Aggression against the USSR. German aggression against the Soviet Union. The failure of the blitzkrieg strategy. The beginning of the formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition
Western military experts in their assessment of the combat power of the Red Army were divided into optimists and pessimists. Optimists believed that the Red Army would hold out against the Germans for four months; pessimists gave her no more than four weeks. So, maritime minister USA Franklin William Knox wrote to President Roosevelt that "it will take Hitler from six weeks to three months to deal with Russia." British and German military experts had broadly similar assessments.
By the end of October 1941 - at the end of the fourth month of the war - everything looked in favor of the opinion of the optimists, and the USSR (this "clay colossus without a head", as the hundred "Fuhrer" called it) was on the verge of complete disaster. The cadre Red Army, which entered the war on June 22, 1941, was completely destroyed. Only the Germans captured by that time up to 3 million Red Army soldiers. Almost all the huge stocks of weapons and military equipment that the Soviets had at the start of the war were destroyed or captured (for example, from July to December 1941, the Red Army lost 20.5 thousand tanks and 18 thousand aircraft).
By the end of October, after the monstrous defeat near Vyazma, the Soviet command had nothing to defend Moscow with - from Podolsk to the defenseless capital of the Soviet Union there was a giant German tank column, and there were no Soviet troops in its path. military units, except for the Podolsk military school. The panic that seized Moscow at that time seemed to be a harbinger of an imminent end.
Two months later, however, for the first time since the outbreak of World War II, the hitherto invincible Wehrmacht was put to flight. German troops
were thrown back from the Soviet capital, having suffered great damage. Only at the cost of enormous efforts and sacrifices did the German command manage to achieve stabilization by the spring of 1942 Eastern Front, but I had to forget about the blitzkrieg. Germany again, as during the First World War, faced the nightmare of a protracted war on two fronts.
Start of formation Anti-Hitler coalition.
The unexpected resilience shown by the Soviet Union served as the basis for the formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition. During the first months of the war, Western politicians could be convinced that the USSR would not become easy prey for the Wehrmacht, and that therefore it makes sense to help the Soviet Union.
On July 12, 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was concluded, according to which the parties were obliged to provide each other with assistance and support in the war against Nazi Germany, and not to conduct separate negotiations and not to conclude a separate peace. The first practical consequence of this agreement was the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Northern and Southern Iran (August 25, 1941), which was of tremendous importance in terms of ensuring Anglo-Soviet interests in the region and supplying the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease through Iran. On August 16, 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was concluded on mutual deliveries, credit and payment procedures.
However, with regard to practical assistance to the Russian front - both in the form of supplies and in the form of opening a second front - in London and Washington they were inclined to wait until the summer-autumn campaign in Russia was completed and its results were finally clear. Such, in particular, were the instructions received by the personal representative of President F. D. Roosevelt Harry Hopkins before his visit to the USSR in July - August 1941.
During the Moscow Conference of the USSR, USA and Great Britain (September 29 - October 1, 1941), in which the USA was represented by Averell Harriman, and England by William Aigken, Baron Beaverbrook, a decision was made on monthly US-British deliveries to the USSR in the amount of 400 aircraft and 500 tanks. To finance supplies to the Soviet Union, the American lend-lease law was extended to it. The USSR was granted an interest-free loan of $1 billion.
However, a month after the Moscow Conference, the Soviet leadership had serious questions for its Western allies:
- 1) the volume of Western aid to the Soviet Union turned out to be less than the Kremlin expected (and after the summer-autumn campaign, the army had to be created, in fact, anew, and all these Western supplies were urgently needed in conditions when Stalin distributed tanks and aircraft on the fronts by the piece);
- 2) uncertainty remained about the goals of the war and the post-war world order;
- 3) in Moscow they did not receive a definite answer regarding the opening of a second front (and this, perhaps, is the main thing).
The visit of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to the USSR in December 1941 was aimed, in the words of E. Eden himself, "to disperse
mistrust of the Soviet Union and, without assuming certain obligations, give Stalin maximum satisfaction.
During the talks in Moscow, the British representative offered to conclude an Anglo-Soviet agreement, drawn up in very general terms, on accession to the Atlantic Charter, but refused to recognize the Soviet western borders.
However, Moscow's victory allowed Stalin to speak to his Anglo-Saxon allies in a much firmer tone. The latter were forced to admit during the American-British summit in Washington in December 1941 January 1942 that it was the Soviet-German front that played the main role in the war. The most important outcome of this summit was the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, signed in Washington by representatives of 26 countries, including the USSR. The declaration stated that the signatory countries would use all their resources to fight the Tripartite Pact and would not conclude a separate peace with the enemy.
At the same time, the USSR made great efforts to strengthen the country's foreign policy positions. At the most tense moment, when the political crisis in Europe reached its highest intensity, and the second World War was already on the threshold, the Soviet government, determined to block the path of fascist aggression, did everything in its power to save humanity from bloody slaughter. The USSR put forward a plan for collective security in Europe and throughout the world, proposing that Britain and France conclude an agreement on joint action against Hitler's aggression. The implementation of these measures could have prevented the outbreak of war by the fascist aggressors.
However, the British and French governments chose a different path. They pushed the Nazis to unleash an aggressive war, hoping to weaken Germany as a result of military operations, to eliminate a dangerous competitor. Their policy of "non-intervention" accompanied the Italo-German intervention in Spain, the position of "neutrality" - the capture of Austria, Munich agreement- the enslavement of Czechoslovakia. Pursuing an insidious two-faced policy, the Western powers in the summer of 1939 disrupted military negotiations in Moscow. The reactionary ruling circles of the Western countries, desiring the weakening of the USSR, sought to push Germany against our country, to create a united front of fascist states against it, considering German fascism and Japanese militarism as a striking force in the war. The Soviet Union faced the prospect of a war on two fronts at the same time - in the West and in Far East, moreover - in isolation, without allies.
In order to frustrate the plans of the imperialists to organize " crusade"against the USSR, to delay, as far as possible, the outbreak of war, the Soviet government was forced in August 1939 to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany, proposed by the German government. In that particular situation, it was the only correct solution, which made it possible to split the emerging anti-Soviet bloc of imperialist states and achieve a delay, which was extremely necessary for strengthening the defense capability of the USSR. But the time allotted to us for this turned out to be insufficient. The respite given to the Soviet people by history after the end of the Civil War amounted to only two decades. This short period of time that our country had at its disposal did not allow us to fully complete all the preparations for repelling fascist aggression.
Thus, the situation and the general state of forces on the eve of the Nazi attack on the USSR were not in favor of the Red Army. All this predetermined the unfavorable course of hostilities for her in the initial period of the war.
1 Aggression against the USSR
In the early morning of June 22, 1941, fascist Germany, violating the non-aggression pact, suddenly, treacherously, without declaring war, unleashed a huge blow on the Soviet Union. The allies of fascist Germany, Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland, headed by the reactionary governments, also entered the war against the USSR.
AT difficult conditions After the outbreak of war, the Communist Party and the Soviet government developed a program to mobilize all the forces of the people to fight the enemy, appealed to the working class, the collective farm peasantry and the intelligentsia with the appeal: "Everything for the front, everything for victory!"
All Soviet people, all the peoples of the multinational country of the Soviets rose to a holy war for the honor, freedom and independence of their homeland.
