along other military personnel. The army detachment of the 21st Army, which was located in this sector, eliminated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous situation. Actually, here what we see, again, the key words are that these 30 people, they did not just run, but at the same time, as it was rightly said, they dragged other servicemen with them. Because, unfortunately, man, he is by definition a herd creature, as you know, we came from wildlife , from social animals, and therefore, everyone runs, then ... "Everyone ran, and I ran." Yes. And therefore, naturally, it is necessary that people be found who would stop this panic and, accordingly, bring to life those who participate in such an escape. “On November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293rd Infantry Division, during the enemy’s counterattack, two mortar platoons of the 1306th Infantry Regiment, together with platoon commanders, junior lieutenants Bogatyrev and Yegorov, left the occupied line without an order from the command and in a panic, leaving weapons, began to flee from the battlefield. The platoon of submachine gunners of the army detachment, which was located on this site, stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their previous lines, after which they successfully moved forward. That is, again, as we see, that two alarmists were identified and shot, but at the same time, the rest of the fighters, in general, as they say, came to their senses and then quite successfully fulfill their duty. But, unfortunately, such are the realities that, in general, are far from those ideals of humanism that are preached to us today. Since today it is believed that human life is the highest value, therefore, it is natural that a coward and a selfish person should, apparently, be inviolable. I’ll give another example: “On November 20, 1942, during the enemy’s counterattack, one of the companies of the 38th Infantry Division, which was at a height, without resisting the enemy, began to randomly retreat from the occupied area without an order from the command. The 83rd detachment of the 64th Army, serving as a barrier directly behind the combat formations of the units of the 38th Infantry Division, stopped the fleeing company in a panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the height, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy." That is, as we can see, there was no need to shoot anyone here, just roughly speaking, people running in panic had to be stopped, brought to their senses, returned back to the same positions that they occupied, after which they already quite successfully and steadfastly performed your military duty. I would also note that if they were returned to their positions, then it does not indicate that the Germans had already occupied these positions and they were kicking someone out of there, they simply abandoned the trenches and began to scatter, obeying some kind of, apparently, momentary impulse. We met a detachment, talked and returned back, and sat down again in their places, Well, do not succumb to momentary impulses. This, in fact, is, in general, a quite common situation, and not only during that war, but also in other conflicts, when people can simply simply move away from the fact that, roughly speaking, panic rumors have spread there that we bypassed or simply began to shoot very hard at the front line. The black sheep spoils the whole herd. It's true. Accordingly, the barrage detachments acted in this way during the Battle of Stalingrad. Well, the next such large-scale battle, when, again, our troops had to defend themselves so stubbornly, it, as you know, was the Kursk Bulge. in the summer of 1943. And accordingly, again, detachments participated in this and acted quite successfully. For example, let's say, on the very first day of this battle on the Kursk Bulge, i.e. July 5, 1943: “The 13th Army, the 2nd Battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 15th Division, led by the battalion commander, Captain Rakitsky, arbitrarily left its line and retreated in a panic to the rear of the division, where it was detained by a detachment and returned to battle. » I note: not by machine-gun fire, but by the personnel of the barrage detachment. Accordingly, further: “From July 5 to July 10, 1943, the barrage detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1,870 people. Most of them were military personnel who had lost contact with their units. In the process of filtering them, 6 deserters, 19 self-mutilators and 49 cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield were identified and arrested. The rest of the detainees (that is, almost 1,800 people) were returned to duty.” Here I have such a document as a special message from the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the 69th Army of the Voronezh Front, Colonel Stroilov, about the work of detachments from July 12 to July 17, 1943. What does he report there: “In order to fulfill the task of detaining the rank and file and command and command staff of formations and units of the army who arbitrarily left the battlefield, the Smersh Counterintelligence Department of the 69th Army on July 12, 1943 from the personnel of a separate company organized 7 detachments , 7 people each, headed by 2 operatives. These detachments were deployed in the villages of Alekseevka - Prokhodnoye, Novaya Slobodka - Samoilovka (there are a number of names here, I will not read them out). As a result of the work carried out by detachments from 12 to 17 July with. inclusive, 6956 people of ordinary and commanding staff were detained, who left the