home General biology Grevs American adventure in Siberia. From the memoirs of General Grevs, the head of the American military expedition in the Far East and Siberia (USA). Goals of military intervention in Siberia

Grevs American adventure in Siberia. From the memoirs of General Grevs, the head of the American military expedition in the Far East and Siberia (USA). Goals of military intervention in Siberia

Early in 1918, President Wilson told me that he was being persuaded that American troops, together with the forces of the Allies, should undertake an expedition to northern Russia and Siberia, and asked me to think about how he should respond to the French and British. As an argument in favor of this enterprise, the fact was cited that very large military depots are located in the vicinity of Arkhangelsk, which could fall into the hands of the Germans if they are not protected by allied forces. In addition, a significant part of the people living in the north of Russia remains true to allied obligations and is ready to join the Allied forces in order to reorganize the Eastern Front or at least draw a significant part of the German troops to the East. As for Siberia, one of the reasons was that a significant contingent of Czech soldiers had broken away from the Austrian army that fought on the Eastern Front, and now they are heading through Siberia to Vladivostok with the goal of crossing from this port by sea to France and re-entering the war on the side of the Allies. . It was reported that these Czechs were not well enough armed and, moreover, lacked food to make such a transition, and they needed to be protected from detachments of German and Austrian prisoners, who, after October revolution in Russia were released from POW camps and are now under the command of German officers turned into well-organized and combat-ready detachments, aimed at capturing Russian military depots, placing them at the disposal of Germany and Austria, and also pursuing Russians assisting the allies. In addition, it was said that the sacrifices made by Russia during the war entitle its people to any possible assistance that the allies could provide in maintaining order and establishing new social institutions. This consideration has already led to the dispatch to Siberia of the so-called Stevens Commission, designed to assist in the restoration of the work of the railways vital for this territory.

A few days later, the president and I discussed this issue in its entirety. I expressed the point of view of my army colleagues that the war on the Western Front must be won and that in order to achieve the fastest possible success, every possible effort must be made to concentrate there maximum amount troops, ensuring numerical superiority, while distributing them over several theaters of military operations will, at best, delay the final victory, making it impossible to achieve significant results in any of the directions. My arguments made such a strong impression on the president that he sent for the chief of staff and discussed with him the possibility of a successful restoration Eastern Front and the impact of the proposed expedition on the combat capability of the Allied armies on the Western Front. During our third conversation, the president told me that he was satisfied with the unanimity of the military department, but for reasons other than purely military he felt obliged to take a certain part in both expeditions. The circumstances that prompted the President to this decision were diplomatic, and I refrained from discussing them. At the time I believed - and did not change my mind later - that the situation as it was presented to him justified such a decision, but subsequent events in both cases fully confirmed the correctness of the opinion of the General Staff.

The Siberian expedition, described by Major General William Graves, who commanded the American Expeditionary Force, was the most important of the two undertakings, and almost daily gave rise to situations as delicate as they were dangerous. To a certain extent - although, I must confess, far from completely - we foresaw this, and the appointment of General Graves to the post of commander of the American contingent, proposed by the Chief of Staff, General March, met with my immediate and full approval. When I was appointed Secretary of War, General Graves was Secretary of the General Staff, so I was in constant contact with him. Because of this, I knew him as a self-confident, educated and well-trained military man, possessing common sense, modesty and loyalty - qualities most needed in the many difficult situations that I could foresee. After the completion of this amazing undertaking, I am more than satisfied with our choice of an American commander. A reckless, inconsistent officer in command of American forces in Siberia could easily create situations requiring disproportionate military efforts on the part of the allies, and especially on the part of the United States, and could cause our country the most undesirable difficulties. The possibilities of their occurrence are found on almost every page of the following narrative.

General Graves cites, for example, the so-called Aide Memoires written by President Wilson, which, as the General confirms, I gave him personally at the Kansas City Railroad Station. Since I was well aware of the restrictions that the President placed on the participation of American forces in the Siberian operation, as well as the reasons why our government decided to participate in it, I did not want General Graves to leave the country without first meeting with me. personally. During this meeting, I wanted to convert him Special attention some of the difficulties he may encounter, and the particular firmness that the president expected of him in following the above policy line. In this connection I undertook an inspection tour of the Leavenworth Military Prison and sent orders to General Graves to meet me in Kansas City, which enabled him to avoid the delay in preparations for his departure, which would inevitably arise if he had to come to me in Washington. Unfortunately, his train was late, and our meeting was shorter than I had planned, but this time was enough. From that day until the return of the Siberian Expedition back to the United States, General Graves faithfully followed government policy despite difficult and often outrageous circumstances. In Washington, I often heard from the Allied military attaches, and sometimes from the State Department, criticisms of General Graves and accusations of uncooperation. However, when I asked for detailed information, invariably convinced that the failures attributed to the general are nothing more than his refusal to deviate from the letter and spirit of the instructions given to him. In June 1919, I met with President Wilson in Paris, and he told me about the representations made to him by France and Britain, in which they complained about General Graves' stubbornness, his difficult character and inability to cooperate. However, when I reminded the President of the policy line outlined in his Aide Memoire and detailed similar complaints I had received in Washington, I was able to convince him that General Graves was completely loyal to his policy in the face of the desire of part of the Allied command to turn the Siberian Expedition into military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of Russia, which the president objected to from the very beginning. At the end of our meeting, the president smiled and said, “I guess it's an old story, Baker. People often get a reputation for being stubborn just because they're always right." One way or another, but at that time, and then the president fully approved of the behavior of General Graves. And if, in fact, the Siberian expedition turned out to be unjustified, if as a result it was not possible to achieve significant results - as it was in reality - then this is due to the conditions prevailing at that time. It did not turn into a military adventure and, having deterred others from such adventures, created the conditions that made it necessary to withdraw the allied forces from the territory of Siberia, thereby preventing the conquest and appropriation of Russian land by other countries whose interests in the Far East could easily lead to a violation of armistice and, ultimately, to the establishment of a permanent colonial administration in the vast territory of the Russian Far East.

Grevs. American adventure in Siberia, translated from English, Voengiz, 1932.

I. Atamanshchina in Siberia and the Far East

... Semyonov appeared to me, who later turned out to be a murderer, a robber and the most dissolute scoundrel. Semyonov was financed by Japan and had no convictions, except for the consciousness of the need to act at the behest of Japan. He always remained and the field of view of the Japanese troops. He did this because he could not have held out in Siberia even for a week if he had not relied on the support of Japan. Semyonov always talked about "the revival of the motherland."

In Khabarovsk, I first met this famous murderer, robber and cutthroat Kalmykov. Kalmykov was the most notorious scoundrel I have ever met, and I seriously think that if you carefully flip through encyclopedic Dictionary and look at all the words that define various kinds of crimes, it will hardly be possible to find a crime that Kalmykov would not have committed. Japan, in its efforts to "help the Russian people", supplied Kalmykov with weapons and financed him. I deliberately tell this because I have evidence that should satisfy every sane person. Where Semyonov ordered others to kill, Kalmykov killed with his own hand, and in this is the difference between Kalmykov and Semyonov. Russian expression- "liquidated" (killed) by the Chinese, when, after his expulsion from Siberia, he tried to find refuge in China. As for Semenov, he was also later expelled from Siberia and found shelter in Japan, where he lives to this day.

In 1919 Semyonov sent the captain of his staff to Washington. Not only did this captain meet no difficulty in entering the United States, but I read in the papers that some of the prominent American figures arranged for him to be interviewed about events in Siberia while he was on the road from San Francisco to Washington. I do not know the purpose of this visit by Agent Semyonov, but he himself boastfully stated that one of the purposes of his visit to America was to force me to be removed from the post of commander of the American troops. When this captain returned to Vladivostok, he declared that the military department was very attentive to him, assigned Colonel Kronin as an escort to him and helped him meet with some eminent figures. He also stated that when he left Washington, Colonel Cronin assured him that I would be removed from my post before he arrived in Vladivostok. This man represented Semyonov in America, and there is every reason to believe that he possessed the same criminal traits as his boss. Washington knew perfectly well what Semyonov represented; therefore, it must be assumed that in deciding whether Russians should be allowed into the United States, such data were not paid attention to, but only political considerations were taken into account.

I received credible reports that one of the Japanese officers tried to induce Semyonov to declare himself dictator of the Trans-Baikal region and seize the railways and tunnels on November 28, that is, ten days after Admiral Kolchak became dictator in Siberia, I received a message that seemed plausible to me that directives were given to Semyonov from Tokyo to go against Kolchak and that the Japanese representatives in Siberia followed this policy. As far as we knew, Japan supported Semyonov in Chita and Kalmykov in Khabarovsk with troops and money; moreover, it was known - at least in Siberia - that Japan did not at all want the situation in Siberia to be settled and a strong and stable government come to power. In March 1918, Japan turned to the Allies with a request to allow her to occupy the Chinese Eastern and Amur railways alone, as well as Vladivostok, if the Allies consider it necessary to occupy Eastern Siberia. Despite the fact that this proposal failed due to the position of the United States, Japan did not give up hope of achieving this goal when the Allies sent their troops to Siberia.