As early as June 23, 1941, crowded rallies took place at the enterprises of Bryansk. The working people and youth of the city unanimously adopted resolutions in which they declared that they were ready, at the first call of the party and government, to defend their homeland with weapons in their hands.
The newspaper “Orlovskaya Pravda”1 wrote about the patriotic upsurge of the workers of the Bryansk plant “Krasny Profintern” (now JSC BMZ): “The impudent provocation of the German fascists, who provoked the Soviet Union to war, caused a storm of indignation among the workers of the city. Crowded rallies took place in the workshops of the Krasny Profintern plant.
At meetings, the workers and specialists ardently approve of the measures taken by the Soviet government and declare their full readiness to smash the enemy. The Red Profinternists pledged to maximize labor productivity, to produce more locomotives and wagons, which our country, the Red Army, needs. The machine builders undertake to further increase revolutionary vigilance, to work even more intensely and stubbornly, and to restore Bolshevik order in production. Everything is to strengthen the Motherland, to defeat the enemy - these are the unanimous statements of the workers of Ordzhonikidzegrad. Similar meetings of workers took place in the cities of Klintsy, Novozybkov and other districts of the Bryansk region.
Industrial enterprises were transferred to the production of military products. The men who went to the front were replaced by women and teenagers. 14.5 thousand students and students came to industrial enterprises of the region on Komsomol vouchers, 300 thousand teenagers came to agricultural work. Here is the Letter to the newspaper "Bryansk Rabochiy", published in No. 150 of July 4, 1941:
We forge the swords of Victory!
We, Komsomol tenth-graders of schools in the mountains. Bryansk, who are called upon by the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League to work for enterprises, state farms and collective farms, are determined to work hard, hard, selflessly to help their native country forge the swords of victory.
All members of the Komsomol and all non-allied youth - high school students should by their work contribute to the victory of our Motherland over the insidious enemy. We must work in any areas, wherever we are sent. No matter how difficult this work may be, we will do it with the proud consciousness that, by working in the rear, we are helping the Red Army destroy bloody fascism to death.
N. Inozemtseva, A. Kovaleva, M. Laevskaya, M. Mochanis, L. Loginova, V. Shankina are Komsomol graduates of Bryansk schools.
With the approach of the front in the Bryansk region, a titanic work was done to evacuate people and material values to the eastern regions of the country. In Sverdlovsk, Nizhny Tagil, Gorky, Krasnoyarsk, Ust-Katov, 7,550 freight wagons were sent. Together with the equipment of enterprises, qualified workers, engineering and technical workers were evacuated. Only from Bryansk 60 thousand people were evacuated.
In the first days of the war, our region sent over 200 thousand of its inhabitants to the Red Army. A division of armored trains was formed in the Bryansk region. Already on June 28, 1941, as part of the 21st Army, he took part in the battles in the Polesie region.
In August 1941, the workers of the Krasny Profintern factory manufactured, staffed from among the volunteers and sent the armored train No. 2 “For the Motherland” to the front.
From the volunteers of Bryansk and the region, the 331st Proletarian rifle division, defending the capital of our Motherland - Moscow, and then fighting to Prague.
On August 14, 1941, the Bryansk Front was created, which was entrusted with the responsible task of covering the Moscow strategic region from the southwest and preventing the breakthrough of Guderian's tank group to Moscow. In July - August 1941, the Bryansk region sent 130 thousand people to the construction of defensive lines. About how large-scale construction work was organized, says a lot of documents of those times.
Recently, the old, dilapidated version of preventive war has been pulled out of the bins again and again. Its primary source should be considered "Hitler's Address to the German People and Soldiers of the Eastern Front" on the day of Nazi Germany's attack on the USSR. It was then that the fascist dictator put forward the thesis that he was forced to start hostilities in order to prevent the USSR from attacking Germany and eliminate the “Soviet threat” allegedly hanging over Europe. From the first day of the war, the fascist adventurers repeated this vile provocative slander countless times to the fooled population of the "third empire", to the duped soldiers of the German army, to the tormented and disgraced peoples of Europe. Hitler's plan for organizing a "crusade against Bolshevism" was based on this vile fabrication.
We asked the doctor historical sciences, professor of the department national history and the historiography of G. A. Shirokov to tell how Nazi Germany was preparing aggression against the USSR.
The German fascists had been preparing an attack on the Soviet Union for a long time. AT general form the Barbarossa plan was mentioned by Hitler in February 1933 at a meeting with the generals, where Hitler stated: “The main task of the future army will be the conquest of a new living space in the East and its ruthless Germanization. The idea of conquering Russia was clearly formulated by Hitler after the Anschluss of Austria, i.e. in 1938. Hitler’s childhood friend, engineer Josef Greiner, wrote in his Memoirs about a conversation with SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich, who told him: “War with the Soviet Union is a decided matter” .
Having established themselves in Europe, the fascist rulers turned their eyes to the East. Not a single Wehrmacht military plan was prepared as fundamentally as the Barbarossa plan. Two major periods can be distinguished in the preparation by the German General Staff of the war against the USSR. The first - from July to December 18, 1940, that is, until Hitler signed Directive No. 21; and the second from 18 December 1940 until the beginning of the invasion. During the first period of preparation, the General Staff developed the strategic principles of warfare, determined the forces and means necessary for an attack on the USSR, and carried out measures to increase the armed forces of Germany.
The following participated in the development of the war plan against the USSR: the operational department of the General Staff of the ground forces (chief - Colonel Greifenberg), the department of foreign armies of the East (chief - Lieutenant Colonel Kinzel), the chief of staff of the 18th Army, General E. Marx, deputy. Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces F. Paulus.
The first calculations for the war plan against the USSR, at the direction of Hitler, began to be made on July 3, 1940. On this day, General Halder ordered Colonel Greifenberg to determine the timing of the deployment of troops and the necessary forces in the event of a war with the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1940. A few days later, Halder was presented with the following considerations :
a) the deployment of troops will last 4-6 weeks;
b) it is necessary to defeat the Russian army. It is desirable to advance deep into the USSR so that German aviation can destroy its most important centers;
c) 80-100 divisions are needed. The USSR has 70-75 good divisions.
Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, reported these calculations to Hitler. Having familiarized himself with the preliminary considerations of the General Staff, Hitler ordered that the Russian problem be tackled more vigorously.
To speed up the development of the plan for the "eastern campaign", on July 23, Halder ordered General E. Marx to be sent from the 18th Army to the General Staff (this army was the first to be deployed near the borders of the Soviet Union). E. Marx began to develop a plan on July 29, 1940. On the same day, Hitler received Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces, and Colonel General Jodl, Chief of Staff of the Operations Command, and told them that he wanted to defeat the USSR in the autumn of 1940. In general, approving this intention, Keitel expressed doubts about the timing of its implementation. The underdeveloped network of highways and railways in Poland, in his opinion, could not provide in a short time the concentration of forces necessary to defeat the Red Army. Keitel and Jodl, according to the latter, allegedly showed convincingly that 100 divisions were clearly not enough for this purpose. In this regard, Hitler decided to postpone the attack on the Soviet Union until the spring of 1941. He was afraid of the fate of Napoleon, who could not end the fighting in Russia before winter.
