home Educational literature Hitler's plan of attack on the USSR 1940. Plans for the German attack on the USSR. What did they prepare for us?

Hitler's plan of attack on the USSR 1940. Plans for the German attack on the USSR. What did they prepare for us?

On March 23, 1940, a Lockheed-12A twin-engine civilian aircraft with the registration number G-AGAR took off from the airfield in the London suburb of Heston. He was led by the English pilot Haig McLane. The plane headed for Malta, then flew through Cairo to the British military base in Baghdad. From there, taking on board two specialists in aerial photography, the plane headed towards the border of the USSR. Having flown over the border unnoticed at an altitude of seven thousand meters, the plane flew over Baku for an hour, making reconnaissance surveys.

What did they prepare for us?

The captured photographic materials were handed over to the relevant services of England and France. On their basis, plans were prepared for a surprise attack on the USSR - the English “Ma-6? and French "R.I.P." (Russia. Industry. Fuel.). The attack was to begin with the bombardment of the cities of Baku, Grozny, Batumi, Maykop and Poti. For the bombing of Baku, it was supposed to use British Blenheim bombers and American Glen Martin bombers in the amount of 90-100 vehicles. The bombing was supposed to go on day and night, guided by the flames of fires. All oil fields, oil refineries and oil ports were to perish in the fire.

By the beginning of 1940, the conversion of oil refineries was completed in the USSR. But from the past, there were still huge oil collectors - pits filled with oil, and a large number of wooden oil rigs. According to American experts, the soil of those places is so saturated with oil that the fire will certainly spread with great speed and move on to other fields... Putting out these fires will take several months, and restoring production will take years«.

Modern knowledge makes it possible to assess the consequences of the bombing as an ecological disaster. This is the emergence of "convective columns" over fires, when hot air carries combustion products into the upper atmosphere - which means that acid rain will fall, heat transfer in the atmosphere will be disturbed, everything around will be contaminated with carcinogenic and mutagenic substances. These are fires of deep wells with emissions of "dead water" containing compounds of copper and nitrogen. This is the runoff of combustion products into the sea and the destruction of marine flora and fauna. This is the deprivation of all residents of water - Baku does not have its own water resources, few wells would be poisoned by combustion products.

This is how, even before the barbaric bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the “civilized” West was cold-bloodedly preparing the murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians. It was the peaceful ones - neither in Baku, nor in Dresden, nor in Hiroshima, nor in Nagasaki were there any significant military forces and facilities.

Everyone was getting ready

Leger, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the American Ambassador Bullitt, January 11, 1940: “ France will not break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or declare war on it, it will destroy the Soviet Union if possible - if necessary - with cannons«.

French Prime Minister Daladier proposed sending a squadron to the Black Sea to blockade Soviet communications and shell Batumi from the sea. On January 19, 1940, he sent a document on the attack on the USSR to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Ground Forces in France and Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Military Council, General Gamelin, as well as to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy, Admiral Darlan. Two copies of this document were sent respectively to General Kieltz, Commander of the French Land Forces, and General Vuillemin, Commander-in-Chief of her Air Fleet.

On January 24, 1940, the chief of the imperial general staff of England, General Ironside, presented to the military cabinet a memorandum "The main strategy of the war", where he wrote: " In my opinion, we will be able to provide effective assistance to Finland only if we attack Russia as far as possible with more directions and, most importantly, we will strike at Baku, the oil production area, in order to cause a serious state crisis in Russia«.

On January 31, 1940, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of England and France in Paris, French General Gamelin suggests that the British bombard targets in the depths of Russia, Marshal Pierce, Deputy Chief of Staff of the British Air Force, supports this proposal.

As they say, where a horse with a hoof, there goes a cancer with a claw. Iranian Minister of War Nakhjavan asked the British to supply 80 aircraft and coordinate plans for a war with Russia.

On February 3, 1940, the French General Staff instructs General Jono, commander of the French Air Force in Syria, to study the possibility of an air attack on Baku. Three days later, this issue is discussed at a meeting of the British War Cabinet and is approved, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff is instructed to prepare a document in the light of the task.

On February 28, 1940, the French Air Force headquarters issues a document with specific calculations forces and means to attack Baku. The British approach the matter more thoroughly and propose an attack on our country from three directions. In the end, all the details and details were agreed upon, in March negotiations were held with the leadership of the Turkish General Staff - it was understood that Turkey would also participate in the attack on the USSR. Even more intense work to harmonize and coordinate the plans of the aggressors was going on in April. Reynaud, who succeeded Daladier as Prime Minister, was even more "hawkish" than his predecessor, and demanded more active action from the British.

The infernal machine for preparing an attack on the USSR began counting the last days and hours before the bombardment of the oil-bearing regions of our country, which was scheduled for May 15, 1940. At the airfields of the British and French Air Forces in the Middle East, stockpiles of aviation fuel, high-explosive and incendiary bombs were accumulated, navigators laid on maps directions of strikes, the pilots practiced night bombing. On May 10, 1940, Reynaud telephoned Churchill, informing him that France was ready for an attack on May 15.

What stopped them

But - the paradoxes of fate! - it was on May 10, five days before the start of the war between England and France against the USSR, that Hitler gave the order to stop the "strange war" with France, when there were no hostilities, and go on a decisive offensive. The Germans in a matter of days defeated the French, their recent winners, and the newly-minted Napoleons were somehow not up to a new campaign against Russia. The Germans did not finish off the British Expeditionary Force in France, allowing him to get out the best of health through Dunkirk.