The soldiers of Semenov and Kalmykov, under the protection of Japanese troops, flooded the country like wild animals, killed and robbed the people, while the Japanese, if they wished, could stop these killings at any time. If at that time they asked what all these brutal murders were for, they usually received the answer that the dead were Bolsheviks, and this explanation apparently satisfied everyone. Events in Eastern Siberia were usually presented in the most gloomy colors, and human life there was not worth a penny.

Terrible murders were committed in Eastern Siberia, but they were not committed by the Bolsheviks, as was commonly thought. I will not be mistaken if I say that in Eastern Siberia, for every person killed by the Bolsheviks, there were 100 people killed by anti-Bolshevik elements. While I was in Siberia, I thought - and still think the same way - that by encouraging all these killings, Japan hoped that the United States would get tired of this whole situation, they would withdraw their troops and ask Japan to clarify the situation. of things,

Kalmykov received power in the spring of 1918, after he was elected ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks. These latter authorized him to receive a loan from the allies to help the Cossacks to produce spring crops. Japan granted them such a loan on the condition that the Ussuri Cossacks would not join the Bolsheviks. The money paid by Japan gave Kalmykov the opportunity to go to the Pogranichnaya station and recruit a Cossack division there, in which a Japanese major was an adviser on the organization of troops. This information was reported by Kalmykov's agents in Vladivostok.

During the Ussuri campaign, from July to September 1918, Kalmykov's Cossacks took part in hostilities and entered Khabarovsk along with Japanese troops on September 5-6. Kalmykov remained in Khabarovsk and established a regime of terror, extortion and bloodshed there; this may have been the reason his troops rebelled and turned to American troops for help. Under the pretext of eradicating Bolshevism, Kalmykov resorted to wholesale arrests of wealthy people, tortured them to force them to give him money and valuables, and executed some of them on charges of Bolshevism. These arrests became such a daily occurrence that they terrorized all classes of the population: there were many hundreds of people shot by Kalmykov's troops in the vicinity of Khabarovsk. We established the facts of the commission of murders according to the stories of the peasants and according to the testimony under oath of the local authorities. Finally, Kalmykov's troops began to flog and beat their own commanders, and on December 6 one of the intelligence officers of the 27th Infantry Regiment reported that the situation was becoming serious. Of course, it cannot be called a betrayal that on December 28 part of Kalmykov's troops appeared at the headquarters of the 27th regiment and asked permission to join the ranks of the United States Army, and many of them asked to help them get out of Khabarovsk.

The Japanese first approached me with a request to return to Kalmykov the horses, weapons and equipment issued by his soldiers to Colonel Steyer, but I turned down this request. I was told that all this property belongs to Japan. To this I replied to the Japanese Chief of Staff that if Japan informed me in writing that she had armed this assassin, that nothing had ever been paid for all this property by the Kalmykovs, and if Japan could prove the identity of this property and issue a receipt for receiving it, then I will give this property. All this was done, and the receipt was sent by me to war ministry along with the report.

In my reports and telegrams, I always pointed out not only the excesses of Semyonov and Kalmykov, but also the behavior of the Kolchak Russian troops, acting under the direct leadership of Ivanov-Rinov. The behavior of these troops, insofar as it is a matter of various kinds of attacks and robberies, almost approaches in its scale the outrages of the troops of Semenov and Kalmykov, although, nevertheless, the troops of Ivanov-Rinov and Khorvat killed fewer people than Kalmykov did.

The Japanese, holding under their control Semyonov in Chita, Kalmykov in Khabarovsk and exerting a decisive influence on Ivanov-Rinov in Vladivostok, in fact kept all of Eastern Siberia under their control. If they could manage to conclude a business agreement with Kolchak, then they could at least to some extent eliminate the causes of friction between them, on the one hand, and the British and French, on the other. These tensions arose from the moment when power in Siberia passed into the hands of Admiral Kolchak.

II. Allied relations - Japan, England and France in the Far East and Siberia

England, France and Japan acted in unison in so far as the eradication of Bolshevism was under way; however, Britain and France believed that the main task was to fight equally intensively against the threat of Bolshevism in all parts of Siberia and the use of Kolchak to combat this danger. Japan had expended large sums of money in Eastern Siberia, and her chief object was to fight Bolshevism here in the Far East, and to exploit, if possible, any situation that might arise; As for the fight against Bolshevism west of Lake Baikal, in comparison with its interests in Eastern Siberia, this was only a secondary task for Japan.

"Regiment. Morrow informed Semyonov to get his armored car out of the American section; otherwise, it will output it itself. Japanese General Yoshe told Morrow that "the Japanese will oppose by force the withdrawal of American troops from the Semyonov armored car section." Slaughter wires that Sukin (the Omsk foreign minister) told him that he considered this incident indicative of the Japanese desire to cause a clash between the Americans and the Russians. Prior to receiving this message from Slaughter, Smith (the American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Committee) said that Colonel Robertson, the current British High Commissioner, had informed him very privately yesterday that he believed that this encounter between Semyonov and the Americans was being orchestrated by the Japanese.

There is no doubt that all the serious performances of Semenov were inspired by the Japanese. I have already informed the War Department that when considering Far Eastern questions, the Cossacks and the Japanese should be regarded as a single force. I have no reason to change this opinion.

Some Japanese would have been happy to see American Forces clash with the Russians, but others were more cautious because they knew I had enough information to prove Japan's connection to any hostile action by Semyonov or Kalmykov against the Americans.

Around August 20, the ambassador and I left Omsk and set off for Vladivostok. We stayed in Novonikolaevsk, Irkutsk, Verkhneudinsk and Harbin. Nothing interesting happened until we reached the Semyonov territory.

At that time, it was widely known that Semyonov established something called "death stations", and openly boasted that he could not sleep at night if he did not kill someone during the day. We stopped at a small station, and they entered our car two Americans from a detachment for the maintenance of Russian railways They told us about the murder of Russians carried out by Semenov soldiers two or three days before our arrival in a freight car in which there were 350 people, I don’t remember if there were only men on the train or men and women.

The most significant of the two Americans' account is this: “A freight train carrying arrested persons passed by the station to a place where executions were widely known to have been carried out. The officers of the detachment went to the place of execution, but were stopped by Semyonov's soldiers. After 1 hour and 50 minutes, the empty train returned to the station. The next day, two employees went to the scene of the murder and saw evidence of a mass execution. From the cartridges scattered on the ground, it was clear that the arrested were killed by machine guns, as empty cartridges were piled up in a heap, as is the case with machine gun fire. The bodies were piled in two pits, which were covered with fresh earth. In one pit, the bodies were completely covered, in the other, many arms and legs remained uncovered.

September 13 Col. Sargent, who was in command at the time of my departure for Omsk, telegraphed the War Department as follows:

"Today Semyonov and Kalmykov left Vladivostok for Khabarovsk."

These two Japanese henchmen went together to Khabarovsk with a special purpose. This one. the goal was - to create a plan of attack on American soldiers.

Gene. A Croat, who was opposed to my policy of non-intervention in internal affairs, visited me and warned me that Kalmykov was coming to destroy the American soldiers, and that if I did not concentrate small detachments guarding the railroad, I would lose some of them. He stated that Japan authorized this and provided Kalmykov with 30,000 yen; further, he said that a telegram was prepared for sending "to everyone, to everyone", indicating that the same would be done with all the Bolsheviks.

Fortress Commander Col. Butenko had access to all telegrams going through Vladivostok. Visiting me at about the same time as Gen. Croat, he confirmed the latter's message and rolled up that Semyonov telegraphed Kalmykov to go ahead and attack the American troops, and if he needed support, Semyonov would send his troops to help him. The Japanese telegraphed Kalmykov that they would not give him active assistance, but would provide moral support.

In this regard, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Omsk government, Sukin, told Major Slaughter in Omsk the following:

“I can also tell you, if you don't know about it, that there are not enough American troops in the Far East to overcome the difficulties that will arise if you have friction with Semyonov and Kalmykov. The fact is that the Japanese support Semyonov by all means, even to the point of sending troops, if this seems necessary.

“Due to the ongoing attacks by Semyonov’s armored cars on the railway, the seizure of cars, threats to railway employees, attacks on workers, continued threats against my guards, shelling and arrests of Russian troops leaving for the front - yesterday, June 8, at 5 pm, I had a conversation with the general of the Japanese army Yoshe, the military governor of the gene. Medzhik and the commander of the Russian troops in Berezovka, Gen. Peshinko. Based on the foregoing, "I demanded of them that the removal of armored cars from the American section be ensured, and at the same time brought to their attention that if my demand was not met within 24 hours, then I would destroy these cars."