Armed with the instructions of Hitler and Halder, the “expert in Russian affairs” (as E. Marx was considered since the First World War) developed a stormy activity. At the beginning of August 1940, E. Marx reported to Halder on the draft of Operation OST. This was a detailed and complete development, which took into account all the data available at the General Staff about the armed forces and the economy of the USSR, about the terrain, climate and road conditions of the future theater of operations. In accordance with the plan, it was planned to create two large strike groups north and south of the Pripyat marshes and deploy 147 divisions, including 24 tank and 12 motorized. The outcome of the entire campaign against the USSR - it was emphasized in the development - to a large extent depends on how effective the strikes of tank and motorized formations turn out to be.
So that the Soviet troops could not repeat the maneuver of the Russian army in 1812, i.e., avoid the battle in the border zone and withdraw their troops in depth, the German tank divisions, according to E. Marx, had to rapidly move forward into the enemy’s location. The duration of the "eastern campaign" is 9-17 weeks. The development was approved by Halder.
E. Marx led the planning of the "eastern campaign" until the beginning of September, and then, at the direction of Halder, handed over all the materials to General F. Paulus, who had just been appointed to the post of deputy. chief of the general staff.
Under the leadership of F. Paulus, the staff of the General Staff continued to work on the plan. On October 29, 1940, F. Paulus submitted a note to Halder, in which he outlined the principles of waging war against the Soviet Union. It noted the advantages of the German troops over the Soviet ones (the presence of combat experience), and therefore the possibility successful actions German troops in a mobile fleeting war.
F. Paulus believed that in order to achieve a decisive superiority in forces and means, it was necessary to ensure the surprise of the attack.
Like E. Marx, F. Paulus focused on depriving the Red Army troops of the opportunity to retreat deep into the country and conduct a mobile defense. The German groupings were faced with the task of creating gaps in decisive directions, encircling and destroying Soviet troops, preventing them from retreating.
At the same time, another plan of war against the USSR was being developed. On September 19, 1940, the head of the country's defense department, Warlimont, reported to Yodl a draft plan drawn up by Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg. The plan emphasized the need to create three army groups instead of the two proposed by E. Marx on the basis of Hitler's earlier instructions with the concentration of forces north of the Pripyat marshes in order to pass the shortest route to Moscow through Smolensk. The third group was supposed to strike at Leningrad. As it turned out later, B. Lossberg borrowed these ideas from F. Paulus, being in contact with him in violation of Jodl's order.
For four months, the General Staff developed a plan for a war against the USSR. On November 12 (according to other sources, November 19), 1940, Halder reported the Otto program (as the plan of war against the Soviet Union was originally called) to Brauchitsch, who on December 5 presented the plan to Hitler. The latter agreed with his main strategic provisions, indicated the approximate date for the start of the war - the end of May 1941, and ordered that preparations for war against the USSR be launched at full speed in accordance with this plan.
So, the war plan against the USSR was developed, received Hitler's approval, but they were in no hurry to approve it: they decided to check the reality of the implementation of the plan in the military game of the leadership of the General Staff, which was entrusted to General Paulus. The participants in the development of the plan acted as commanders of army groups and tank groups. The game consisted of three stages.
The first began on November 29 with the invasion of German troops and battles in the border zone. On December 3, the second stage of the operation was lost - an offensive with the aim of capturing the Minsk-Kyiv line. Finally, on December 7, the destruction of possible targets that could be beyond this border was lost. Each stage of the game ended with a detailed analysis and summing up the position and condition of the troops. The results of the game made it possible to make some adjustments to the plan.
But the high command of the ground forces was not limited to these games. Halder summoned the chiefs of staff of the three army groups that had been created by that time, told them the main data from the developed plan and demanded that they state their thoughts on the main problems of conducting an armed struggle against the Soviet Union. All proposals that differed significantly from the plan of the General Staff were discussed under the leadership of Halder and Paulus at a meeting with the chiefs of staff of army groups and armies on December 13, 1940. The meeting participants came to the conclusion that the USSR would be defeated within 8-10 weeks.
After making the necessary clarifications, General Jodl ordered Warlimont to develop a directive based on the plan of war against the USSR approved by Hitler. This directive, number 21, was prepared and reported to Hitler on 17 December. Before approving the document, he demanded a number of changes.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 of the Supreme High Command, which received the code name "Option Barbarossa" and is the main guiding document of the war against the USSR.
From Directive No. 21: “The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia during a short-term campaign ... "
After the signing of Directive No. 21 by Hitler, the second period of preparation by the General Staff of the war against the USSR began. Whereas prior to Directive No. 21, training was mainly limited to the development of a plan at the General Staff of the ground forces and the training of reserves, now the plans of all branches of the armed forces were already thought out in detail.
The war plan against the USSR is a whole complex of political, economic and strategic measures of the Hitlerite leadership. In addition to directive No. 21, the plan included directives and orders from the supreme command and the main commands of the branches of the armed forces on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, theater preparation, camouflage, disinformation, and so on. The political goal of the war is reflected in a group of documents bearing the code name “General Plan “Ost””; in Goering's Green Folder; directive “On special jurisdiction in the area of Barbarossa and on special measures of the troops” of May 13, 1941; in the "Instructions on Special Areas" of March 13, 1941, which outlined the system of the occupation regime in the conquered territory, and other documents.
The political essence of the war plan consisted in the destruction of the Soviet Union, the transformation of our country into a colony of fascist Germany, the conquest of world domination.
The General Plan "Ost" is one of the most shameful documents in the history of mankind, which revealed the criminal plans of the Nazis to exterminate and Germanize the Slavic peoples. The plan was designed for 20-30 years and defined three lines:
- "biological" dismemberment of the Slavic peoples through mass destruction (46-51 million people) and forcible Germanization of the elective part;
The transformation of Eastern Europe into an area of SS military settlements,
Eugenic weakening of the Slavic peoples.
The Nazis planned to deport 65% of the population of Western Ukraine, 75% of the population of Belarus, a significant part of the population of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia within 30 years. In this territory they intended to settle 10 million Germans. The remaining indigenous population (according to their calculations, 14 million people) was supposed to be gradually Germanized and used as unskilled labor.
The drafters of the "Ost" plan intended to "defeat the Russians as a people, to divide them."
The program for the mass extermination of Soviet people was the directive "On special jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region and special measures for the troops." Trampling on all international law, she demanded to show ruthlessness to Soviet citizens, to carry out mass repressions and to shoot on the spot without trial anyone who would show even the slightest resistance or sympathize with the partisans. From the directive: “... The crimes of hostile civilians, until further notice, are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of military and field courts.
Partisans must be mercilessly destroyed by troops in battle or in pursuit.
Any other attacks by hostile civilians on the armed forces, their members and personnel serving the troops must also be suppressed by the troops on the spot using the most extreme measures ... "
Any responsibility for any crimes on Soviet soil was removed from the Nazi soldiers and officers. Moreover, they were aimed at it. On June 1, 1941, the twelve commandments for the conduct of Germans in the East were drawn up. Here are excerpts from them.
“... No explanations or justifications, let the Russians see our workers as leaders.
... In view of the fact that the newly annexed territories must be permanently assigned to Germany and Europe, much will depend on how you place yourself there. You must make it clear to yourself that for centuries you are representatives of great Germany and the standard-bearers of the National Socialist revolution and the new Europe. Therefore, with the consciousness of your dignity, you must carry out the most stringent and merciless measures that the state will require of you ... Berlin June 1, 1941 G. Bakke.