Only five days - and history would have gone completely differently! And the war would have been completely different - we would have repelled the attack of the Anglo-French aggressors at a completely different price than the attack of the Germans. The Soviet leadership was aware of the plans to attack Baku and was preparing retaliatory measures. MiG-3 high-altitude fighters were developed and put into service - they were able to intercept British, American and French bombers at high altitudes. For the Il-2 armored attack aircraft, British fighters, armed only with machine guns, posed no danger, and there was no need to talk about the French. So the air raid of the “allies” would not have brought the disasters, casualties and destruction that they were counting on. But the whole world would see who the real aggressor is. Relations with Germany would have completely changed and, quite possibly, there would have been no date in our history for June 22, 1941. There would have been a date for May 15, 1940, but these are not at all the same victims and losses.

As for Hitler, it was not in vain that Stalin once said that the Hitlers come and go, but Germany, the German people, remains. Sooner or later, the political system in Germany would have evolved, excesses would have gone and remained in the past, just as the fires of the Inquisition and Crusades, persecution of the Gentiles and the burning of witches. What worries me most - I'm such an egoist - is his attack on my country. And how Germany decided its relations with England or France - I care little. Moreover, England had its own Sir Oswald Mosley, the leader of the British fascists, a member of the British Parliament and government, who personally knew both the English and Belgian kings, and Hitler and Goebbels - they would have found a common language. And two hundred thousand French volunteers fought against Russia in Hitler's troops, and the French SS men were the last defenders of his bunker.

Alexander TRUBITSYN

On August 1, 1940, Erich Marx presented the first version of the war plan against the USSR. This option was based on the idea of a fleeting, lightning war, as a result of which the German troops were planned to reach the line Rostov - Gorky - Arkhangelsk, and later - to the Urals. The decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow. Erich Marx proceeded from the fact that Moscow is "the heart of Soviet military-political and economic power, its capture will lead to an end to Soviet resistance."

According to this plan, two strikes were envisaged - north and south of Polissya. The northern blow was planned as the main one. It was supposed to be applied between Brest-Litovsk and Gumbinen through the Baltic states and Belarus in the direction of Moscow. The southern strike was planned to be carried out from the southeastern part of Poland in the direction of Kyiv. In addition to these strikes, a "private operation to seize the Baku region" was planned. The implementation of the plan was given from 9 to 17 weeks.

Erich Marx's plan was played out at the headquarters of the supreme command under the leadership of General Paulus. This test revealed a serious drawback of the presented option: it ignored the possibility of strong flank counterattacks by Soviet troops from the north and south, capable of disrupting the advance of the main grouping towards Moscow. The headquarters of the supreme command decided to revise the plan.

In connection with Keitel's report about the poor engineering preparation of the bridgehead for an attack on the USSR, the Nazi command on August 9, 1940 issued an order called "Aufbau Ost". It outlined measures for the preparation of a theater of military operations against the USSR, the repair and construction of railways and highways, bridges, barracks, hospitals, airfields, warehouses, etc. The transfer of troops was carried out more and more intensively. On September 6, 1940, Jodl issued an order stating: “I order to increase the number of occupation troops in the east during the following weeks. For security reasons, the impression should not be created in Russia that Germany is preparing for an offensive in an easterly direction.

On December 5, 1940, at a regular secret military meeting, Halder's report was heard on the Otto plan, as the war plan against the USSR was originally called, and on the results of staff exercises. In accordance with the results of the exercises, it was planned to destroy the flank groups of the Red Army before the capture of Moscow by developing an offensive against Kyiv and Leningrad. In this form, the plan was approved. There were no doubts about its implementation. Supported by all those present, Hitler declared: “It is to be expected that the Russian army, at the first blow of the German troops, will suffer an even greater defeat than the army of France in 1940.”3 Hitler demanded that the war plan provide for the complete annihilation of all combat-ready forces on Soviet territory.

The participants in the meeting had no doubt that the war against the USSR would be completed quickly; CPOK~ weeks was also indicated. Therefore, it was planned to provide only a fifth of the personnel with winter uniforms, Hitler's General Guderian admits in his memoirs published after the war: was provided only for every fifth soldier. German generals later tried to shift the blame for the unpreparedness of the troops of the winter campaign to Hitler. But Guderian does not hide the fact that the generals were also to blame for this. He writes: "I cannot agree with the widespread opinion that only Hitler is to blame for the lack of winter uniforms in the autumn of 1941."4

Hitler expressed not only his own opinion, but also the opinion of the German imperialists and the generals, when he, with his usual self-confidence, said in a circle of close associates: “I will not make such a mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter."

The next day after the meeting, December 6, Jodl instructed General Warlimont to draw up a directive for war against the USSR on the basis of the decisions taken at the meetings. Six days later, Warlimont submitted directive No. 21 to yodel, who made several corrections, and on December 17 it was handed over to Hitler for his signature. The next day, the directive was approved under the name Operation Barbarossa.

At a meeting with Hitler in April 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow, Count von Schulenburg, tried to express his doubts about the reality of the plan, the war against the USSR. BUT he only achieved that he fell into disfavor forever.

The fascist German generals worked out and put into effect a plan of war against the USSR, which corresponded to the most predatory desires of the imperialists. The military leaders of Germany unanimously spoke in favor of the implementation of this plan. Only after the defeat of Germany in the war against the USSR, the beaten fascist commanders for self-rehabilitation put forward a false version that they objected to an attack on the USSR, but Hitler, despite the opposition he received, nevertheless unleashed a war in the East. Thus, for example, the West German General Btomentritt, a former active Nazi, writes that Rundstedt, Brauchitsch, and Halder tried to dissuade Hitler from going to war with Russia. “But all this did not bring any results. Hitler insisted. With a firm hand, he took the helm and led Germany to the rocks of complete defeat. In reality, not only the "Fuhrer", but the entire German generals believed in the "blitzkrieg", in the possibility of a quick victory over the USSR.