Gene. Yoshe in the presence of Col. Morrow agreed to remain neutral, but later sent him the following message:

"The Japanese declare that they will resist by force the removal of Semyonov's armored cars by American troops, will take the armored cars under Japanese guard in Berezovka and will protect them there from American troops."

III. Japanese atrocities in the Far East

After my return from Omsk, a report appeared in my office about the brutal and disgusting murder committed by the Japanese.

This report indicated that on July 27, 1919, a detachment of Japanese soldiers under the command of a Japanese major arrested nine Russians in the town of Sviyagino, which was located on the railway entrusted to the American guard. The Japanese told the American officer that these people were suspected of Bolshevism.

The Russians were told that if they gave information about the Bolsheviks they would be released.

Four out of nine were released. The other five were severely beaten but refused to speak.

Again, the Japanese were not responsible for Sviyagino.

The Japanese began to behave as if they intended to execute the Russians who did not testify to them, and as soon as this intention of the Japanese became clear, the American officer protested, but to no avail.

The report described the execution as follows:

“Five Russians were brought to the graves dug in the vicinity of the railway station; they were blindfolded and ordered to kneel at the edge of the graves with their hands tied back. Two Japanese officers, taking off their outer clothing and drawing sabers, began to cut the victims, directing blows from behind the neck, and while each of the victims fell into the grave, from three to five Japanese soldiers finished it off with bayonets, emitting cries of joy.

Two were immediately beheaded by sabers; the rest were apparently alive, as the earth thrown over them moved.

I am bitter to admit that several soldiers and officers of the American army were witnesses to this massacre.

This murder was carried out by the Japanese, not because the victims had committed any crime, but only because they were suspected of being Bolsheviks.

I was so depressed by this atrocity that I called the head of the American team from Sviyagin to the main American apartment in Vladivostok and, in the presence of the Japanese chief of staff, told him that he should have used force and prevented this assassination. I also told the Japanese Chief of Staff that if such things ever happened on the American sections of the railroad, it would cause conflict between Japanese and American troops. He replied that he would like to collect information about the contents of the report.

I noticed that I did not find any obstacles to making inquiries, and expressed the hope that he would inform me of the results. He promised to do it. Approximately five weeks later, he visited my office and said that he was forced to admit the veracity of the report.

In Krasnoyarsk I learned something about Gen. Rozanov, with whom I tried to establish relations in Vladivostok.

"one. Occupying villages that were previously occupied by bandits (partisans), demand the extradition of the leaders of the movement; in those villages where it will be impossible to find them, but there will be sufficient grounds to assume their presence, to shoot every tenth of the population.

2. If, during the passage of troops through the city, the population does not inform (if possible, do so) about the presence of the enemy, a monetary contribution should be imposed on all without exception.

3. The villages, whose inhabitants will meet our troops with weapons in their hands, must be burned to the ground, and the entire adult male population must be shot; property, houses, carts, etc. must be used for the needs of the army."

We learned that Rozanov had hostages, and for every one of his supporters he killed, he killed ten of them. He spoke of these methods he practiced in Krasnoyarsk as necessary in order to keep the population in a tight grip, but he announced his intention to throw off the gloves when he went to Vladivostok and introduce other methods of government than those he applied to to the Krasnoyarsk population.

Such were the deeds of Kolchak's supporters at the time when they were supported by foreign troops.

Text reproduced from the edition: Japanese intervention 1918-1922 in documents. - M., 1934. S. 175 - 183.

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William Graves
American intervention in Siberia. 1918–1920 Memoirs of the Commander of the Expeditionary Force

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Foreword

Early in 1918, President Wilson told me that he was being persuaded that American troops, together with the forces of the Allies, should undertake an expedition to northern Russia and Siberia, and asked me to think about how he should respond to the French and British. As an argument in favor of this enterprise, the fact was cited that very large military depots are located in the vicinity of Arkhangelsk, which could fall into the hands of the Germans if they are not protected by allied forces. In addition, a significant part of the people living in the north of Russia remains true to allied obligations and is ready to join the Allied forces in order to reorganize the Eastern Front or at least draw a significant part of the German troops to the East. As for Siberia, one of the reasons was that a significant contingent of Czech soldiers had broken away from the Austrian army that fought on the Eastern Front, and now they are heading through Siberia to Vladivostok with the goal of crossing from this port by sea to France and re-entering the war on the side of the Allies. . It was reported that these Czechs were not well enough armed and, moreover, lacked food to make such a transition, and they needed to be protected from detachments of German and Austrian prisoners who, after the October Revolution in Russia, were released from prisoner-of-war camps and now under the command of German officers turned into well-organized and combat-ready detachments, aimed at capturing Russian military depots, placing them at the disposal of Germany and Austria, and also pursuing Russians assisting the allies. In addition, it was said that the sacrifices made by Russia during the war entitle its people to any possible assistance that the allies could provide in maintaining order and establishing new social institutions. This consideration has already led to the dispatch to Siberia of the so-called Stevens Commission, designed to assist in the restoration of the work of the railways vital for this territory.

A few days later, the president and I discussed this issue in its entirety. I expressed the point of view of my army colleagues that the war on the Western Front must be won and that in order to achieve the fastest possible success, every possible effort must be made to concentrate the maximum number of troops there, ensuring numerical superiority, while distributing them over several theaters of war would lead to , at best, to a delay in the final victory, making it impossible to achieve significant results in any of the areas. My arguments made such a strong impression on the President that he sent for the Chief of Staff and discussed with him the possibility of a successful restoration of the Eastern Front and the impact of the proposed expedition on the combat effectiveness of the Allied armies on the Western Front. During our third conversation, the president told me that he was satisfied with the unanimity of the military department, but for reasons other than purely military he felt obliged to take a certain part in both expeditions. The circumstances that prompted the President to this decision were diplomatic, and I refrained from discussing them. At the time I believed - and did not change my mind later - that the situation as it was presented to him justified such a decision, but subsequent events in both cases fully confirmed the correctness of the opinion of the General Staff.

General Graves cites, for example, the so-called Aide Memoires written by President Wilson, which, as the General confirms, I gave him personally at the Kansas City Railroad Station. Since I was well aware of the restrictions that the President placed on the participation of American forces in the Siberian operation, as well as the reasons why our government decided to participate in it, I did not want General Graves to leave the country without first meeting with me. personally. During this meeting, I wanted to draw his special attention to some of the difficulties that he may encounter and to the particular firmness that the president expected from him in following the above policy line. In this connection I undertook an inspection tour of the Leavenworth Military Prison and sent orders to General Graves to meet me in Kansas City, which enabled him to avoid the delay in preparations for his departure, which would inevitably arise if he had to come to me in Washington. Unfortunately, his train was late, and our meeting was shorter than I had planned, but this time was enough. From that day until the return of the Siberian Expedition back to the United States, General Graves faithfully followed government policy despite difficult and often outrageous circumstances. In Washington, I often heard from the Allied military attaches, and sometimes from the State Department, criticisms of General Graves and accusations of uncooperation. However, when I asked for detailed information, I was invariably convinced that the failures attributed to the general were nothing more than his refusal to deviate from the letter and spirit of the instructions given to him. In June 1919, I met with President Wilson in Paris, and he told me about the representations made to him by France and Britain, in which they complained about General Graves' stubbornness, his difficult character and inability to cooperate. However, when I reminded the President of the policy line outlined in his Aide Memoire and detailed similar complaints I had received in Washington, I was able to convince him that General Graves was completely loyal to his policy in the face of the desire of part of the Allied command to turn the Siberian Expedition into military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of Russia, which the president objected to from the very beginning. At the end of our meeting, the president smiled and said, “I guess it's an old story, Baker. People often get a reputation for being stubborn just because they're always right." One way or another, but at that time, and then the president fully approved of the behavior of General Graves. And if, in fact, the Siberian expedition turned out to be unjustified, if as a result it was not possible to achieve significant results - as it was in reality - then this is due to the conditions prevailing at that time. It did not turn into a military adventure and, having deterred others from such adventures, created the conditions that made it necessary to withdraw the allied forces from the territory of Siberia, thereby preventing the conquest and appropriation of Russian land by other countries whose interests in the Far East could easily lead to a violation of armistice and, ultimately, to the establishment of a permanent colonial administration in the vast territory of the Russian Far East.