Similar instructions were given to their troops by the commanders of the armies and tank groups. From the order of the commander-in-chief, Field Marshal von Reichenau: “... In the event of the use of weapons in the rear of the army by individual partisans, take decisive and cruel measures against them.<…>Without going into political considerations for the future, the soldier has a twofold task:
1. Complete destruction of the Bolshevik heresy, the Soviet state and its armed forces.
2. Merciless eradication of enemy cunning and cruelty and thereby ensuring the security of the German armed forces in Russia.
Only in this way can we fulfill our historic mission to liberate the German people forever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.”
Let the reader forgive us, but we decided to bring another document testifying to the bloodthirstiness of the Nazis.
From the “Memo of the German Soldier”: “Soldier of great Germany, you will be invulnerable and invincible, exactly following the following instruction. If you don't complete at least one of them, you will die.
To save yourself, act on this “Reminder”.
Remember and do:
1) In the morning, afternoon, at night, always think about the Fuhrer, let other thoughts not disturb you, know that he thinks and does for you. You only have to act, not be afraid of anything, you, German soldier, invulnerable. Not a single bullet, not a single bayonet will touch you. No nerves, heart, pity - you are made of German iron. After the war, you will again find a new soul, a clear heart - for your children, for your wife, for great Germany. Now act decisively, without hesitation.
2) A German cannot be a coward. When it gets hard for you, think of the Fuhrer. You will feel joy and relief. When the Russian barbarians attack you, think of the Fuhrer and act decisively. They will all die from your blows. Remember the greatness, the victory of Germany. For your personal glory, you must kill exactly 100 Russians, this is the fairest ratio - one German is equal to 100 Russians. You have no heart and nerves, they are not needed in a war. Destroy pity and compassion in yourself, kill every Russian, do not stop if there is an old man or a woman, a girl or a boy in front of you. Kill, in this way you will save yourself from death, secure the future of the whole family and become famous forever.
3) Not a single world power can resist the German pressure. We will bring the whole world to its knees. The German is the absolute master of the world. You will decide the fate of England, Russia, America. You are a German, as befits a German, destroy all living things that resist on your way, always think about the sublime, about the Fuhrer - you will win. Neither a bullet nor a bayonet will take you. Tomorrow the whole world will kneel before you.”
For Soviet people who were in captivity, it was prescribed to create a regime of inhuman conditions and terror: to set up camps under open sky, fencing them only with barbed wire; use prisoners only for hard, exhausting work and keep them on half-starvation rations, and if they try to escape, they are shot without warning.
Especially the appearance of fascism is revealed by the "Instruction on the treatment of political commissars" dated June 6, 1941, which demanded the extermination of all political workers of the Red Army.
Hitler's strategists planned in every possible way to kindle national enmity between the peoples of the Soviet Union. This idea runs like a red thread through the entire section of the "Directives", entitled "Attitude towards the population on territorial grounds."
Regarding the Baltic Soviet republics it was pointed out that there “it is most expedient for the German authorities to rely on the remaining Germans, as well as on the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. The contradictions between national groups and the remaining Russians should be used in the interests of Germany.
Finally, the same about the Caucasus: "The contradictions between the natives (Georgians, Armenians, Tatars, etc.) and the Russians should be used in our interests."
In the occupied territory, it was planned to destroy medium and higher schools. The Nazis believed that the education of the enslaved peoples should be the most elementary. Here is what Reichsführer SS Himmler wrote about this: “There should be no higher schools for the non-German population of the eastern regions. It is enough for him to have a four-class public school. The aim of the training should be to teach only simple counting, up to 500 at the most, the ability to sign, the suggestion that the divine commandment is to obey the Germans, to be honest, diligent and obedient. I consider the ability to read unnecessary. And the head of the party office and secretary of the Fuhrer Martin Bormann said: “The Slavs should work for us. When we no longer need them, they may die. Forced vaccinations and health services are not necessary for them. A high birth rate among the Slavs is undesirable. Their education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count to one hundred. The best and acceptable will be an education that will form useful coolies for us. Any educated person is a future enemy.” The main goal of the training is to inspire the Soviet population with the need for unquestioning obedience to the Germans.
The economic goals of the aggression included the robbery of the Soviet state, the depletion of its material resources, the use of the public and personal wealth of the Soviet people for the needs of the Third Reich.
The program for the economic plunder of the Soviet Union was contained in instructions and directives, summarized in the so-called "Goering Green File". Its documents provided for the immediate export to Germany of stocks of valuable raw materials (platinum, magnesite, rubber, etc.) and equipment. “Getting as much food and oil for Germany as possible is the main economic goal of the campaign,” one of the directives of Goering's Green File said.
The Nazi invaders hoped to provide their armed forces with food by robbing the occupied regions of the USSR, which doomed the local population to starvation.
The section of Goering's Green Folder entitled "Regulation of Consumption" states: "All the raw materials, semi-finished products and finished products we need should be removed from trade by orders, requisitions and confiscations."
In the order of the commander-in-chief, Field Marshal von Reichenau, on the behavior of the troops, we read: "... supplying food to local residents and prisoners of war is unnecessary humanity ..."
Appointed as the head of economic policy in the occupied territory of the USSR (the Oldenburg plan), Goering declared: “I intend to rob, and it is effective,” and taught his subordinates: “You must be like setter dogs. What may be useful to the Germans must be removed from the warehouses and delivered here.
Goering's "Green Folder" on economic policy in Russia said: "When we take everything we need from the country, tens of millions of people will undoubtedly die of starvation."
It is hard to believe that people can think of such fanaticism. So, the motto of the invaders: destroy, rob, exterminate! This is what they did in practice.
The Barbarossa plan also contained ways to achieve the goals set. main idea his was to deliver a lightning strike on the Soviet Union (blitzkrieg), which was supposed to lead to surrender.
The plan, in particular, provided for the covert concentration of large troop masses and combat assets on the border with the USSR; delivering sudden strikes against Soviet troops concentrated in the border areas; exit by July 11 to the line of Leningrad, Smolensk, Kyiv; subsequent occupation of the territory of the Soviet Union for 1.5-2 months until the line "A-A" (Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan).
From Directive No. 21 (Plan Barbarossa): “... The ultimate goal of the operation is to create a defensive barrier against Asian Russia along the Volga-Arkhangelsk common line. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region remaining with the Russians in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation ... Adolf Hitler.
The war against the USSR was planned to start at the end of May 1941. Subsequently, in connection with the events in the Balkans, Hitler postponed the attack several times. In mid-May, he announced that the launch date for Operation Barbarossa was 22 June. On May 30, Hitler finally confirmed this date.
What would have happened if Operation Barbarossa had succeeded? Our country was to break up into 4 German Reichskommissariats.
3. Reichskommissariat Moscow. It includes the general commissariats: Moscow, Tula, Leningrad, Gorky, Vyatka, Kazan, Ufa, Perm.
4. Reichskommissariat Ostland. General Commissariats: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus.
5. Reichskommissariat Ukraine. General Commissariats: Voyno-Podolia, Zhitomir, Kyiv, Chernigov, Kharkov, Nikolaev, Tavria, Dnepropetrovsk, Stalino, Rostov, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Saratov, Volga Germans.
6. Reichskommissariat Caucasus. General commissariats: Kuban, Stavropol, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Gorsky commissariat and the main commissariat of Kalmykia. (The creation of the Reichskommissariat Turkestan was also supposed later.)