Directive No. 21 said: “The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia through a fleeting military operation even before the end of the war with England” - the main idea of the war plan was defined in the directive as follows: “The military masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia armies must be destroyed in bold operations with deep advances of armored units. The retreat of combat-ready units into the expanses of Russian territory should be prevented ... The ultimate goal of the operation is to fence off from Asiatic Russia the general line Arkhangelsk-Volga.

On January 31, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the German Ground Forces issued a "Directive on the Concentration of Troops", which set out the general plan of the command, determined the tasks of army groups, and also gave instructions on the deployment of headquarters, dividing lines, interaction with the fleet and aviation, etc. .This directive, defining "first intent" German army, set before her the task of "splitting the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep blows from powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy disunited groupings of enemy troops."

Thus, two main directions for the offensive of the German troops were outlined: south and north of Polesie. To the north of Polissya, the main blow was delivered by two army groups: "Center" and "North". Their task was defined as follows: “To the north of the Pripyat swamps, Army Group Center is advancing under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Having introduced powerful tank formations into battle, she makes a breakthrough from the Warsaw and Suwalki area in the direction of Smolensk; then turns the tank troops to the north and destroys, together with the Finnish army and the German troops thrown up for this from Norway, completely deprives the enemy of the last defensive possibilities in the northern part of Russia. As a result of these operations, freedom of maneuver will be ensured for the implementation of subsequent tasks in cooperation with the German troops advancing in southern Russia.

In the event of a sudden and complete defeat of the Russian forces in the north of Russia, the turn of troops to the north is no longer possible and the question of an immediate strike on Moscow may arise.

To the south of Polesye, it was planned to launch an offensive by the forces of Army Group South. Its task was defined as follows: “South of the Pripyat swamps, Army Group South under the command of Field Marshal Rutsdstedt, using a swift blow from powerful tank formations from the Lublin region, cuts off Soviet troops stationed in Galicia and Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, captures crossing the Dnieper River in the region of Kyiv and to the south of it thus provides freedom of maneuver for solving subsequent tasks in cooperation with troops operating to the north, or performing new tasks in southern Russia.

The most important strategic goal of the Barbarossa plan was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army concentrated in the western part of the Soviet Union and capture militarily and economically important areas. In the future, German troops in the central direction expected to quickly reach Moscow and capture it, and in the south - to occupy the Donets Basin. In terms of great importance was attached to the capture of Moscow, which, according to the plan of the German command, should have brought Germany a decisive political, military and economic success. The Hitlerite command believed that his plan of war against the USSR would be carried out with German precision.

In January 1941, each of the three army groups received a preliminary task under Directive No. 21 and an order to conduct a war game in order to check the expected course of battles and obtain material for the detailed development of an operational plan.

In connection with the planned German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece, the start of hostilities against the USSR was postponed for 4-5 weeks. On April 3, the high command issued an order stating: “The time for the start of Operation Barbarossa, due to the operation in the Balkans, is postponed by at least 4 weeks.” On April 30, the High Command of the German Armed Forces made a preliminary decision to attack the USSR on June 22 1941 An intensified transfer of German troops to the Soviet border began in February 1941. Tank and motorized divisions were brought up last so as not to reveal a premature attack plan.

17 June 1941 high command armed forces Germany gave the final order, which indicated that the implementation of the plan "Barbarossa" should begin on June 22. The headquarters of the high command was transferred to the Wolfschanze command post, equipped in East Prussia near Rastenburg.

Long before the attack on the USSR, the head of the Gestapo, Himmler, on behalf of the German government, began to develop the master plan "Ost" - a plan to conquer the peoples of Eastern Europe, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, by fire and sword. The starting points of this plan were reported to Hitler as early as May 25, 1940. Himmler expressed confidence that as a result of the implementation of the planned measures, many peoples, in particular Poles, Ukrainians, etc., would be completely exterminated. For the complete elimination of national culture, it was planned to destroy any education, except primary in special schools. The program of these schools, as Himmler suggested, was to include: “simple counting, up to 500 at the most; the ability to sign, the suggestion that the divine commandment is to obey the Germans, to be honest, diligent and obedient. The ability to read,” added Himmler, “I consider it unnecessary.” Having familiarized himself with these proposals, Hitler fully approved them and approved them as a directive.

Special teams and "equipment" were created in advance for the mass extermination of civilians. The German armed forces and authorities in the occupied territories were to be guided by the relevant instructions of Hitler, who taught: “We are obliged to exterminate the population - this is part of our mission to protect the German population. We will have to develop a technique for exterminating the population... If I send a color German nation in the heat of war, shedding precious German blood without the slightest pity, then, without a doubt, I have the right to destroy millions of people of an inferior race who multiply like worms.

Bibliography

For the preparation of this work, materials from the site http://referat.ru were used.

Balkan - in the south. The war against the countries of Western Europe allowed Germany to largely provide a strategic rear. Military operations on the Soviet-German front. June 22, 1941 by treacherous attack Nazi Germany the Soviet Union began the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people, which became the most important integral part Second World War. Forced entry of the USSR into the war ...