Apart from its consequences for the whole world, the Siberian expedition remains a mysterious enterprise. Indeed, even General Graves himself "... could never reach any satisfactory conclusion as to why the United States took part in this intervention at all." However, if you look at the situation in the world, you can find an adequate, albeit difficult, explanation. The world was at war. The most terrible military clashes were concentrated on the Western Front from the English Channel to the Swiss border, but the echo of this conflict affected the whole world, and everywhere, here and there, strange side adventures were started. All these “side effects” were, to one degree or another, peripheral echoes of the deepest shock to the central nervous system planets. Some of these were carefully planned to divert enemy forces or undermine their resources. Some were undertaken to keep the Allied spirit alive amid the prolonged stalemate on the Western Front and carried a touch of romance, such as the capture of Jerusalem by Field Marshal Allenby and the expulsion of the infidels from the holy places of Palestine. Some were the result of the release of the repressed sentiments of the backward peoples against the backdrop of the weakening of their containment by the colonial authorities, whose entire efforts were concentrated on fighting in Europe and who had neither the time nor the strength to maintain their power in remote territories. The success of the revolutions in Russia led to Moscow's loss of real power in the Far East and unleashed the predatory ambitions of such Cossack atamans as Semyonov and Kalmykov. The expanses of Siberia have long been the scene of commercial and military adventures and conflicts between the Germans, the British, the French and the Japanese. Siberia itself was populated partly by semi-savage peoples, partly by political exiles, to which a large number of released prisoners of war have now been added. The changing government in Moscow changed its attitude towards the world war and Russia's participation in it, and these opposing opinions, hardly understood in distant Siberia, clouded the already vague idea of Russia's national interests. On the Western Front, the nations were committed to one dominant aspiration, but in places like Siberia, this understanding and tension were absent. Siberia found itself in the same position as Sergeant Grisha, who had no idea what all this was for, but understood that old world fell into some incomprehensible general disorder.

Under the conditions described above, Allied military intervention no longer seems so unnatural, given the complexities inherent in such situations. The nations concerned have found it easy to find that changing circumstances from day to day imply, if not require, changes in their policies. Most of the nations that had troops in Siberia were too busy with what was happening at home to pay much attention to what was happening around Baikal. Not surprisingly, as a result, their military commanders were given more freedom in dealing with political issues, and General Yui or General Knox had a feeling that, taking advantage of the new turn of events, they could make a big leap towards the goals of the Allies and at the same time satisfy commercial and the territorial wishes of their governments, as they understood them. General Graves' book provides evidence that, from time to time, similar ideas took root in the minds of some officials and in the United States. I can't figure out how to explain the apparent conflict between the War Department and the U.S. State Department over the Siberian operation, just as I can't understand why the State Department attempted—and at times succeeded—to indoctrinate its ideas about Siberian policy directly into the general. Graves. Perhaps the State Department was more impressed than I was with certain Allied views on extending cooperation beyond what was outlined in the Aide Memoire. Perhaps some of these judgments were simply a reflection of the Allies' dissatisfaction with what they could count on. However, they were not previously presented to the Secretary of State and were not considered by him as something that could influence the clearly formulated line of conduct of the United States in the Siberian expedition. Undoubtedly, one day all this will be carefully studied, and an inquisitive researcher will find documents, notes and reports of conversations in which it was proposed to change course based on some new facts, but even when all of them are discovered, Siberia will remain a sergeant. Grisha. The situation that has developed in Siberia will forever remain an illustration of the oddities generated on the periphery by the madness that dominated the center of the warring world.

Nevertheless, I cannot finish this preface without expressing, to the best of my ability, gratitude on behalf of our entire country to those soldiers who courageously and meekly carried out the service entrusted to them by the country in that distant and mysterious land. Even the warriors of Democracy cannot always understand the reasons behind certain strategic decisions. Political and military decisions are made in offices and general staffs, and soldiers carry out orders. Therefore, those who ended up on the shores of the White and Yellow Seas carried out their service in exactly the same way as those who were on the Marne and the Meuse. And if it turns out that someone needs details that justify the Siberian expedition from the point of view of national interests, they can, at least in part, find satisfaction in the knowledge that American troops in Siberia behaved bravely and humanely. That they were following the orders of a commander who acted out of his country's lofty desire to exert a stabilizing and beneficent influence over a vast area populated by confused but friendly people. Also, I think they can be sure that history will find its pluses in what can be regarded as the unfortunate outcome of the American intervention in Siberia, because if it were not for the presence of American soldiers in the allied forces, things could happen that would further complicate the situation in Russia and seriously influenced the future of the whole world.

Newton D. Baker

From the author

It's hard to write or even talk about Russia without being accused of sympathy. Soviet power. However, during my service in Siberia, the Russian Far East was completely cut off from the rest of Russia controlled by the Soviet government. Thus, I had no dealings with either the Soviet government or any person who claims to be its representative.

The only authority with which I have been in contact throughout my entire service in Siberia is the Kolchak government, if it can be called a government. I doubt that without the support of foreign troops, Kolchak and his government could have had enough strength to act as a sovereign power. In a treaty known as the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, concerning the maintenance and operation of railways in Siberia, all the nations that had troops there recognized Kolchak as the representative of Russia, the highest degree of recognition that his government had ever been able to achieve. No state has ever recognized Kolchak as the head of any existing de facto or de jure government of Russia.

The main reason I have chosen to recall the facts and circumstances connected with the intervention is the belief that not only in the United States, but everywhere there is an erroneous impression regarding the prescriptions under which the American troops acted in Siberia. Another reason was the fact that the English Colonel John Ward wrote a book that creates - and, in my opinion, does this deliberately - the wrong impression about the behavior and loyalty to their duty of the American troops stationed in Siberia. This book can be found in American libraries, and I do not think it would be right for those Americans whom I had the honor to command if these unfair conclusions were left to posterity without refutation.

In writing this book, it was not my intention to justify any of my actions or the actions of American troops in Siberia, since the Secretary of War, the Honorable Newton D. Baker, and the Chief of the General Staff, General Peyton S. March, who held their posts during the entire period when American troops were in Siberia, as shown below, rendered any excuse redundant, giving the actions of American troops their generous and all-encompassing approval. I received the following personal letter from the Minister of War, dated August 31, 1920:

“I have just finished reading your detailed report of May 26, regarding the operations of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia from July 1, 1919 to March 31, 1920. The Siberian expedition is fully completed, and now that its last act has become the subject of a report, I am pleased to congratulate you on the fact that, as commander of the expedition, you have consistently managed to act with such tact, energy and success.

The prescriptions given to you were consistent with the purposes set out in the Aide Memoire issued by the State Department to announce to the world the tasks and conditions for the use of US troops in Siberia. In this ambiguous situation, your duties were often very complex and sensitive, and due to the remoteness of your field of activity from the United States, you could rely only on your own resources and initiatives. If you take into account the difficulties with communications, ensuring publicity and, in particular, a biased interpretation of the state of affairs in Siberia and the actions of your team, the situation is even more complicated.

You will be pleased to know that the War Office has relied with complete confidence on your estimates from the very beginning, and I am happy to assure you that your actions throughout the expedition are now approved by the Ministry.

In his report to the Minister of War for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, the Chief of Staff wrote regarding the Siberian Expedition: “The situation faced by the commander, his officers and soldiers turned out to be surprisingly difficult and risky. The way he accomplished his difficult task is worthy of the most best traditions our army."

William S. Graves

Goals of military intervention in Siberia

April 6, 1917, the day the United States entered world war, I served in the War Department as Secretary of the General Staff. I have been a lieutenant colonel of the General Staff and its secretary since August 1914. Prior to that, I was secretary from January 1911 to July 1912.

Like all the other officers of the War Department, I had hoped that I would be relieved of my current duties and sent to serve in France, but the Chief of the General Staff, Major General New L. Scott, turned down my request. On September 22, 1917, General Scott reached the legal age to retire and was replaced by General Tasker H. Bliss, who had previously served as Deputy Chief of the General Staff. General Bliss resigned on December 31, 1917, and Maj. Gen. Peyton S. March soon became chief. He learned about his appointment while in France, and took up his new duties on March 1, 1918.

Upon my arrival in the United States, General March informed me that he wanted me to continue with my current duties for about four months, after which he intended to allow me to go to France. However, in May 1918 he said: "If anyone has to go to Russia, it's you." This remark surprised me greatly, but since it was made as an assumption, I did not comment on it, realizing that General March was well aware of my desire to serve in Europe and that every opportunity that my current official duties gave me, I devoted to the study of conditions and military operations in France. I did not even think that American troops could be sent to Siberia, and I did not attach any importance to General March's remark. of great importance, because I did not imagine that someone would actually have to go there.

At the end of June 1918, General March announced that they intended to make me a major general of the national army, after which I would be appointed commander of one of the divisions located in the United States and left without a permanent commander. This gave me confidence that the idea of sending troops to Siberia had been abandoned, or that I would definitely not be sent there. The next morning I told the general that I would like to command the 8th Division stationed at Camp Fremont, Polo Alto, California. He agreed, and soon my candidacy was submitted to the Senate for confirmation with the rank of Major General of the National Army. On July 9, 1918, I was confirmed, after which I immediately informed General March that I wanted to leave for my division, and on July 13 I left Washington. On July 18, 1918, I took over as commander of the 8th division and took up my new duties. I was very pleased and happy when I learned that in October it was decided to send the 8th Division to France.