battlefield or left the encirclement of enemy troops. » Further on, where all these people came from. What was done to them: “It should be noted that the number of detained servicemen, starting from July 15, has sharply decreased compared to the first days of the work of the detachments. If on July 12 2842 people were detained, and on July 13 - 1841 people, then on July 16 394 people were detained, and already on July 17 only 167 people were detained, and then those who had left the encirclement of the enemy troops. The massive retreat of the rank and file, command and command personnel from the battlefield by the detachments organized by us, which began at five o'clock on July 12, 1943, was basically stopped at 16 o'clock on the same day, and subsequently completely stopped. Accordingly: “From among the detainees, 55 people were arrested, of which: suspected of espionage - 20 people, terror - 2, traitors to the Motherland - 1, cowards and alarmists - 28, deserters - 4. The rest of the detainees were sent to their units . In view of the fact that the withdrawal of military personnel from the battlefield has been stopped, I removed the detachments, and their personnel were sent to perform their direct military duties. By the way, here we observe that these were barrage detachments, which were created just under a special department, i.e. what has been in effect since the beginning of the war. Yes, I’ll further explain here that this famous “Smersh” is mentioned here, it was just created the day before, or rather, not the day before, but a few months before that, on April 19, 1943, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD, it was again transferred to the Army and, accordingly, reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Accordingly, people from there, i.e. from Smersh, they acted like this - they stopped those who retreated in such a panic in the face of the enemy. Accordingly, here is another document, a memorandum addressed to V.S. Abakumov on the results of checking the counterintelligence units of the 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front from July 12 to 30, 1943, signed by Colonel Shirmanov: “In order to prevent possible panic and to fight cowards deserting from the battlefield, I, together with the heads of departments "Smersh" of the 13th and 70th armies in all divisions, brigades and regiments, obstacle groups and barriers were organized under the leadership of the operational staff of the armies, corps, divisions. As a result of these measures, about 1,300 servicemen who were leaving the battlefield in an unorganized manner were detained in the sector of the 13th and 70th armies, among whom cowards and alarmists, deserters, self-mutilators and other anti-Soviet elements were identified. Most of the military personnel were returned in an organized manner to their positions and took part in the battles. That is, again, we see that it is practically the same as in the previous documents. Well, I'll read another note. Memorandum of the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis, dated August 13, 1943, on the work for July 1943, respectively: 4501 people, of which: arrested - 145 people, transferred to the prosecutor's office - 70 people, transferred to the bodies of the NKGB - 276 people, sent to special camps - 14 people, sent to units - 3303 people. That is, again, it turns out, however, here, after all, about 2/3, a little more, who were simply sent to their units. Of the indicated number, the Smersh counterintelligence bodies of only one army, where the head of the Department, Colonel Pimenov, detained: elders - 35 people, policemen - 59 people who served in german army- 34 people who were in captivity - 87 people, subject to conscription in the spacecraft - 777 people. Of these, 4 agents of the German gendarmerie were arrested and exposed. That is, here, among other things, the process of checking our people who have been in the German occupation also begins and, accordingly, one of them could again behave, let's say, wrong. Well, many suffer because they checked those who ended up in the occupied territories. Firstly, everyone left the occupied territories, evacuated to the east, this time. Secondly, once there, you could do very different things, for example, wash the floors in the commandant's office and inform the partisans about what was happening in the commandant's office, or you could serve as a policeman in this commandant's office, walk around with weapons, arrest, shoot fellow citizens. Well, that should probably be the answer. Somehow it doesn’t fit at all, everyone is so white and fluffy, and, probably, in order to reveal this, it is necessary to carry out checks. Probably, in order to carry out checks, some of the citizens must be taken into custody and even, oh, horror! To arrest. The same thing, which is typical, is happening now. By the way, in one of our previous conversations, he just gave an example of one of the check-filtration camps and how the same elders were checked there, and how it turned out that some of them were not even released, but even hired into the ranks of the NKVD. That is, apparently, these were either our agents, or those people who showed themselves so well precisely in that capacity, as assistants to the partisans, underground workers, that they were, in general, accordingly appreciated on their merits. Well, those who exactly served the Germans, it was in good faith, so to speak, treating ... From the bottom of their hearts. Yes. Those became “innocent victims of illegal Stalinist repressions,” as we say. Recently, digressing a little to the