Labonne will have to meet, since relations between France and the USSR have assumed a strained character. The ambassador should take into account the fears of the Soviet leaders. Having won a victory over France, the German Reich will undertake aggression against the USSR. Therefore, it can be assumed, the instructions said, that the Soviet Union is interested in changing the balance of forces between Germany and the Anglo-French coalition. However, not...

Foothills of the Carpathians. And by the end of March 25, formations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the state border of the USSR. Exit to the border. The summer of 1944 came. The German command believed that the Red Army would continue its offensive in the southern direction. However, since the spring of 1944, preparations have been underway for an operation codenamed "Bagration". The configuration of the front at the site of the operation was ...

The USSR resigned its powers. Changes in the political system of Russia in the first half of the 1990s. The beginning of changes in the political system of Russia is associated with the election of B.N. Yeltsin as Chairman of the Supreme Council (May 1990) and the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation (June 1990), which in fact meant the emergence of dual power in the country. By this time...

On August 1, 1940, Erich Marx presented the first version of the war plan against the USSR. This variant was based on the idea of a swift, blitzkrieg war, as a result of which the German troops were planned to reach the Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line, and later to the Urals. The decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow. Erich Marx proceeded from the fact that Moscow is "the heart of Soviet military-political and economic power, its capture will lead to an end to Soviet resistance."

On December 5, 1940, at a regular secret military meeting, Halder's report was heard on the Otto plan, as the war plan against the USSR was originally called, and on the results of staff exercises. In accordance with the results of the exercises, it was planned to destroy the flank groups of the Red Army before the capture of Moscow by developing an offensive against Kyiv and Leningrad. In this form, the plan was approved. There were no doubts about its implementation. Supported by all those present, Hitler declared: “It is to be expected that the Russian army, at the first blow of the German troops, will suffer an even greater defeat than the army of France in 1940.”3 Hitler demanded that the war plan provide for the complete destruction of all combat-ready forces on Soviet territory.

On January 31, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the German Ground Forces issued a "Directive on the Concentration of Troops", which set out the general plan of the command, determined the tasks of army groups, and also gave instructions on the deployment of headquarters, dividing lines, interaction with the fleet and aviation, etc. This directive, defining the "first intention" of the German army, set before it the task of "splitting the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep blows from powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat marshes and, using this breakthrough, destroy the disunited groups of enemy troops.

The most important strategic goal of the Barbarossa plan was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army concentrated in the western part of the Soviet Union and capture militarily and economically important areas. In the future, German troops in the central direction expected to quickly reach Moscow and capture it, and in the south - to occupy the Donets Basin. The plan attached great importance to the capture of Moscow, which, according to the plan of the German command, was to bring Germany a decisive political, military and economic success. The Hitlerite command believed that his plan of war against the USSR would be carried out with German precision.

Original taken from igor_mikhaylin in 1940-41 From Marx to Paulus. Creation of a shock group

writes http://maxpark.com/community/14/content/3134170 Aizen Taicho

In history Patriotic War There is one little known detail.

The fact is that the Barbaros operational plan was by no means the first operational plan developed for an attack on the USSR, and the attack itself was planned in the fall of 1940.
Hitler believed that the British would quickly conclude a truce (or peace), he would turn to the USSR and quickly end the war in the east.
But England persisted and the plan eventually fell through. That's what it was.

INTENTION
On July 21, Hitler categorically stated: “The Russian problem will be solved by an offensive.

Following the ground forces of Germany, Brauchitsch received an order to prepare a plan of war against the USSR, given that the attack would be undertaken 4-6 weeks after the end of the concentration of troops.
»
It was at this meeting on a national scale that the decision to attack the Soviet country was approved.
For the first time, the question of a war with the USSR was put on the basis of operational calculations.
Here is the commander-in-chief of 0 divisions.
Herman Goth, who commanded the 3rd during the attack on the USSR tank group, in his memoirs “Tank Operations”, he notes that on July 29, 1940, the chief of staff of the 18th Army (this post was previously held by Lieutenant General Marx, the author of the very first plan of attack on the USSR) was called to Berlin, “where he received the task to develop plan of operation against Russia.
Goth wrote:
“At this time, Hitler, who was about to launch an offensive against Russia in the fall (autumn of 1940), was informed that the concentration and deployment of troops along the eastern border would take from four to six weeks ...
On July 31, Hitler made his intentions more specific and stated that he would most willingly launch an offensive against Russia this year.
But this cannot be done, since hostilities will take over the winter, and a pause is dangerous; the operation makes sense only if we defeat the Russian state with one blow.

Herman Goth
About the same General Tippelskirch:
“The beginning of military preparations can be traced back to the summer of 1940. At the end of July, before the order was given for an air attack on England, Jodl informed one of his closest collaborators that Hitler had decided to prepare for war against the Soviet Union.
This war had to start under all circumstances, and then it would be better to fight it within the framework of a war already being waged; in any case, it is necessary to prepare for it.
Initially, even the possibility of starting new war still coming autumn (i.e., in 1940). However, this would have to face insurmountable difficulties associated with strategic concentration, and such an idea had to be abandoned soon ”
Only limited time - the Germans did not have time to make a strategic concentration for aggression against the USSR - kept them from attacking the Soviet Union in 1940.
Simply put, the decision to attack the USSR was made in the summer of 1940. Everything else was technical developments.
CREATING A STRIKING GROUP
In the summer and autumn of 1940, the high command of the German Wehrmacht began to intensively transfer to Poland, closer to the Soviet borders; their troops. Against the USSR, Hitler planned to throw 120 divisions, leaving 60 divisions in the West, in France and Belgium, as well as in Norway.