On August 2, 1918, in the afternoon, my Chief of Staff reported that a ciphered message had been received from Washington, and his first sentence read: "You must not give any of your employees or anyone else the contents of this message." I asked the chief of staff who signed the message and he replied "Marshall". Then I said that Marshall had nothing to do with me or him, and ordered the deputy chief of staff to decipher the message. It told me to “take the nearest and fastest train to San Francisco and go to Kansas City, where to go to the Baltimore Hotel and ask the Secretary of War. If he is not there, then wait for his arrival. This telegram seemed to me one of the strangest dispatches the War Office had ever sent, and unless Marshall's signature had been erroneously substituted for March, I would have been placed in the precarious position of an officer who would either disobey an order or leave a unit, without telling anyone about who gave him this right and where he is going.

The telegram did not say why I was being called to Kansas City, how long I would be away, or whether I would ever return. At the same time, such information could significantly affect how I prepare for departure. I did not know what clothes I should take, and I doubted whether this order meant an irreversible change in my position. Looking at the timetable, I saw that the train to Santa Fe was leaving San Francisco in two hours, so I packed a few things in my travel bag and some more in a small suitcase and set off for San Francisco. I managed to catch the train, but I couldn't buy a ticket for the sleeping car. On the way to Kansas City, I telegraphed the Secretary of War, Mr. Baker, at the Baltimore Hotel, telling me which train I would take. On the way, I tried to imagine what kind of secret mission it might be, and thought with fear that it was about Siberia, although I did not see anything in the press that the United States intended to send troops to Russia.

At 10 o'clock in the morning, when I arrived in Kansas City, I was met by an employee who said that Mr. Baker was waiting for me in the hall of the station. Since there was very little time before the departure of his train, Mr. Baker immediately said that, unfortunately, he had to send me to Siberia. With his usual generosity, he expressed his regrets and said that he knew about my reluctance to go and that perhaps someday he would tell me why I should do this. In addition, he wanted me to know that General March was trying to save me from being sent to Siberia and wanted to send me to France. He said: "If in the future you want to curse the one who sent you to Siberia, know that I did it." Then he handed me a sealed envelope with the words: “Here is the line of conduct of the United States in Russia, which you must follow. Weigh each step, because you will have to walk through a minefield. Goodbye, and God bless you."

As soon as I got to the hotel, I opened the envelope and inside saw seven pages entitled "Aide Memoire" without attribution, but at the end it read "State Department, Washington, July 17, 1918." After I carefully studied the document and felt that I understood the prescribed course of action, I went to bed but could not sleep, continuing to think about how other nations operate and why I was not informed about what was happening in Siberia. The next day, I read the document a few more times to analyze and understand the meaning of each phrase. I felt that there could be no discrepancies in understanding the line of conduct of the United States and that I did not need any further clarification. The line of conduct prescribed for me was as follows:

The people of the United States wish with all their hearts to win this war. The guiding principle of the United States government is to do whatever is necessary and efficient to win it. It wishes to co-operate in every possible way with the Allied governments and will do so willingly, since it does not pursue any goals of its own and believes that the war can only be won by common action and by close agreement on principles of action. It is ready to explore all possible strategies and actions in which the Allies would like to embody the spirit of this cooperation, and it has confidently concluded that if it considers itself obliged to refuse to participate in any undertakings or actions, it should be understood that this is being done only because it considers it necessary to prevent these plans and actions.”

Recently, a curious Russian translation of the memoirs of William Sidney Graves, who, as a brigadier general, led the American occupation forces in Siberia and the Far East during the Civil War in 1918-1920, appeared on the Web.

He wrote the book "American Adventures in Siberia" in 1931 when he was retired, and it was even published in a small edition in the USSR. As an objective view of a foreign military on the horrors of the Civil War.

The US expeditionary force in the amount of almost 8 thousand people operated on the territory from Vladivostok to Verkhneudinsk, guarding the Trans-Siberian Railway and delivering former Czechoslovak prisoners of war to their homeland.

Graves announced that he would pursue a policy of "non-intervention in Russia's internal affairs" and "complete neutrality", thus not antagonizing either side of the conflict. Moreover, according to the “whites”, the Americans actually contributed to the rapid growth of the “red” partisan detachments, which Graves was accused of by the commander of the Trans-Baikal Cossack army Grigory Semyonov.

In addition to Semenov, the American general came into conflict with the chieftain of the Ussuri army, Ivan Kalmykov, whom he suspected of wanting to seize American weapons sent by the United States to support the units of Admiral Alexander Kolchak.

Graves describes the horrors that happened in Siberia under the rule of the White Cossacks and the Japanese occupying forces. Nobody argues that the Bolsheviks were saints. But after the collapse of the USSR, we somehow began to rush from one extreme to another, whitewashing the "whites" and denigrating the "reds", either we represent Lenin as such a monster, or shed tears on the film "Admiral".

Blogger bulochnikov, who posted the post, notes:

What a blessing that our revolutionary great-grandfathers resisted, did not give up and won, did not allow the victory of the Whites in civil war in general and the notorious admiral in particular. Happiness for everyone; even for those who are now thoughtfully broadcasting about the victory of "red-bellied boors" and "Jewish commissars", longing for the crunch of French bread.

So what did General Graves write about? If anything - not a staff white-handed woman, but a combat officer who had a campaign against Spain and the Philippines under his belt.

Admiral Kolchak surrounded himself with former tsarist officials, and since the peasants did not want to take up arms and sacrifice their lives for the return of these people to power, they were beaten, flogged with whips and killed in cold blood by the thousands, after which the world called them "Bolsheviks". In Siberia, the word "Bolshevik" means a person who, by word or deed, does not support the return to power in Russia of representatives of the autocracy.

The soldiers of Semyonov and Kalmykov, under the protection of Japanese troops, roamed the country like wild animals, killing and robbing people; if Japan so desired, these killings could stop in a day. If questions were asked about these brutal murders, the answer was that the dead were Bolsheviks, and this explanation, apparently, suited the world quite well. Conditions in Eastern Siberia were terrible, and there was nothing cheaper than human life. Terrible murders were committed there, but not by the Bolsheviks, as the world thinks. I would be far from any exaggeration if I say that for every one killed by the Bolsheviks in Eastern Siberia, there are a hundred killed by anti-Bolsheviks.

Ataman Semyonov and General Graves.

It is difficult to imagine a person like Kalmykov existing in modern civilization; scarcely a day passed without reports of the terrible atrocities committed by him and his troops.

Kalmykov remained in Khabarovsk and instituted his own regime of terror, violence and bloodshed, which eventually caused his own troops to rebel and seek protection from the American army. Under the pretext of fighting Bolshevism, he groundlessly arrested any wealthy people, tortured them to get their money and executed many on charges of Bolshevism. These arrests were so frequent that they intimidated all classes of the population; it is estimated that Kalmykov's troops executed several hundred people in the vicinity of Khabarovsk.

Ataman Ivan Kalmykov (center) and American officers.

It is surprising that the officers of the Russian tsarist army did not realize the need for changes in the practice used by the army under the tsarist regime. The atrocities committed east of Lake Baikal were so startling that they left no open-minded person in doubt about the veracity of the many reports of excesses.

The opinions of Russian monarchists about the ethical methods of seeking funding are characterized by the following: Colonel Korf, the Russian liaison officer with the American command, told US intelligence officer Colonel Eichelberger that General Ivanov-Rinovi and General Romanovsky have enough power to stem the tide of criticism like me and all Americans, as well as American politics, and if I provide funding for the Russian army by the United States in the amount of twenty thousand dollars a month, propaganda against the Americans will be stopped.

American officer and Cossacks.

In March, a young woman, a village teacher, came to the headquarters of the American troops. He asked for protection for himself and his brothers so that they could return to their village, Gordievka, and bury their father, who was killed by the troops of Ivanov-Rinov. The woman said that Russian troops came to Gordiyevka in search of young men for forced conscription, but the youth fled, and then the troops detained ten men in the village, whose age was above the draft age, tortured and killed them, and placed guards at the bodies to prevent relatives to bury them. This sounded so cruel and unnatural that I ordered one officer with a small detachment to go to Gordievka and investigate, and notified the woman of my intentions. The officer sent to investigate reported the following:

Upon arrival at the Gordian school building, I was met by a crowd of 70 or 80 men, all armed with rifles, mostly Russian army rifles, as well as some old single-shot rifles of 45-70 caliber. All the information I collected was obtained in the presence of these 70 or 80 armed villagers and about 25 or 30 women. Most of the information comes from the wives of the victims, these women lost their senses many times during this difficult ordeal for them. The first interrogator said that her husband was walking towards the school with his rifle in order to surrender it to the Russian military in accordance with the order. He was seized on the street, beaten with his own rifle on the head and torso, and then taken to a house next to the school, where, with his hands tied, he was tied by the neck to a pin in the rafters and terribly beaten on the torso and head until blood splattered even the walls of the room .

White guard punishers and their victims.