side, I bought a book called, in my opinion, “Thank God, the Germans have come.” And there are memoirs of some scum named Osipov, they used to be on the Internet ... There was some kind of woman in the occupied city of Pushkin, here we had one near Leningrad ... Yes, I remember one. There is such patented scum that I don’t even know how at all ... well, these are not people ... there is some, you know, a collective mixture of Gozman and Novodvorskaya. Nothing changes. You are bastards of such a caliber that normal person, I don’t know, he won’t sit next to the field. Quiet horror ... And what do you have there, you should have regretted it, or what? But the scum went with the Germans, first to Riga, then to Berlin, and then, of course, as scum should be, ended up in the United States. Well, yes. By the way, we want to analyze this book with Egor separately. Well, returning, in fact, to our topic, because after Kursk Bulge a radical turning point in the war took place, i.e. Since we have already begun to advance and liberate first our territory, and then the occupied countries of Europe, then, accordingly, the need for such units and subunits that are engaged in defensive service has gradually disappeared. And in the end, on October 29, 1944, an order was issued by People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 0349 “On the disbandment of individual barrage detachments”, which sounded like this: “Due to the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared. I order: 1. To disband separate barrage detachments by November 13, 1944. Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions. 2. Report the disbandment of the barrier detachments by November 20, 1944.” That is, on this, in fact, the combat path of the army detachments ended. Well, it’s clear that the same platoons that were under the Smersh organs continued to operate until the end of the war, because the functions of protecting the rear, respectively, detaining a suspicious element, etc., as if no one removed them in any normal army they in this or that structure are all the same executed. In general, summing up, behold, a cruel time, terrible circumstances, they require cruel and terrible measures. An order called "Not a step back!" was known to the troops. There is a wonderful book by citizen Simonov, The Living and the Dead, which, in my opinion, shows very, very well how the servicemen felt about this order, what they thought about it and what they said. It was necessary - it was, it ceased to be necessary - and they dismissed it. By the way, on this occasion, just about what people said, I will quote one veteran, respectively, his memoirs were published somewhere in the zero years. This is a certain M.G. Abdulin, he served in the 293rd Rifle Division during the Battle of Stalingrad. And there was an interview with him, we had such a magazine “Brother”, in my opinion, and now it is still being published: “- Mansur Gizatulovich, tell us how the famous order No. 227 was adopted in the trenches? - It was a stern order. He appeared when the retreat reached the Volga. And he was a strong sobering agent - "Not a step back!" The order stopped the people. There was confidence in the neighbors on the right and on the left - they would not retreat. Although it was not easy to realize: there was a barrage detachment behind you. How did these units work? - I do not know of a case when they would shoot at the retreating. Under the "new panicle" in the first weeks after the order, the guilty fell, and someone not very guilty. I remember that I was sent from the company to observe the execution of seventeen people "for cowardice and alarmism." I had to tell my people about what I saw. Later I saw the barrage detachment under very dramatic circumstances. In the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe heights of Five Kurgans, the Germans pressed us so that we scrambled, leaving our overcoats, in some tunics. And suddenly our tanks, and behind them the skiers - a barrage detachment. Well, I think, here it is, death! A young Estonian captain approaches me. “Take,” he says, “the overcoat from the dead, you will catch a cold ...” Here is such an eyewitness account and there are quite a few such examples. But in general, no one gives examples of how to shoot from machine guns. Only Nikita Sergeyevich Mikhalkov in the cinema. More precisely, how to say, we still have our accusers, they are, as they say, like a fool with a written bag, they are still rushing with a fragment from the memoirs of the tankman Loza, who was a participant in the events when the commander ordered to hit from tank machine guns in front of the fleeing in order to stop them . But then again, at the same time, there are those who tried to brandish it, respectively, either they read the text inattentively, or simply distort it. Because the fire was not to defeat, but precisely in order to stop. Well, they don’t understand such trifles, it doesn’t matter, “everyone was killed anyway.” It really ended up that several people were killed there, but this is ... well, what to do if a unit is running and, accordingly, if these people are not stopped, then the losses will be much greater. As citizen Papanov said: "They will help you, but don't steal." That's it, you don't have to run, you have to honestly fulfill your military duty. Thank you, Igor Vasilievich. About what next time? And next time, then, continuing this topic of bloody gebni, we can consider how our penal units acted and existed: that is, penal battalions and penal companies. Fine. Looking forward to. Thank you. And that's all for today. See you again.