To this end, the railway network in Poland was improved, old tracks were repaired and new tracks were laid, communication lines were established.
Immediately after the defeat of France, three Nazi armies of the von Bock group - 4, 12 and 18 - numbering up to 30 divisions were sent to the East, to the Poznan region.
Of the 24 formations that were part of the 16th and 9th armies of group "A", intended to attack England according to the "Sea Lion" plan, 17 were transferred to the East
The headquarters of the 18th Army was deployed in Poland, uniting all German troops in the East. Only during the period from July 16 to August 14, more than 20 Nazi divisions were redeployed, making marches along a mysterious curve.

They went from Central France to the English Channel and Pas de Calais, and then through Belgium and Holland to Germany and on to Poland, to the borders of the Soviet Union. However, everything will become extremely clear if we consider that the Nazi command, which carried out these mysterious marches, pursued a single goal: to cover up Germany's preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union.

According to German data, by September 20, 1940 from France to the borders of the USSR, in East Prussia, Poland, Upper Silesia, about 30 divisions were transferred
To wage war against the USSR, the German command formed new infantry, tank, motorized divisions.
Since for Germany since the autumn of 1940 decisive task preparations for a war against the Soviet Union began, on October 12, 1940, an order was given to stop all preparations for the Sea Lion plan until the spring of 1941.
Tank, mechanized and infantry divisions, including the division of selected thugs "Dead Head", as well as Himmler's terrorist apparatus, which were intended for landing in England, at the end of the summer and autumn of 1940 were loaded into wagons and moved to the borders of the Soviet Union.

Preparations for the attack on the USSR were carried out with German punctuality. Operational-strategic plans were developed very carefully and comprehensively. Tens of thousands of pages were written, thousands of maps and diagrams were drawn. The most experienced field marshals, generals, and officers of the General Staff methodically developed an aggressive plan for a treacherous attack on a socialist state that was engaged in peaceful, creative work.

The slowness and thoughtfulness of this preparation testify to the fact that fascist Germany was not afraid of an attack from the USSR, and the legends of German politicians, generals, "historians" about Germany's "preventive war" against the USSR are simply falsification and lies.
After a meeting with Hitler at the Berghof, on August 1, 1940, E. Marx presented Halder with the first version of the plan for the war against the USSR. It was based on the idea of "blitzkrieg". Marx proposed the formation of two shock groups, which were to advance to the line Rostov-on-Don - Gorky - Arkhangelsk, and further to the Urals. The decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow, which would lead, Marx pointed out, to the "termination of Soviet resistance"

Only 9-17 weeks were allotted for the implementation of the plan to defeat the USSR.
After Keitel's report about the insufficient engineering preparation of the bridgehead for an attack on the USSR, Jodl on August 9 gave the top secret order "Aufbau ost". It outlined the following preparatory measures: repair and construction of railways and highways, barracks, hospitals, airfields, training grounds, warehouses, communication lines; provided for the formation and combat training of new formations
By the end of August 1940, a preliminary version of the plan for the war of fascist Germany against the USSR was drawn up, which received the code name of the plan "Barbarossa
Marx's plan was discussed at operational meetings with the participation of Hitler, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Halder and other generals. was put forward and new version- invasion of the USSR by forces of 130-140 divisions; the final development of it was entrusted to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Paulus. The purpose of the invasion was to encircle and defeat the Soviet units in the western part of the USSR, access to the line Astrakhan - Arkhangelsk

Paulus considered it necessary to create three army groups: "North" - to attack Leningrad, "Center" - to Minsk - Smolensk, "South" - in order to reach the Dnieper near Kyiv. Started in August 1940, the development of the preliminary plan "Barbarossa", according to General Paulus, ended with two war games.

In late November and early December 1940, these large operational games were held at the General Staff of the Ground Forces in Zossen under the leadership of Paulus.
They were attended by Colonel General Halder, the Chief of Operations of the General Staff, Colonel Heusinger, and specially invited senior staff officers from the OKH.
Field Marshal Paulus at the Nuremberg Tribunal testified
“The result of the games, taken as the basis for the development of directives for the strategic deployment of the Barbarossa forces, showed that the envisaged disposition on the line Astrakhan - Arkhangelsk - the distant goal of the OKW - was supposed to lead to the complete defeat of the Soviet state, which, in fact, the OKW achieved in its aggression and what, finally, was the goal of this war: to turn Russia into a colonial country"
At the end of the military games, in December, a secret meeting was held with the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, who used the theoretical results of the games with the involvement of individual headquarters of army groups and armies responsible for unleashing aggression against the USSR.
It discussed issues that were not resolved during the military games.