The marks on his body showed me that he had also been hung up by his feet. He was later lined up with eight other men and shot at 2:00 pm. There were ten men in the line, all were killed except for one, whom Ivanov-Rinov's soldiers left to die. Next I interrogated a woman in whose house everyone was beaten and then shot behind her threshing floor. She stated that on the morning of March 9, 1919, at about 11:00 a.m., several Ivanov-Rinov officers came to her house and forced her to take her husband to another house, but at 11:30 a.m. they took her husband back and beat him along with the others; they broke his arm, cut off his nails and knocked out all his front teeth. Her husband was disabled and crippled.

I found that the floor of the room where these men were beaten was covered in blood, and all its walls were spattered with blood. The wire and rope loops that tied their necks still hung from the ceiling and were covered in blood. I also found that some of the men were doused with boiling water and burned with red-hot irons heated in a small oven that I found indoors. I visited the site where these men were shot. They were lined up and shot, each with at least three bullet holes, some with six or more. Obviously, they were shot first in the feet, and then higher in the torso.

The young officer conducting the investigation received and included in his report much more testimony, and those statements that I do not quote agree in every detail with those quoted. This case seemed so disgusting to me that I ordered the officer to report to me personally. He was not a regular, he was called up for the duration of the war. I will never forget the words this officer said to me after I had finished questioning him. He declared:-

General, for God's sake, don't send me on such expeditions again. I could hardly restrain myself from tearing off my uniform, joining these unfortunates and helping them with all that was in my power.

* * *

Addressing those fellow citizens who believe that it is necessary to fight Bolshevism regardless of US policy, I will note that I have never been able to determine who exactly was a Bolshevik and why he was one. According to the Japanese representatives and their paid puppets in Siberia, the Bolsheviks were all Russians who did not want to take up arms and fight for Semyonov, Kalmykov, Rozanov, Ivanov-Rinov; but in the criminal archives of the United States you will not find worse characters. According to the British and French representatives, the Bolsheviks were all those who did not want to take up arms and fight for Kolchak.

The mobilized Russians were mostly provided with uniforms by the British. General Knox stated that Britain had supplied Kolchak's forces with 100,000 uniforms. This is partly confirmed by the number of Red Army soldiers wearing British uniforms. General Knox was so disgusted by the fact that the Reds were wearing British uniforms that he is reported to have said later that Britain should not supply Kolchak with anything, as everything supplied ends up with the Bolsheviks. Generally speaking, the Red Army soldiers in British uniforms were the same soldiers who had been given these uniforms while they were in Kolchak's army. A significant part of these soldiers were not inclined to fight for Kolchak. The methods used by Kolchak to mobilize the Siberians caused a fury that is difficult to calm down. They went to the service, embittered by fear, but not before the enemy, but before their own troops. As a result, after the issuance of weapons and uniforms, they deserted to the Bolsheviks in regiments, battalions and one by one. On April 9, 1919, I reported:

The number of so-called Bolshevik gangs in Eastern Siberia has increased as a result of the order of mobilization and the extraordinary methods used in its implementation. The peasants and the working class do not want to fight for the Kolchak government.

The harsh measures used by the tsarist regime to prevent prisoners from escaping had not disappeared even by the time I passed through Irkutsk. I saw about twenty prisoners who had healthy chains fastened to their ankles, to the end of which large balls were attached; so that the prisoner could walk, he had to carry the ball in his hand.

In Krasnoyarsk, I learned something about General Rozanov, with whom I tried to work in Vladivostok. He was the same man who, on March 27, 1919, ordered his troops:

1. When occupying villages previously occupied by bandits (partisans), demand the extradition of leaders of the movement; where you cannot capture the leaders, but have sufficient evidence of their presence, shoot every tenth inhabitant. meets our troops with weapons, should be burned to the ground, all adult men should be shot; property, houses, carts should be requisitioned for use by the army.

We learned that Rozanov held hostages, and for each of his supporters who met death, he killed ten hostages. He spoke of these methods used in Krasnoyarsk as dealing with the situation with gloves, but declared his intention to take off the gloves after arriving in Vladivostok in order to deal with the situation without the restraint he had shown to the Krasnoyarsk people... Rozanov was the third most disgusting character of those , whom I knew in Siberia, although the level of Kalmykov and Semyonov was unattainable for him.

In order to indicate the combat readiness of Kolchak's troops in August 1919, I will try to analyze the official reports that came to me. One of the reports read:

It is estimated that, with the exception of officials and the military, the Omsk government supports no more than 5% of the population. According to estimates, about 45% support the Reds, about 40% support the Socialist Revolutionaries, about 10% is divided between other parties, and 5% remains for the military, officials and supporters of Kolchak.

From that time until the fall of the Omsk government, Kolchak's army was a retreating gang.

American soldiers on the streets of Vladivostok.

The Ambassador and I left Omsk for Vladivostok around 10 August. We stayed in Novonikolaevsk, Irkutsk, Verkhneudinsk and Harbin. Until we were on the territory of Semyonov, nothing interesting happened. By this time, it was well known that Semyonov had set up what were known as "murder stations" and openly boasted that he could not sleep well if he had not killed at least someone during the day. We stopped at a small station, and on Our train was taken up by two Americans from the Russian Railways Maintenance Corps. They told us about the murder of Semyonov by soldiers two or three days before our arrival of a whole echelon of Russians, in which there were 350 people. I don’t remember if there were only men there, or also women. The Americans reported the following:

The train of prisoners passed the station, and everyone at the station knew that they would be killed. The employees of the Corps went to the place of execution, but were stopped by Semyonov's soldiers. One hour and fifty minutes later, the empty train returned to the station. The next day, the two went to the scene of the murder and saw evidence of the mass execution. From the shell casings on the ground, it was clear that the prisoners were shot from machine guns: the spent shell casings lay in heaps in the places where machine guns threw them. The bodies were in two recently dug ditches. In one ditch, the bodies were completely covered with earth; in another, many arms and legs were visible.

I doubt that in the history of the last half century there will be at least one country in the world where murders were committed even calmer and with less fear of punishment than it was in Siberia under the regime of Admiral Kolchak. One example of cruelty and lawlessness in Siberia is a typical case in Omsk, Kolchak's residence, which occurred on December 22, 1918, just a month and four days after Kolchak assumed the authority of the "Supreme Ruler". On this day in Omsk there was an uprising of workers against the Kolchak government. The revolutionaries were partially successful, opened the prison and allowed 200 arrested persons to escape. Among them, 134 were political prisoners, including several members Constituent Assembly.

On the day this happened, the Omsk commander-in-chief Kolchak issued an order requiring all those released to return to prison, and stated that those who did not return within a day would be killed on the spot. All members of the Constituent Assembly and a number of other prominent political prisoners returned to prison. On the same night, several Kolchak officers took the members of the Constituent Assembly out of prison, telling them that they would be taken to the place of their trial for the crimes they were accused of, and they were all shot dead. There was nothing for the officers for this cruel and lawless murder. The conditions in Siberia were such that such atrocities could easily be hidden from the world. The foreign press constantly claimed that it was the Bolsheviks who committed these terrible excesses, and the propaganda was so active that no one could even think that these atrocities were committed against the Bolsheviks.

Colonel Morrow, who commanded the American forces in the Trans-Baikal sector, reported on the most brutal, heartless and almost unbelievable murder of an entire village by Semyonov. As his troops approached the village, the residents apparently tried to flee their homes, but Semyonov's soldiers shot at them—men, women, and children—as if they were hunting rabbits, and dumped their bodies at the murder scene. They shot not just one, but everyone in that village. Colonel Morrow had a Japanese and a Frenchman go with an American officer to investigate this massacre, and what I have told is contained in a report signed by the American, the Frenchman and the Japanese. In addition to the above, the officers reported that they found the bodies of four or five men who were apparently burned alive. People naturally wondered what could have been the target of such horrific murders. The purpose is similar to the reason camp guards keep sniffer dogs and use other means to intimidate prisoners; to prevent escape attempts. In Siberia, the persecuted people were not prisoners, but those responsible for these horrors were convinced that all Russians should at least act as if they sincerely supported the Kolchak cause. This treatment has sometimes succeeded in making people hide their true feelings for a time. This is exactly what happened in Siberia, and I am convinced that the Americans do not know anything about these terrible conditions.

When Americans first got to Siberia, most of us naturally expected that the experience of war and revolution had changed the thinking of the government from the former ruling class, but when this ruling class began to commit terrible atrocities in Siberia, to allow them and indulge them, it became clear that they had not learned anything.

It was well known in Vladivostok that from November 18, 1919 to January 31, 1920, Rozanov killed from five hundred to six hundred men, without commenting on his murders. First, a decision was made on the execution, then a military tribunal was going to legalize the planned murder; such was the method used by Rozanov. This procedure was well known in Vladivostok; in one case, I personally checked the accuracy of the information at the request of a Russian woman who lived at one time in New York.