Already by June 1941, all posts were handed out in Berlin, including the posts of 1050 regional commissars. In Tbilisi, Rosenberg's deputy Arno Shikedanz was appointed, in Moscow - Gauleiter Siegfried Kashe, in Riga - Gauleiter Lohse, in Rovno - Gauleiter Erich Koch.
According to the Barbarossa plan, attention should be paid to the following.
Firstly, the change in the date for the start of the war served as a pretext for falsifiers of history to consider this change one of Hitler's "fatal decisions" that allegedly led to the defeat of Nazi Germany (Zeitler, Guderian, etc.). But not everything depended on Hitler: the peoples of Greece and Yugoslavia offered heroic resistance to the invaders, and the flood of the western rivers, which dragged on until June, also did not depend on him.
Secondly, no matter how the Nazis rushed with the Sea Lion plan, threatening England with terrible punishments, they failed to hide the Barbarossa plan in the safes.
In Berlin, since 1934, the quiet American S. Wood served as a trade attaché at the US Embassy. He managed to establish contacts with high-ranking Nazis. Already in August 1940, one of his informants reported that the Nazi leadership was planning a war against the USSR. In Washington, at first, they treated this information with a certain distrust. But a thorough check convinced the president of their veracity. In early January 1941, S. Wood managed to get and send to Washington a document that dispelled all doubts - Directive No. 21 of December 18, 1940, the so-called "Barbarossa" plan. The document was soon presented to F. Roosevelt with an indication that the State Department and the FBI consider it identical to the original. In March 1941, the US government warned the Soviet government of an impending attack.
Thirdly, despite the thoroughness of the development of the plan and the German punctuality, it was fundamentally flawed.
The plan proceeded from a clear overestimation of the forces and capabilities of Nazi Germany and an underestimation of the forces of the Soviet Union.
The German command, relying on intelligence estimates, ignored the potential of the Soviet economy. In every possible way forcing the timing of the attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler, in a conversation with Field Marshal Keitel in August 1940, said: "Russia is only at the stage of creating its military-industrial base, but is far from ready in this regard."
In reality, contrary to the forecasts of Hitler's intelligence, which believed that it would be able to disorganize our rear, disable a number of key defense enterprises, the Soviet economy, even in the conditions of relocation of industry to the eastern regions, was able, as a result of intensive mobilization of all means, not only to maintain its stable position, but also to supply the front with everything necessary and on an ever-increasing scale.
Perhaps one of the most fatal miscalculations of the German leadership was a misjudgment of the Soviet mobilization capacity. In August 1941 the German military intelligence estimated it at 370-390 divisions, i.e., approximately 7.5-8 million people, while the actual mobilization capacity of the USSR turned out to be 4 times higher. This miscalculation can in no way be explained by ignorance of the facts, since the data on the population of the USSR in 1939-1940. were well known to the German side. Although the 1939 census data on the sex and age structure of the population of the USSR were never published, the materials of the previous 1926 census were known, as well as the fact that the losses of Germany and Russia during the First World War and civil wars were close to each other in proportion to the population, as well as the indicators of the natural movement of the population in the interwar period. All this made it possible to fairly accurately assess the mobilization ability of the Soviet Union.
The plan proceeded from the possibility of isolating the Soviet Union in the international arena.
Finally, the viciousness of the fascist German war plan also consisted in the fact that it was aligned with the complete mobilization of the army, the transfer of the German national economy to serve the needs of the war, the concentration of the necessary number of troops in the strategically necessary directions for the offensive, the use of the experience of conducting modern warfare gained German army in campaigns against the states of Western Europe, etc.
Life soon confirmed the unreality and adventurism of the German fascist plan.
When concluding the treaties in 1939, both the Nazi leadership and the Stalinist entourage understood that the agreements were temporary and a military clash in the future was inevitable. The only question was timing.
Already in the first months of the Second World War, the leadership of the USSR, relying on the agreements reached with Germany, decided to implement their own military-political plans. With the approval of their German partner, the Stalinist leadership concluded mutual assistance treaties with the Baltic states: September 28, 1939 - with Estonia, October 5 - with Latvia, October 10 - with Lithuania. Characteristically, at the conclusion of these treaties, Stalin declared: “Neither your constitution, nor organs, nor ministries, nor foreign and financial policy, nor economic system we will not touch upon”, that the very expediency of concluding such agreements is explained only by “the war of Germany with England and France”.
Subsequently, the tone of the talks changed markedly: they began to take place in an atmosphere of diktat by Soviet participants. In June 1940, at the request of Molotov, some members of the cabinet of A. Merkys in Lithuania were removed. Molotov then demanded that Lithuanian Minister of the Interior Skucas and the head of the political police department Povilaitis be brought to justice immediately as "the direct perpetrators of provocative actions against the Soviet garrison in Lithuania." On June 14, he also addressed an ultimatum to the government of Lithuania, in which he demanded the formation of a new, pro-Soviet government, immediate access to the territory of a neighboring sovereign state Soviet troops"to place them in the most important centers of Lithuania" in sufficient numbers to prevent "provocative actions" against the Soviet garrison in Lithuania. On June 16, Molotov demanded from the government of Latvia the formation of a pro-Soviet government and the introduction of additional troops. 9 hours were allotted for considering the ultimatum. On the same day, with an interval of only 30 minutes, the Soviet People's Commissar presented a similar ultimatum to the representative of Estonia. The requirements of the Soviet leadership were met. On June 17, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted A.A. Zhdanov and A.Ya. Vyshinsky. Previously, such powers were presented to V.G. Dekanozov. Stalin's representatives took up the selection of new cabinets of ministers, and through the Comintern and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - the preparation of public opinion for joining the USSR. July 14 at the Baltic States Elections to the highest economic bodies were held. And on July 21, Lithuania and Latvia adopted declarations on state power(which adopted Soviet system its organization) and the declaration of joining the USSR. On the same day, the State Duma of Estonia adopted a similar document on state power, and a day later, a declaration on Estonia's accession to the USSR. In a similar way, the leadership of the USSR decided on the fate of Bessarabia, occupied by Romania in 1918. Romanian troops and the occupation by the Soviet armed forces of the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Rumania's appeal for help to England and Germany did not give positive results. On the evening of June 27, the proposals of the USSR were adopted by the Crown Council of Romania. And on June 28, the Red Army began to occupy these territories.
Relations between the USSR and Finland developed in a special way. Back in the spring of 1939, the Soviet government "in the interests of ensuring the security of Leningrad and Murmansk" suggested that Finland consider leasing certain islands in the Gulf of Finland to the USSR for the defense of sea approaches to Leningrad. At the same time, it was proposed to agree on a partial change of the border on the Karelian Isthmus with compensation due to a much larger territory in Karelia. These proposals were rejected by the Finnish side. At the same time, measures were taken in Finland to ensure the country's security. Reservists were mobilized into the army, direct contacts of the Finnish command with the highest military ranks of Germany, England and Sweden intensified.
New negotiations, begun in mid-October 1939 at the initiative of the USSR, on the conclusion of a defensive joint treaty with mutual territorial concessions also reached an impasse.
AT last days November, the Soviet Union, in an ultimatum form, offered Finland in unilaterally withdraw their troops 20–25 km deep into the territory. In response, the Finnish proposal was made to withdraw the Soviet troops to the same distance, which would mean doubling the distance between the Finnish troops and Leningrad. However, the official Soviet representatives, who were not satisfied with this development of events, declared the "absurdity" of the proposals of the Finnish side, "reflecting the deep hostility of the Government of Finland to the Soviet Union." After that, war between the two countries became inevitable. On November 30, Soviet troops began military operations against Finland. In unleashing the war, the decisive role was played not so much by the desire to ensure the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, but by the political ambitions of Stalin and his entourage, their confidence in military superiority over a weak small state.