At the end of the meeting, Colonel Kindel, Head of the Vostok Department of Foreign Armies, delivered a special report. He gave detailed economic and geographical characteristic the Soviet Union, as well as the Red Army, although he really could not appreciate its true strength.
Paulus testified:
“The speaker’s conclusions are a noteworthy adversary that there was no information about special military preparations and that the military industry, including the newly created one east of the Volga, was highly developed”
As Tippelskirch notes, this was essentially the first step towards the strategic deployment of the German armed forces against the Soviet Union. In July, the direct development of plans for an attack on the USSR begins.
Interesting is the following remark by Tippelskirch, referring to the beginning of the development of the German plans for the eastern campaign:
“The hitherto known grouping of enemy forces, as well as general considerations independent of this, made it possible to assume that the Russians would retreat no further than the Dnieper and the Western Dvina, because with a further retreat they would no longer be able to protect their industrial regions.
Based on this, it was planned to prevent the Russians from creating a continuous front of defense to the west of the indicated rivers with the strikes of tank wedges.
Those. the information about the Soviet group that the Germans had at the time they began to develop plans for a war against the USSR did not at all cause them fears that they might be subjected to a military strike from the east.
On the contrary, they assume that the Russians will retreat, and they are thinking about how to prevent the Red Army from retreating too far - to defeat it in border battles. General Marks
The very first draft of the Ost operation plan, developed by the chief of staff of the 18th Army, Major General Marx, who, according to Hoth, enjoyed "special authority" with Hitler, says the same thing.
MARX PLAN
On August 5, 1940, General Marx presented his project. Now this document was declassified in the 90s by the international fund "Democracy", "Documents", v. 1, pp. 232-233;
In the very first lines it stated:
"The goal of the campaign is to defeat the Russian armed forces and make Russia unable to act as an enemy to Germany in the foreseeable future." And not a word about the fact that there is a threat of a Soviet attack and that the campaign is designed to prevent it. Vice versa! The document says in black and white: "The Russians will not do us a favor by attacking us."
But the Russians will not render such a service, it’s not scary - the Germans will attack themselves.
How will the enemy (i.e. Soviet troops) behave in response to the German attack? General Marx stated his considerations: “We must count on the fact that the Russian ground forces will resort to defense, while only aviation and naval forces, namely the submarine fleet.
Therefore, the conduct of war by Soviet Russia will consist in the fact that she will join the blockade (of Germany).

To this end, a Russian invasion of Romania is likely to take oil from us. Therefore, one should count on at least strong Russian air raids on the Romanian oil regions.
On the other hand, the Russian will not be able, as in 1812, to evade any decision on the battlefield. The modern armed forces, numbering 100 divisions, cannot give up the sources of their strength. It should be assumed that the Russian ground forces will take up a defensive position to fight in order to protect Great Russia and Eastern Ukraine.
After the frank indication of General Marx that “the Russians will not render us a service by their attack on us” (i.e., the Germans initially proceeded from the fact that they would be the aggressors, and the Soviet Union was assigned the role of a victim of aggression), it is quite obvious: any forecasts of German strategists about the possible actions of the Red Army - these are reflections on retaliatory, defensive actions on the Soviet side.

General Marks
And, of course, quite legal and natural for a country that has been attacked by an aggressor.
This is to the fact that Rezun quite often exaggerates the topic of the “Soviet threat to the Romanian oil fields” - they say, poor and unfortunate Hitler, who depended on fuel supplies from Romania, was afraid that the USSR would cut these supplies.
But we see - from the reflections of the German strategists themselves, under what circumstances could something like this happen - "a Russian invasion of Romania in order to take oil from us (Germans.)" - only in the case (and under the condition) of a German attack on the USSR.
The fact that the Germans were absolutely not afraid of any strike from the USSR - even a preemptive one (!), Even in a situation where Germany's aggressive intentions were unraveled in Moscow, is also evidenced by the indisputable fact that the German troops concentrating near the Soviet border were not even put tasks in case the Red Army strikes first.
German strategists, in principle, did not consider such an option and completely ruled it out!
And this despite the fact that the concentration Soviet troops the Germans noted and perceived this fact as a reciprocal, defensive measure of the USSR.
For example, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, on March 27, 1941, writes in his diary:
“A meeting was held at the headquarters of the OKW on the issue of speaking out against Russia ... No decision was made on issuing the necessary instructions in case of an unexpected Russian offensive on the border in the sector of the army group.
Although such a development of events seems unlikely, we must be prepared for any surprises, since any attempt to attack in the direction of the German border threatens the huge stocks of ammunition, food and weapons concentrated there, intended to support our planned operation.
As you can see, von Bock, although he considers any unexpected offensive by the Red Army "unlikely", would still consider it necessary to play it safe - one must, they say, be prepared "for any surprises."
Which, in general, is logical. But even for reinsurance purposes, the OKW does not give any appropriate (to cover the border in case of a Soviet attack) instructions to the German troops - get ready calmly for the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, do not be distracted by "unlikely" scenarios (and the OKW, apparently, had reason count Soviet offensive and completely incredible), do not bother your head with unnecessary problems.

So all rezunism can be sent to a landfill ...

DEVELOPMENT OF OKW
All Soviet border districts (in the west of the country) received orders from their command to provide cover for the border in the event of a German attack; German army groups did not set similar tasks.
As they say, feel the difference! So the Germans were "afraid" of the Soviet attack.
The most curious document Strategic development of the operational department of the OKW for the preparation and conduct of a campaign against the USSR.
The head of the operations department of the OKW was Alfred Jodl, who was also Hitler's chief military adviser on operational-strategic issues.
The document is dated September 15, 1940.
Among the goals of the campaign against the USSR, we again do not find a hint of the "threat of a Soviet invasion" that should have been prevented. In general, not a single word that the Soviet Union is plotting something against Germany.
“The goal of the campaign against Soviet Russia,” the document said, “is: by swift action to destroy the mass of ground forces located in western Russia, to prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready forces into the depths of Russian space, and then, cutting off western part Russia from the seas, to break through to such a boundary, which, on the one hand, would secure the most important regions of Russia for us, and on the other hand, could serve as a convenient barrier from its Asian part.
A map was attached to this strategic development of the operational department of the OKW, which schematically showed "the grouping of forces of the Russian ground forces according to the data at the end of August 1940."
Perhaps in the grouping of Soviet troops "at the end of August 1940" was something threatening for Germany?
No. The Soviet grouping - at the moment when the Germans no longer even make a decision (this happened back in July 1940), but are developing their plans for the upcoming attack on the USSR - did not represent any threats to Germany.
What worries German military strategists?