General Knox served in Russia as a military attache under the tsarist regime. He could speak Russian and no doubt thought he understood Russians. He probably understood the character and characteristics of those Russians with whom he was associated in Petrograd, but I cannot believe that he understood the aspirations of the vast mass of the Russian people. If he understood these people, he probably would not have thought - and he obviously thought that way - that the Russian peasants and workers would take up arms and fight to bring to power the supporters of Kolchak who committed such atrocities. against those people from whom military support was sought. General Knox shared his thought with me: "The poor Russians were just pigs."

Personally, I never thought that Kolchak had any chance of establishing a government in Siberia, but the belief of Knox and others like him that the populace were pigs and could be treated like pigs hastened Kolchak's downfall.

"Terrible murders were committed in Eastern Siberia, but they were committed
not by the Bolsheviks, as was commonly thought. I won't be mistaken if I say that
Eastern Siberia, for every person killed by the Bolsheviks, there were
one hundred people killed by anti-Bolshevik elements"

This quote is very much liked to be inserted in historical discussions by modern
neo-bolsheviks. Usually this is followed by a comment: so he wrote in his
memoirs "American adventure in Siberia" American general
William Graves, who commanded the American interventionists in Kolchak's army.
After such a comment, it should be clear to everyone that the data on
"atrocities of Kolchak" are objective and independent, since they come from the lips
an American (why should he lie?), and even served with Kolchak (that
He has no reason to lie anymore!).

Let's try to figure out who the American General Graves was and whether he had a reason to lie.

William
Graves was born in Mount Calm, Texas. Graduated from the military academy
West Point in 1889. Served 7 and 6 infantry regiments. Promoted to Senior
lieutenant in November 1896, and captain in September 1899. In 1899-1902
participated in the Philippine-American War. Then the period of the garrison
service and in 1904-1906 again service in the Philippines. Appointed in 1909
to work in general staff in Washington. Promoted to Majors in March
1911, lieutenant colonels in July 1916, colonels in June 1917 and brigade
generals in February 1918. In May-July 1917 he made a secret trip to
Great Britain and France, preparing the entry of the United States into the First World War.

4
September 1918 he arrived in Vladivostok. official task
Graves was the protection of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Legions from
Russia - i.e. the American government did not set him the task of helping
Kolchak's army, but only to contribute to the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Corps.

Graves
announced that he would pursue a policy of "non-intervention in internal
affairs of Russia" and "complete neutrality", that is, the same attitude towards
Kolchak forces and red partisans. According to the inter-allied
railway agreement, the Americans were assigned to guard sections
Transsib from Vladivostok to Ussuriysk and in the Verkhneudinsk region.

We read what G.K. wrote about this. Gins (business manager in
Siberian Government, then chairman of the Economic Conference and
the new manager of affairs already in the Government of A.V. Kolchak) in
memoirs "Siberia, allies and Kolchak":

America in the Far East.

"On the
D. East, the American Expeditionary Forces behaved in such a way that in
in all anti-Bolshevik circles, the idea was strengthened that the United
The states do not want victory, but the defeat of the anti-Bolshevik government.

Here are some facts.

American
command at the Suchansky coal mines (near the mountains.
Vladivostok), without notifying the administration of the enterprise,
allowed the workers of the mines to convene a general meeting to discuss the issue of
refugees from the surrounding villages. The meeting was called on April 24 by the ordinary
for Bolshevik rallies in a way - by hanging a red flag
on the building of the People's House. It took place in the presence of a representative
American command, an American army officer who
guaranteed the speakers immunity and unlimited freedom
the words.

As it appears from the protocol of the meeting, the participants of the rally,
having heard the rebellious declaration, partisan detachments "(Bolsheviks)
and reports of persons located in the area of operations of Russian troops
government troops, decided: "appeal to the American
command with a proposal to immediately eliminate the robber gangs
Kolchakists, otherwise, we all, as one person, will quit work
and go to the aid of our fellow peasants."

On the second
At a similar meeting on April 25, a delegation was elected to be sent to
Vladivostok for the purpose of reporting on the resolutions of the meetings to the American
command, and Captain Grevs, having asked permission from his
colonel, kindly agreed to go to Vladivostok together with
delegation.
While the Japanese fought vigorously against
Bolsheviks in the Far East and suffered human sacrifices, Americans not only
refused to help them, but also expressed sympathy for the partisans, as if
encouraging them to new performances.
Appearing in Verkhneudinsk to guard the road, the Americans declared that they could not take any measures against popular uprisings.

It was impossible to explain all these
actions of America's anti-Japanese sentiment. It was clear that in the United
States did not realize what the Bolsheviks were, and what
American General Graves acts according to certain instructions.

In their area of responsibility, the Americans did not oppose the Reds
partisans. As a result, under the protection of the Americans in Primorye, there were soon
large red forces were formed, reaching several thousand people.
This led to a conflict between Graves and Ataman Semyonov.

Here is what G.M. wrote about this in his memoirs “About Myself”. Semyonov:

Chapter 3 REVOLUTION IN SIBERIA

"AT
At the same time, the Americans, with their ugly behavior, have always contributed
disorder, causing deep discontent among the population. With the exception of
some individuals, such as Major Borros, who is excellent
understood our tasks and the fatality of communism and was with us in spirit,
most of the Americans, led by Major General Graves, openly
supported the Bolsheviks, including up to the sending of single people and
groups with information and all sorts of assignments to the Reds. Them
unfamiliarity with the situation that existed in Russia was so
it is striking that they were completely sincerely amazed why the Russians were so
stubbornly resist the power of "the most advanced and progressive party",
preferring the horrors of royal despotism to enlightened rule
communist international. I believe that the reason for this was
the very low morale of the American soldiers sent to Siberia,
and the lack of discipline in the American army. Largely
the soldiers of the American units that carried out the intervention were
deserters great war, typed in concentration camps on the
Philippines, and were almost exclusively immigrants from Russia,
fled either from the persecution of the law, or from conscription. From
They did not endure anything to Russia except hatred for their former fatherland
and state structure him, so it is clear that all their sympathies
were on the red side. We, Russian nationalists, they considered
supporters of the old regime and therefore treated us with the same
the hatred with which they also treated national Russia. I dont know,
who Major General Grevs was, but the manner of his actions is undoubtedly
masterful - because it is difficult to allow the government
instructed Grevs to openly and constantly oppose everything
Russian nationalists - indicates that, in its moral
level, he was not far from his soldiers. One thing is certain: that
the enmity that we Russians have towards the Americans,
must be attributed by us not to the American people, but to the personal
account of Major-General Greves, whose criminal conduct
restored the entire national-minded element against the Americans
Siberia."

A year after Grevs' arrival in Russia until
the American Government began to realize that the fall of the Government
A.V. Kolchak can have more serious consequences than just
domestic affairs. For this, an American
ambassador.

Let's read again G.K. Guinsa:

Arrival of the American Ambassador.

“Another recipe for salvation was put forward by Sukin.
- We are on the eve of recognition, he usually declared, at each report in the Council of Ministers.

The president
Wilson, he once reported, was sending Ambassador Morris to Omsk.
The President wants to find out what the Omsk Government needs in order to
lay the foundation for systematic help. We are on the eve of decisive
turn in Allied policy. After the arrival of Morris, we are recognized, and
help will take US sizes.

Morris has arrived.

it
there was a completely different Morris, not the one we saw in Vladivostok
in the autumn of 1918, arrogant and mocking. His proud shaven face
it didn't look like an impenetrable mask now. It smiled kindly
sympathized. But who knows, maybe it's a prejudice - me
sometimes it seemed to hide an inner laugh.

Together with
Morris came General Greves. The same general from Vladivostok,
who encouraged the rebels on Suchan and refused to help the Japanese to
struggle against the Bolsheviks.

Now General Grevs has become different. He
expressed contempt for the Bolsheviks and such an ardent desire for their speedy
death that the French commissioner, Comte de Nartel, could not contain
smiles and threw notice a part: „mais qu` est-ce qu`il u perisait a
Souchan!" (aside: "But what was he thinking on Suchan?")"

But as it soon became clear, on the part of Grevs it was all a game for the public.
When in the fall of 1919 they began to fly to Vladivostok on American ships
arrive rifles purchased by the Kolchak government in the USA, Graves
refused to send them further by rail. His actions he
justified by the fact that the weapon could fall into the hands of the ataman’s units
Kalmykov, who, according to Graves, with moral support
The Japanese were preparing to attack the American units.