Stalin's original plan was to create a puppet government of "People's Finland" headed by Kuusinen. But the course of the war thwarted these plans. The fighting took place mainly on the Karelian Isthmus. A quick defeat of the Finnish troops did not work. The fighting took on a protracted character. The commanding staff acted timidly, passively, the weakening of the army as a result of the mass repressions of 1937-1938 affected. All this led to great losses, failures, slow progress. The war threatened to drag on. Mediation in the settlement of the conflict was offered by the League of Nations. On December 11, the XX session of the Assembly of the League of Nations formed a special committee on the Finnish question, and the next day this committee turned to the Soviet and Finnish leadership with a proposal to stop hostilities and start peace negotiations. The Finnish government immediately accepted this proposal. However, in Moscow this act was perceived as a sign of weakness. Molotov responded with a categorical refusal to the call of the League of Nations. In response to this, on December 14, 1939, the Council of the League adopted a resolution on the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations, condemned the actions of the USSR directed against the Finnish state, and called on the member countries of the League to support Finland. In England, the formation of a 40,000th expeditionary force began. The governments of France, the United States and other countries were preparing to send military and food aid to Finland.
Meanwhile, the Soviet command, having regrouped and significantly strengthened the troops, on February 11, 1940, a new offensive began, which this time ended with a breakthrough of the fortified areas of the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus and the retreat of the Finnish troops. The Finnish government agreed to peace talks. On March 12, a truce was concluded, and on March 13 hostilities at the front ceased. Finland accepted the conditions offered to it earlier. The security of Leningrad, Murmansk and the Murmansk railway was ensured. But the prestige of the Soviet Union was seriously damaged. The Soviet Union was excluded from the League of Nations as an aggressor. The prestige of the Red Army also fell. The losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 67 thousand people, Finnish - 23 thousand people. In the West, and above all in Germany, there was an opinion about the internal weakness of the Red Army, about the possibility of achieving an easy victory over it in a short time. The results of the Soviet-Finnish war confirmed Hitler's aggressive plans against the USSR.
The growing danger of war was taken into account by the leadership of the USSR in the plans for the development of the country's economy. There was a wide economic development of the eastern regions of the country, old industrial centers were modernized and new industrial centers were created in the rear. Backup enterprises were built in the Urals, in the republics Central Asia, in Kazakhstan, in Western and Eastern Siberia, in the Far East.
In 1939, on the basis of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry, 4 new People's Commissariats were created: the aviation industry, shipbuilding, ammunition, weapons. The defense industry developed at a faster pace. For 3 years of the third five-year plan, the annual increase in industrial production amounted to 13%, and defense - 33%. During this time, about 3900 large enterprises were put into operation, built in such a way that they could be transferred to the production of military equipment and weapons in a short time. The implementation of plans in the field of industry was fraught with great difficulties. The metallurgical and coal industries could not cope with planned targets. Steel production declined, and there was practically no increase in coal production. This created serious difficulties in the development of the national economy, which was especially dangerous in the face of the growing threat of a military attack.
The growth rate in the aviation industry lagged behind, and the mass production of new types of weapons was not established. Huge damage was caused by repressions against the personnel of designers and heads of defense industries. In addition, due to economic isolation, it was impossible to acquire the necessary machine park and advanced technology abroad. Some problems with new technology were resolved after the conclusion of an economic agreement with Germany in 1939, but the implementation of this agreement, especially in 1940, was constantly disrupted by Germany.
The government took emergency measures aimed at strengthening labor discipline, increasing the intensity of labor and training qualified personnel. In the autumn of 1940, a decision was made to create state labor reserves - factory apprenticeship schools (FZU).
Measures were taken to strengthen the Soviet Armed Forces. In 1941, 3 times more funds were allocated for defense needs than in 1939. The number of personnel army increased (1937 - 1433 thousand, 1941 - 4209 thousand). The equipment of the army increased with equipment. On the eve of the war, the KV heavy tank, the T-34 medium tank (the best tank in the world during the war years), as well as the Yak-1, MIG-3, LA-4, LA-7 fighter aircraft, and the Il-2 attack aircraft were created and mastered. , Pe-2 bomber. However, the mass production of new technology has not yet been established. Stalin expected to complete the rearmament of the army in 1942, hoping to "outwit" Hitler, strictly observing the agreements reached.
In order to strengthen the combat power of the Armed Forces, a number of organizational measures were taken.
On September 1, the Law on universal conscription and the transition of the Red Army to a personnel recruitment system was adopted. The draft age was reduced from 21 to 19 years, increasing the number of recruits. The network of higher and secondary educational institutions- 19 military academies and 203 military schools were created. In August 1940, complete unity of command was introduced in the army and navy. At the same time, army party organizations were strengthened, and measures were taken to improve party political work. Much attention was paid to improving discipline as the basis for the combat capability of the troops, and combat and operational training was intensified.
Since the middle of 1940, after the victory over France, the Hitlerite leadership, continuing to increase military production and deployment of the army, began direct preparations for war with the USSR. On the borders with the Soviet Union, the concentration of troops began under the guise of rest in preparation for Operation Sea Lion. The Soviet leadership was inspired by the idea of deploying troops in order to advance to the Middle East to seize British possessions.
Hitler launched a diplomatic game with Stalin, involving him in negotiations on joining the "tripartite pact" (Germany, Italy, Japan) and the division of spheres of influence in the world - the "legacy of the British Empire." The probing of this idea showed that Stalin favorably reacted to such a possibility. In November 1940, Molotov was sent to Berlin for negotiations.
On November 12 and 13, 1940, Hitler held two lengthy conversations with Molotov, during which the prospects of the USSR joining the "Pact of Three" were discussed in principle. As issues in which the USSR is interested, Molotov named "ensuring the interests of the USSR in the Black Sea and the straits", as well as in Bulgaria, Persia (in the direction of the Persian Gulf) and some other regions. Hitler raised the question of the USSR's participation in the "dividing of the British inheritance" before the Soviet Prime Minister. And here he also found mutual understanding, however, Molotov suggested first discussing other issues that are presented to him at the meeting. this moment more relevant. It is quite possible that Molotov was afraid to give England a pretext for complicating Soviet-British relations. But something else is also possible - Molotov wanted confirmation of his authority to negotiate on these issues from Stalin. One way or another, having told Hitler that he "agreed with everything," Molotov departed for Moscow.
On November 25, the German ambassador to Moscow, Count Schulenburg, was invited to the Kremlin for a secret conversation. Molotov informed him that the Soviet Government could, under certain conditions, join the "Pact of Three". The conditions of the Soviet side were as follows: the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland; securing the Black Sea borders of the USSR; the creation of Soviet bases in the area of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; recognition of Soviet interests in the areas south of Baku and Batumi in the direction of the Persian Gulf; Japan's renunciation of the rights to coal and oil concessions on Sakhalin Island. After laying out the terms, Molotov expressed the hope that an answer would soon be received from Berlin. But there was no response. On December 18, 1940, the Barbarossa plan was signed, Germany was closely involved in preparing an attack on the USSR, and its diplomatic service regularly stated through the Soviet ambassador in Berlin that a response to Stalin was being prepared, agreed with the rest of the parties to the pact, and was about to come. This confirmed Stalin's opinion that there would be no war in 1941, and he regarded all the warnings about the impending attack as the intrigues of England, which sees its salvation in the conflict between the USSR and Germany.