And they are worried that in the USSR they can unravel the aggressive German plans and regroup their forces in such a way that it will not be possible to realize the above plan: "to destroy the mass of ground forces located in western Russia, to prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready forces into the depths of Russian space." This alone worries the Germans.

The document of Jodl's department (later hanged by the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal) stated:
“It should, however, be taken into account that it is in Russia that it is difficult to obtain more or less reliable information about our future enemy. Even less reliable will be this data on the distribution of Russian forces by the time our aggressive intentions are discovered on the other side of the border. At the moment, the distribution of Russian forces may still bear traces of previous events in Finland, the Limitrophes and Bessarabia.
As you can see, in their documents for internal use, the Germans already in 1940 did not hesitate to call themselves aggressors.
So, in the operational department of the OKW, it was assumed that the "aggressive intentions" of the Germans would be noticed in the USSR. And these are quite reasonable assumptions: to completely hide the preparations for an event of such gigantic proportions as an attack on the Soviet Union is a matter of science fiction.
At the very least, one must be prepared for the fact that aggressive German plans will be revealed in the USSR. And in this case, Jodl's department compiled 3 options for possible actions of the USSR:
"I. The Russians will want to pre-empt us and, to this end, will deliver a preemptive strike against the German troops that are beginning to concentrate near the border.
II. The Russian armies will take upon themselves the blow of the German armed forces, deploying near the border in order to hold in their hands the new positions they have captured on both flanks (the Baltic and Black Seas).
III. The Russians use a method that has already justified itself in 1812, i.e. they will retreat into the depths of their space in order to impose on the advancing armies the difficulties of extended communications and the difficulties of supply associated with them, and then, only in the further course of the campaign, will they launch a counterattack.
And then the views of the German strategists were expressed on each of the possible options for the response of the USSR.

THREE OPTIONS
These three options are worth talking about, they are very important.
“Option I. It seems incredible that the Russians would decide on an offensive on a large scale, for example, an invasion of East Prussia and the northern part of the Governor General, until the bulk of the German army was shackled for a long time by hostilities on another front.
Apparently, neither the command nor the troops will be able to do this. Smaller operations are more likely. They can be directed either against Finland or against Romania ... "
Those. in Germany, not only were they not afraid of a Soviet attack, but it seemed “incredible” to the Germans that the Soviet Union would decide on a preemptive strike even when it realized that it was facing German aggression.
And this forecast of the operational department of the OKW came true. When the Soviet military begins to assert the opinion that Germany is systematically concentrating its forces against the USSR, they will have the idea of delivering a preventive (preemptive) strike.
But what did the Germans consider more probable?

The Germans thought it most likely that the USSR would act according to option "II", i.e. when the Red Army will take "on itself the blow of the German armed forces, deploying near the border." Those. stubborn defense will hold the new border (with the annexed Baltic States, Western Belarus and Ukraine, Bessarabia). "
This decision, the OKW document said, “appears to be the most probable, since it cannot be assumed that such a strong military power as Russia will cede its richest, including the recently conquered areas, without a fight.”

And in the discussion about this option, it was said:
“If the Russians stop at option II, then the disposition of their forces will apparently have a certain resemblance to the present. At the same time, even larger forces are likely to be concentrated on the territory of Russian Poland, and the main reserves will remain in the Moscow area, which is already due to at least the structure of the Russian railway network.
“For us, such a solution, in which the enemy is already on early stage will accept the battle with large forces, it would be favorable because after the defeats in the border battles, the Russian command is unlikely to be able to ensure an organized withdrawal of the entire army, ”the German strategists added.

In this document - compiled by no means by Soviet propagandists and not Soviet historians, and by the Germans themselves - there is also a direct answer to Rezunov's numerous "perplexities" about "why such high concentration Soviet troops on the border?

The Germans perfectly understood why and why.
Because (I answer with the words of the German strategists) “the Russian armies will take the blow of the German armed forces, deploying near the border in order to hold in their hands the new positions they have captured on both flanks (the Baltic and Black Seas).”

The Germans quite well calculated the train of thought of the Soviet military-political leadership. And they planned their attack based on this forecast, which turned out to be accurate (according to the second option for the possible actions of the Red Army, which seemed to them "the most likely").
Finally, option III - if the Red Army will act on the model of the Russian army of 1812 - was characterized by the Germans as extremely unfavorable for them (which is understandable: it meant a protracted war). But at the same time, how unlikely.
The OKW noted:
“If the Russians build their war plan in advance on first accepting the blow of the German troops with small forces, and concentrating their main grouping in the deep rear, then the border of the latter’s location north of the Pripyat marshes can most likely be a powerful water barrier formed by the Dvina rivers ( Daugava) and Dnieper. This barrier has a gap only about 70 m wide - in the area south of Vitebsk. Such an unfavorable decision for us should also be taken into account as a possible one. On the other hand, it is absolutely unbelievable that, south of the Pripyat swamps, the Russians will leave the regions of Ukraine, almost indispensable for them, without a fight.
So, we emphasize once again: neither at the moment when the Germans made the decision to attack the USSR, nor when planning for a future aggressive war against the Soviet Union was already in full swing in Germany, such a motive as protection from Soviet aggression was completely absent.
Completely absent and all.