Let us turn again to the memoirs of G.M. Semyonov:

Chapter 4 CONFLICT WITH OMSK

"AT
Omsk, a number of senior officials of the Department of Military Communications were put on trial for
speculation in wagons, and the court pronounced a very severe sentence on the accused,
softened by the admiral. Commission Lieutenant General Katanaev opened
also that by order of the Irkutsk governor Dunin-Yakovlev,
who, as I indicated above, being a socialist-revolutionary, was
in implacable opposition to the government and secretly collaborated with
red partisans, part of the weapons and equipment was filmed at the station
Innokentievskaya supposedly for the needs of the local Irkutsk garrison. For me,
however, it was no secret that all the detained property was sent not
to Irkutsk, and to the partisan detachments of Shchetinkin, Kalashnikov and others. Almost
all weapons and uniforms that came from America, not without the knowledge
General Graves, ardent enemy Omsk government, transmitted from
Irkutsk to the red partisans. The case was so ugly with
point of view of morality and elementary decency of American
representatives in Siberia, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Omsk
Government Sukin, being a great Americanophile, could hardly
hush up the scandal that was about to flare up.

Under pressure
of other allies, Grevs nevertheless sent weapons to Irkutsk. But on this he
did not finish his "allied assistance" to the Russian Government A.V.
Kolchak. Moreover, from that moment on, he not only began to provide
material and organizational support to the "red partisans", but also
embarked on a path of active action against the Omsk government. AT
critical moment in the autumn of 1919, he participated in the Gaida conspiracy against
Kolchak in the Far East, providing communication between the Socialist-Revolutionary underground
and Czechoslovaks.

Here is what G.K. wrote about this. Gins:

Americans are friends of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

"Chapter
peaceful delegation sent by the Irkutsk revolutionaries to the Bolsheviks,
Akhmatov confirmed that if there had been a clash of Soviet troops
with the Japanese, then "The Political Center would do everything possible to
to create against Japan, together with Soviet Russia, single
front". Akhmatov added to this that in the summer of 1919 he had conversations with
individual representatives of American diplomacy and concluded that
that "America is ready to accept the existence of a buffer state,
inclusion in the body of power in it a representative of the communist forces"
("New Life" No. 93).

"The largest representatives
American diplomas in Siberia", added Kolosov, "there were three persons:
Consul General Harris, who lived in Omsk, definitely
who supported Kolchak, Ambassador Morris, who was constantly in
Vladivostok, standing in opposition, but, after a trip to Omsk, bowed
at one time on his side, the third was General Grevs, a certain
Kolchak's opponent. Counted on support from the Americans
rebels, participants in the uprising of General Gaida in Vladivostok, who had
reason to count on America's help in the event of an armed
intervention by Japan in the suppression of the uprising". "Representatives
American diplomacy repeatedly in different cases with its
negotiations with representatives of the Siberian democrats expressed the opinion that
sense that they find that only that "power in Siberia will be strong, in
the creation of which all left democratic elements will unite, in
especially socialist-revolutionaries and Bolsheviks.

Having left Russia, Grevs nevertheless did not stop his pro-Soviet activities.
In the spring - summer of 1922 in Vancouver and New York, he gave under oath
testimonies against Semyonov, saying that he allegedly was
opponent of Kolchak, gave orders for the executions of American soldiers
at the instigation of Japan. Semenov proved a lie with the help of General Knox
Grevsa and American officers demanded the removal of their former
army commander.

G.M. Semyonov "About myself":

Chapter 10 INITIAL DIFFICULTIES IN EMIGRATION

"Most
turned out to be an active collaborator of Skvirsky in his intrigue against me
General Grevs, who, after the termination of the civil process, spoke with
false testimony under oath as a witness in a criminal charge
me by Senator Bor in the execution of American soldiers in Transbaikalia in
period of allied intervention in Siberia.
<…>
This commission
was appointed, and in it General Grace made his testimony,
who, despite the fact that he testified under oath, admitted to them
a clear and gross distortion of the truth, surpassing in its absurdity even
fantastic inventions of some New York newspapers.

Grevs
declared that not only had I never been an employee of Admiral Kolchak, but
opposed him with armed force, holding the front in the rear of the territory,
subordinate to the government of the admiral. Grevs went on to say that the deceased
Admiral Kolchak never gave me full power in the territory
Russian eastern outskirts and that the executions of American soldiers in
Transbaikalia were produced repeatedly, and without any reason, but
instigation of the Japanese command.

I easily refuted all the insinuations
Grevs and proved their falsity, which caused a sharp protest by some
prominent officers of the American army, as having discredited himself with a false
oath. One of these officers, who brought his protests to the logical
end, was Colonel Makrosky, who did not stop before leaving for
resignation in protest against the continued stay of General Grevs in
the ranks of the army.

After the scandalous speech of General Grevs, I
turned to the commission with a request: how gentlemen senators consider
American army soldiers who deserted from their regiments and
who joined the Red Army in Siberia? Do they consider them
criminals and deserters or treat them like army chips,
who took up arms against the national Russian army. AT
in the first case - on the basis of what laws is it imputed to me
punishment by the court of criminals and deserters captured with weapons in
hands during the battle, among other captured Red Army soldiers, and in the second
case - how gentlemen senators will explain the armed uprising of officials
American army sent to Siberia to support national
forces of Russia, against these very forces on the side of the Red International.

Grevs lost the Semyonov case and was soon forced to leave the army.

And
of course, the apotheosis of recognition of the merits of the "independent" American
General William Graves in front of a young Soviet republic on the
Kolchak front was the following document:

Document #48

Letter
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinova
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stvlin regarding the US edition
collection of documents on Soviet-Japanese relations
08.04.1934
Owls. secret
Krestinsky
Sokolnikov

A significant increase in Japanese propaganda both in European countries,
and especially recently in the United States, it is necessary
strengthening our counter-propaganda. A study of the American press shows
that even that part of the newspapers that is inclined towards us
benevolently, very often becomes the mouthpiece of Japanese arguments
due to the lack of our materials and information. This applies to all
totality of our relations with Japan (regime on the CER, fishing
issue, border affairs, non-aggression pact, etc.).

AT
as one of the most effective measures, the NKID proposes
publication in the USA by one of the prominent American bourgeois publishers of a book -
collection of the most important documents of Soviet-Japanese relations since
occupation of Mukden1 and until very recently (with some
excursions into the history of the pre-war Russian-Japanese and post-revolutionary
Soviet-Chinese relations). So far, we can only talk about
documents already published in our press, and does not prejudge the question of
later edition of a collection of the type of diplomatic "Red Book",
which would also contain unpublished correspondence. This collection
it would be necessary to preface a preface written according to our
instructions and under our control, any prominent American
an "independent" publicist with a reputation as an expert
Far Eastern Affairs. As such, they could appear
for example, professor[sor] Schumann2, major general Graves3, Ludwall Denis (author
books "America Conquers Europe"), Louis Fisher4, Roy Howard5
(co-owner of the Scripps Newspaper Trust - Howard, a well-known anti-Japanese
installation), etc. The main thoughts of the preface should be
the sequence of Soviet peace policy, an indication of the elements
common interests of the USSR and the USA in relation to Japanese expansion,
the possibility of removing the military danger in the event of the unification of peaceful
the efforts of other countries.

The same book with a preface by a prominent European figure could be published in Europe, primarily in French.

The compilation of the documentary part of the collection can be done in Moscow.
Negotiations with possible authors of the preface and editing
Forewords can be entrusted to the embassy in Washington.

When
the proposal will be accepted in principle, the NKID will find out in the USA
approximately the amount of chervonny and foreign exchange expenses to cover
which require special allocation.

LITVINOV

WUA RF. F. 05. Op. 14. P. 103. D. 117. L. 89-90. Copy.

1 On the night of September 19, 1931, Japan, accusing the Chinese of destroying
district of Mukden (Shenyang) of the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway, introduced
troops into Northeast China.
2 Schumann Frederick
Lewis (1904-1981) - American historian and publicist, in the 1920s-1930s.
advocated the normalization of relations between the US and the USSR.
3 Graves
(Grevs) William Sidney (1865-1940) - in 1918-1920 commanding
US Expeditionary Forces in Siberia and the Far East,
major general (1925), in 1926-1928. commanded US troops in the zone
Panama Canal, retired from 1928, advocated the establishment
diplomatic relations with the USSR.
4 Fischer Louis (1896-1970) -
American journalist, from 1922 correspondent for The Nation in
Europe, repeatedly visited the USSR.
5 Howard Roy Wilson (1883-1964)
is an American journalist and publisher. President since 1912
news agency United Press. Since 1922 partner of the publishing
Scripps House. In 1936-1952. publishing company president
"Scripps - Howard".

Now it seems to me to become obvious
"objectivity" of the memoirs of the American general "who served with
Kolchak" and the answer to the question: "Who are you, General Grevs?"

Grevs American adventure in Siberia. From the memoirs of General Grevs, the head of the American military expedition in the Far East and Siberia (USA). Goals of military intervention in Siberia

William Graves American intervention in Siberia. 1918–1920 Memoirs of the Commander of the Expeditionary Force

* * *

Foreword

From the author

Goals of military intervention in Siberia

William Graves
American intervention in Siberia. 1918–1920 Memoirs of the Commander of the Expeditionary Force