In March 1941 German troops entered Bulgaria. In April - early May, Germany occupied Yugoslavia and Greece. In late May - early June, the island of Crete was captured by German airborne troops, which ensured air supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean.
In the spring of 1941 it became increasingly clear that the situation was becoming threatening. In March-April, intensive work was underway at the Soviet General Staff to refine the plan for covering the western borders and the mobilization plan in case of war with Germany. In late May - early June, at the request of the military leadership, 500 thousand reservists were called up from the reserve and at the same time another 300 thousand assigned staff to staff the fortified areas and special combat arms with specialists. In mid-May, instructions were given to the border districts to speed up the construction of fortified areas on the state border.
In the second half of May, from the inner districts to railways to the western borders, the transfer of 28 rifle divisions began.
By this time, on the borders with the Soviet Union from the Barents to the Black Sea, in accordance with the Barbarossa plan, the main forces of the Nazi Reich and its allies were completing the deployment - 154 German divisions (of which 33 were tank and motorized) and 37 divisions of Germany's allies (Finland, Romania , Hungary).
Stalin received big number reports through various channels about the impending attack by Germany, but there was no response from Berlin to proposals for a new agreement. To sound out Germany's position, a statement was made to TASS on June 14, 1941, that the USSR and Germany were fulfilling their obligations under the treaty. This TASS statement did not shake Hitler's position; there was not even a report about it in the German press. But the Soviet people and the Armed Forces were misled.
Despite the demands of the military leadership, even in this threatening situation, Stalin did not allow the troops of the border districts to be put on alert, and the NKVD, on the instructions of Beria, carried out arrests for "alarmist moods and disbelief in the policy of friendship with Germany."
During the pre-war crisis, created by the preparations for the war with Nazi Germany against Poland, there was an outbreak of a world military conflict, which they failed, and some political circles of Western states did not want to prevent. In turn, the efforts of the USSR to organize a rebuff to the aggressor were not completely consistent. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany brought the Soviet Union out of the threat of war on two fronts in 1939, delayed the clash with Germany for two years and made it possible to strengthen the country economically and military-strategically. However, these opportunities have not been fully exploited.
Western countries fell victim to the policy of encouraging aggression and collapsed under the blows of the Nazi military machine. However, the support of Germany from the Soviet Union, carried out at the initiative of Stalin, caused damage to the anti-fascist forces and contributed to the strengthening of Germany during the initial period of the world war. Dogmatic faith in the observance of treaties with Hitler and Stalin's inability to assess the real military-political situation did not allow using the resulting delay in the military clash to fully prepare the country for an imminent war.
Planning for German aggression against the Soviet Union began long before the war. Back in the mid-1930s, as can be seen from the documents, the political and military leadership of Germany, in resolving a number of internal issues, proceeded from option "A", which meant a war against the USSR. At that time, the Nazi command was already accumulating information about Soviet army, studied the main operational directions of the eastern campaign and outlined possible options for military action.
The outbreak of the war against Poland, and then the campaign in Northern and Western Europe temporarily switched the German headquarters thought to other problems. But even at that time, the preparation of the war against the USSR did not go out of sight of the Nazis. The planning of the war, concrete and comprehensive, was resumed by the German General Staff after the defeat of France, when, in the opinion of the fascist leadership, the rear of the future war was provided and Germany had enough resources at its disposal to wage it.
Already on June 25, 1940, on the third day after the signing of the armistice in Compiègne, the option of "strike force in the East" (648) was being discussed. On June 28, "new tasks" were considered. On June 30, Halder wrote in his official diary: "The main focus is on the East" (649).
On July 21, 1940, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch, received an order to start developing a detailed plan for the war in the east.
The strategic views on the conduct of the war against the USSR among the Nazi leadership developed gradually and were specified in all details in the highest military instances: in the headquarters of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command, in the general staffs of the ground forces, air force and at the headquarters of the navy.
On July 22, Brauchitsch instructed the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Halder, to thoroughly think over various options "concerning the operation against Russia."
Halder energetically took up the execution of the received order. He was convinced that "an offensive launched from the concentration area in East Prussia and northern Poland in the general direction of Moscow would have the greatest chance of success" (650). Halder saw the advantage of this strategic plan in that, in addition to the direct threat posed to Moscow, an offensive from these directions puts Soviet troops in the Ukraine at a disadvantage, forcing them to fight defensive battles with a front turned to the north.
For the specific development of a plan for an eastern campaign to general staff ground forces was seconded to the chief of staff of the 18th army, General E. Marx, who was considered an expert on the Soviet Union and enjoyed special confidence in Hitler. On July 29, Halder informed him in detail about the essence of the planned campaign against Russia, and the general immediately began planning it.
This stage of developing the plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union ended on July 31, 1940. On that day, a meeting of the leadership of the armed forces of fascist Germany was held in the Berghof, at which the goals and plan of the war were clarified, and its terms were outlined. Speaking at the meeting, Hitler justified the need for a military defeat of the Soviet Union by the desire to gain dominance in Europe. “According to this...,” he declared, “Russia must be liquidated. Deadline - spring 1941 "(651) .
The fascist military leadership considered this period of attack on the USSR as the most favorable, hoping that by the spring of 1941 the Soviet Armed Forces would not have time to complete the reorganization and would not be ready to repel the invasion. The duration of the war against the USSR was determined in a few weeks. It was planned to complete it by the autumn of 1941.
It was supposed to inflict two powerful blows on the Soviet Union: the southern one - against Kyiv and into the bend of the Dnieper with a deep bypass of the Odessa region, and the northern one - through the Baltic states to Moscow. In addition, it was envisaged to carry out independent operations in the south to capture Baku, and in the north - an attack by German troops concentrated in Norway in the direction of Murmansk.
The Hitlerite leadership, preparing for war with the Soviet Union, attached great importance to the political and operational-strategic camouflage of aggression. It was supposed to hold a series of major events that were supposed to give the impression of the preparations of the Wehrmacht for operations in Gibraltar, North Africa and England. A very limited circle of people knew about the idea and plan of the war against the USSR.
At a meeting in the Berghof on July 31, it was decided to find out whether Finland and Turkey would be allies in the war against the USSR. In order to draw these countries into the war, it was planned to give them some territories of the Soviet Union after the successful completion of the campaign. Considerations were immediately considered on the settlement of Hungarian-Romanian relations and guarantees to Romania (652).
On August 1, Halder again discussed with General Marx a plan for a war against the USSR, and already on August 5 he received the first version of this plan.
According to the fascist leadership, by August 1940 the Soviet Army had 151 rifle and 32 cavalry divisions, 38 mechanized brigades, of which 119 divisions and 28 brigades were located in the west and were divided by Polissya approximately into equal parts; reserves were located in the Moscow region. By the spring of 1941, no increase in the Soviet Armed Forces was expected. It was assumed that the Soviet Union would conduct defensive operations along the entire western border, with the exception of the Soviet-Romanian sector, where the Soviet Army was expected to go on the offensive in order to capture the Romanian oil fields. It was believed that the Soviet troops would not evade decisive battles in the border areas, would not be able to immediately retreat deep into their territory and repeat the maneuver of the Russian army in 1812 (653) .