July 31, 1940 Franz Halder again takes notes on the results of the next meeting with Hitler, who has already decided how to “force England to go to peace” (as Hitler put it at the aforementioned meeting in the Berghof on July 13, 1940) - defeat Russia and establish complete German hegemony in Europe.
“England's hope is Russia and America,” Hitler explained to his military leaders.
But, he added, if hope in Russia falls away, then the British will not have to hope in America either - "for the falling away of Russia will in an unpleasant way increase the importance of Japan in East Asia, Russia is the East Asian sword of England and America against Japan." Hitler loved these analogies with the "sword".
Russia, Hitler stressed, is the factor on which England puts the most. However, if Russia is defeated, then " last hope England will fade." And then the prospects are much more tempting: "Then Germany will become the ruler of Europe and the Balkans." Well, stubborn England will have to put up with it.

Hence the conclusion:
“Russia must be finished off,” and “the sooner Russia is defeated, the better.” Hitler also sets a target date: spring 1941

DECISION IS MADE
On October 15, 1940, Franz Halder records in a military diary Hitler's thoughts expressed during a meeting in Brenner, a high-mountainous place on the Austro-Italian border, after the Anschluss of Austria, the German-Italian.
In Brenner, Hitler often held business meetings (for example, with Mussolini) and conferences.

This meeting took place two weeks after the signing of the Berlin Pact (also known as the 1940 Three Power Pact, or the Tripartite Pact).
"On September 27, 1940, in Berlin, Germany, Italy and Japan signed an agreement for a period of 10 years, containing obligations regarding mutual assistance between these powers, in addition, zones of influence between the Axis countries were delimited when establishing a" new order "in the world. Germany and Italy were intended leading role in Europe and Japan in Asia.
The Fuhrer expresses confidence that the war is "won", and bringing it to complete victory is "only a matter of time." The reason for England's resilience, says Hitler, is a double hope: on the USA and the USSR. But America, he says, by the fact of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact "has been given a warning," the United States is confronted "with the prospect of waging a war on two fronts." Accordingly, American aid to England will be limited.
The hope of England in the Soviet Union, continues Hitler, is also not justified. At the same time, he notes, “it is unbelievable that Russia itself would start a conflict with us.”

Which, however, does not stop the Fuhrer from developing plans for an attack on the Soviet Union.
On December 5, 1940, Halder writes:
“Notes on a meeting with Hitler on December 5, 1940… If England is forced to sue for peace, she will try to use Russia as a ‘sword’ on the Continent…
The question of hegemony in Europe will be decided in the struggle against Russia.
Again, no "Soviet threat". The USSR is seen as a factor that (according to Hitler) will play a role in making peace with England.

If the USSR is present as a player on the continent, peace with England will be less profitable.
If the USSR is taken out of the game, England will have no choice but to recognize German hegemony in Europe.
December 13, 1940 - a meeting with the chiefs of staff of army groups and armies.
“In the morning,” writes Halder, “discussion under the leadership of Paulus of the problems of the operation in the East.”
Thus, the plan of war against the Soviet Union is being discussed at full speed. Perhaps the exacerbation of the military-political situation on the Soviet-German border, the growing threat from the east, obliges us to do so?
Not at all. Even vice versa.

Halder writes:
"Military-political situation: Our assessments are based on the statements of the Fuhrer." What are these ratings? For example: “Russia, on which they pin (meaning in London.) hopes that it will not tolerate the sole domination of Germany on the continent.
So far, no result in this sense." Those. there are no threats to Germany from the USSR. However…
However, "Russia is a complicating factor." What is this factor "difficulty"? All the same: “The solution to the question of hegemony in Europe rests on the struggle against Russia”
Those. the presence of Russia in itself (regardless of its intentions) is a problem and an "embarrassing factor". And that's enough.
Therefore, although Hitler “still” has no reason to fear from the East, after 5 days he signs the well-known directive No. 21, the Barbarossa plan (Weisung Nr.21. Fall Barbarossa).

On January 8-9, 1941, in the Berghof, Hitler holds a large meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces in the presence of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, the Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the OKW, the Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the 1st Chief Quartermaster (i.e. First Deputy Chief of the General Staff), Chief of the Operations Department of the High Command of the Naval Forces and Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.

January 16, 1941 Halder writes in his diary:
“About the Führer's report 8-9.1 at the Berghof ... Separate points: The purpose of England in the war? England aspires to dominance on the Continent. Consequently, she will try to defeat us on the continent. So I [Hitler] must be so strong on the continent that this goal can never be achieved. England's Hope: America and Russia...
We will not be able to finally defeat England only by landing troops (aviation, navy). Therefore, in 1941, we must strengthen our positions on the continent to such an extent that in the future we will be able to wage war with England (and America) ...
Russia:
Stalin is smart and cunning. He will increase his demands all the time. From the point of view of Russian ideology, the victory of Germany is unacceptable. Therefore, the solution is to defeat Russia as soon as possible. In two years England will have 40 divisions. This may encourage Russia to move closer to it.”
And again we do not see such a motive as the "threat of a Soviet attack." Hitler does not like that the "smart and cunning" Stalin is trying to use the circumstances prevailing at that time in the interests of the USSR.
But more remarkable is Hitler's indication of the date when, in his opinion, an Anglo-Soviet alliance dangerous for Germany could take shape: "in two years." It is not difficult to calculate when this (and at that time purely hypothetical) situation could have developed: at the beginning of 1943.

Those. Hitler actually admitted that before 1943 there was no threat from the east.

CONCLUSION
The German command developed a plan and strategy for an attack on the USSR in the summer of 1940 and at the same time began to create a strike group of troops on the border with the USSR.
The Germans were not at all afraid of the USSR, they were only concerned with the question of how the USSR would respond to the attack.
They themselves made a decision long before the aggression itself ..