Based on this assessment, the Nazi command planned to deliver the main blow of the ground forces from Northern Poland and East Prussia in the direction of Moscow. Since the concentration of German troops in Romania at that time was impossible, the southern direction was not taken into account. The maneuver north of the Moscow direction was also ruled out, which lengthened the lines of communication of the troops and ultimately led them to an impenetrable wooded area northwest of Moscow.
The main grouping was tasked with destroying the main forces of the Soviet Army in the western direction, capturing Moscow and the northern part of the Soviet Union; in the future - to turn the front to the south in order to occupy Ukraine in cooperation with the southern grouping. As a result, it was supposed to reach the line of Rostov, Gorky, Arkhangelsk.
To deliver the main blow, it was planned to create an army group "North" of three armies (68 divisions in total, of which 15 were tank and 2 motorized). The northern flank of the strike force was to be covered by one of the armies, which at the first stage was to, having gone on the offensive, force the Western Dvina in its lower reaches and advance in the direction of Pskov, Leningrad.
It was planned to deliver an auxiliary strike south of the Pripyat swamps by the Army Group "South" consisting of two armies (35 divisions in total, including 5 tank and 6 motorized) with the aim of capturing Kyiv and crossings on the Dnieper in its middle reaches. 44 divisions were allocated to the reserve of the main command of the ground forces, which were to advance, behind Army Group North (654).
The German Air Force was tasked with destroying Soviet aviation, gaining air supremacy, disrupting rail and road traffic, preventing the concentration of Soviet ground forces in forested areas, supporting German mobile formations with dive bomber attacks, preparing and carrying out airborne operations and providing cover from air concentrations of German troops and transport.
The navy was to neutralize the Soviet fleet in the Baltic Sea, guard iron ore transports coming from Sweden, and provide maritime transport in the Baltic to supply active German formations.
The most favorable time of the year for waging war against the Soviet Union was considered the period from mid-May to mid-October (655).
The main idea of the war plan against the USSR in this version was to carry out operations in two strategic directions, which cut into the territory in wedges, which then, after forcing the Dnieper, grew into giant pincers to cover the Soviet troops in the central regions of the country.
There were serious flaws in the plan. As the fascist German command concluded, the plan in this version underestimated the strength of the resistance of the Soviet Army in the border zone and, moreover, was difficult to implement because of the complexity of the planned maneuver and its support. Therefore, the Nazi leadership found it necessary to improve the first version of the war plan against the USSR. Its development was continued at the General Staff of the Ground Forces under the leadership of Lieutenant General F. Paulus, and in parallel - at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command, headed by General of Artillery A. Jodl.
By September 15, 1940, Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg, head of the OKW headquarters group, presented General Jodl with a new version of the war plan against the USSR. Lossberg borrowed many ideas from the OKH plan: the same forms of strategic maneuver were proposed - inflicting powerful dissecting strikes followed by dismemberment, encirclement and destruction of Soviet Army troops in giant cauldrons, reaching the line of the lower reaches of the Don and Volga (from Stalingrad to Gorky), then the Northern Dvina (to Arkhangelsk) (656) .
New option the plan of war against the USSR had features. He allowed for the possibility of an organized withdrawal of Soviet troops from the western defensive lines deep into the country and inflicting counterattacks on the German groups stretched out during the offensive. It was believed that the most favorable situation for the successful completion of the campaign against the USSR would develop if the Soviet troops with their main forces put up stubborn resistance in the border zone. It was assumed that with such a development of events, the German formations, due to their superiority in forces, means and maneuverability, would easily defeat the troops of the Soviet Army in the border areas, after which the Soviet command would not be able to organize a planned retreat of its armed forces (657) .
According to the Lossberg project, it was planned to conduct military operations in three strategic directions: Kiev (Ukrainian), Moscow and Leningrad. On each of them it was planned to deploy: from the ground forces - an army group and from the air force - an air fleet. It was assumed that the main blow would be delivered by the southern group of armies (as it “was called in the project) from the region of Warsaw and Southeast Prussia in the general direction of Minsk, Moscow. She was given the bulk of tank and motorized formations. “The southern group of armies,” the project said, “going on the offensive, will direct the main blow into the gap between the Dnieper and the Dvina against the Russian forces in the Minsk region, and then lead the attack on Moscow.” The Northern Army Group was to advance from East Prussia through the lower reaches of the Western Dvina in the general direction of Leningrad. It was assumed that during the offensive, the southern army group would be able, depending on the situation, to turn part of its forces from the line east of the Western Dvina to the north for some time in order to prevent the retreat of the Soviet Army to the east.
To conduct operations south of the Pripyat marshes, Lossberg proposed to concentrate a third army group, the combat strength of which would be equal to a third of the German troops intended for operations north of Polesie. This group was tasked with a double enveloping strike (from the Lublin region and from the line north of the mouth of the Danube) to defeat the troops of the Soviet Army in the south and capture Ukraine (658).
Germany's allies, Finland and Romania, were involved in the war against the USSR. Finnish troops, together with German troops transferred from Norway, were to form a separate task force and advance with part of the forces on Murmansk, and with the main forces - to the north Lake Ladoga- to Leningrad. The Romanian army had to cover the German troops operating from the territory of Romania (659).
The German Air Force, under the Lossberg project, provided suppression and destruction of Soviet aviation at airfields, air support for the offensive of German troops in selected strategic directions. The project took into account that the nature of the coastal strip of the Baltic Sea precludes the use of large German surface forces against the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Therefore, the German navy was assigned limited tasks: to ensure the protection of its own coastal strip and close the exits to Soviet ships in the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it was emphasized that the threat to German communications in the Baltic Sea from the Soviet surface and submarine fleet "will be eliminated only if the Russians naval bases, including Leningrad, will be captured during ground operations. Then it will be possible to use the sea route to supply the northern wing. Previously, it was impossible to count on a reliable connection by sea between the ports of the Baltic and Finland ”(660) .
The version of the war plan proposed by Lossberg was repeatedly refined. New developments also arose, until in mid-November 1940 the OKH presented a detailed plan for the war, which initially received the code name "Otto". On November 19, Halder reported him to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Brauchitsch. He did not make any significant changes to it. The plan provided for the creation of three army groups - "North", "Center" and "South", which were to advance on Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The main attention was paid to the Moscow direction, where the main forces were concentrated (661).
On December 5, the Otto plan was presented to Hitler. The Führer approved it, emphasizing at the same time that it was important to prevent the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops and achieve the complete destruction of the military potential of the USSR. Hitler demanded that the war be waged in such a way as to destroy maximum amount forces of the Soviet Army still in the border areas. He instructed to provide for the encirclement of Soviet troops in the Baltic. Army Group South, according to Hitler, should have launched an offensive somewhat later than Army Groups Center and North. It was planned to complete the campaign before the onset of winter cold. “I will not repeat the mistakes of Napoleon. When I go to Moscow, - said the self-confident Fuhrer, - I will act early enough to reach it before winter.
According to the Otto plan, from November 29 to December 7, a war game was held under the leadership of General Paulus. On December 13 and 14, 1940, a discussion took place at the headquarters of the OKH, which, according to Halder, contributed to the development of a common point of view on the main issues of waging war against the USSR. The participants in the discussion came to the conclusion that it would take no more than 8-10 weeks to defeat the Soviet Union.
